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DISSERTATION SUMMARY 
This thesis aimed to extend the existing psychological and neural basis of social processing 
in Major Depressive Disorder. This investigation was an attempt to resolve current conflicts 
and gaps in the social affective neuroscience literature regarding social functioning in 
depression. Chapter 1 consisted of a general introduction to the current evidence-base and 
theoretical frameworks surrounding social processing more generally, and in depression 
more specifically. Chapter 2 provided an exploration of the systemic behavioural biases in 
in those with depression compared to mentally healthy individuals using a range of social, 
affective and process measures implemented across the remaining chapters. Then followed 
a behavioural and neural investigation into self-relevant social processing in depression. 
Chapter 3 described the process of memory generation implemented across  Chapter 4-6 
using a script-driven paradigm. It further discussed the ecological validity of this paradigm 
using social autobiographical memories. Chapter 4 investigated the neural and behavioural 
responses to self-relevant autobiographical memories of social rejection and social inclusion 
in individuals with depression and in healthy controls. The next two chapters discussed the 
behavioural and neural basis of social processing in depression in response to others’ 
memories of social rejection and inclusion, using traditional and novel fMRI analysis 
methodologies in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, respectively. The latter applied a novel 
intersubject correlation analysis to the same population of depressed and healthy controls as 
in Chapter 5. Then, Chapter 7 presented a future application of the script-driven imagery 
paradigm by investigating the effectiveness of different emotion regulation strategies in 
response to socially salient autobiographical memories in a population of healthy controls. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provided a general discussion bringing together behavioural and neural 
findings to provide a clearer understanding of social processing in Major Depressive 
Disorder. Current theoretical frameworks were used to guide the interpretation of these 
findings. 
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1.1 AIMS AND MOTIVATION 
This thesis aims to extend our existing understanding of the psychological and neural 
bases of social processing in Major Depressive Disorder. This investigation is an 
attempt to resolve current conflicts and gaps in the social affective neuroscience 
literature regarding social functioning in depression.  
First, it aims to challenge the long-held view that a dedicated neural network is 
selective for processing negative social emotions, such as social pain, in the human 
brain in response to being rejected or excluded. Recent suggestions indicate that this 
network may, in fact, reflect valence-independent and/or social evaluative processes. 
This debate thus requires further resolution.  
Secondly, this thesis investigates the importance of these brain networks to the 
understanding of social functioning in depression, as deficits in this domain represent 
a hallmark symptom. The literature on depression and social functioning to date has 
focused its efforts on affective biases towards negative material. There is an evident 
gap as to the processing of positive affective information, and in particular, positive 
social signals. That will be a focus of the work reported here. 
Finally, the thesis aims to marry these two lines of investigation within relevant 
theoretical frameworks of social processing in depression by extending current 
behavioural findings with neuroimaging data. The rich dynamic of complex social 
interactions will be explored by means of autobiographical memories of social 
rejection and inclusion. 
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1.2 OUTLINE 
This thesis consists of seven chapters spanning behavioural and neuroimaging 
experiments and discussions. See Figure 1.1 for an illustrated overview.  
Chapter 1 (current chapter) consists of a general introduction to the current evidence-
base and theoretical frameworks surrounding social processing more generally, and 
in depression more specifically, addressing the above questions. Chapter 2 will 
provide an exploration of the systemic behavioural biases in in those with depression 
compared to mentally healthy individuals on a range of social, affective and process 
measures implemented across the remaining chapters.  
The next two chapters consist of a behavioural and neural investigation into self-
relevant social processing in depression. Implementing a script-driven imagery 
paradigm, salient social emotions will be elicited in response to autobiographical 
memories of social rejection and inclusion experiences. Chapter 3 will first describe 
the methodology of generating memories as part of the script-driven imagery 
paradigm, before discussing its ecological validity in the context of socio-affective 
processing in depression. Then, the first neuroimaging study, described in Chapter 4, 
will investigate the neural and behavioural responses to self-relevant social cues 
derived from the generated autobiographical memories of social rejection and social 
inclusion in individuals with depression and in healthy controls,  
The next two neuroimaging chapters will discuss the behavioural and neural basis of 
social processing in depression in response to others’ memories of social rejection 
and inclusion, using traditional and novel fMRI analysis methodologies. Chapter 5 
will explore neural responses to other’s experiences of social rejection and inclusion, 
similarly using script-driven imagery. Chapter 6 applies a novel intersubject 
correlation analysis to the same population of depressed and healthy controls as in 
Chapter 5 (Hasson, Nir, Levy, Fuhrmann, & Malach, 2004a; Kauppi, Pajula, & 
Tohka, 2014). In this chapter, the degree of synchronisation across subjects is 
explored in response to listening to an extended negative and positive social narrative, 
as opposed to a series of brief autobiographical memories, as in Chapter 5.  
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Finally, the last two chapters describe future applications of the script-driven imagery 
paradigm and a general discussion of the work presented in this thesis. Chapter 7 will 
implement script-driven imagery in an emotion regulation task within healthy 
controls. This will investigate the effectiveness of different emotion regulation 
strategies in response to socially salient autobiographical memories. This provides a 
starting point for using script-driven imagery in a variety of social affective research 
areas. Then, Chapter 8 will provide a general discussion of the work presented, which 
aims to bring together both behavioural and neural findings to provide a clearer 
understanding of social processing in Major Depressive Disorder with respect to self- 
and other-relevant cues. Current theoretical frameworks will be used to guide our 
interpretation of these findings. The thesis will conclude with an outline of future 
directions for this fascinating area of research. To quote Paul Gilbert in “Depression, 
the evolution of powerlessness” (2nd edition): “That is the outline; let’s begin the 
journey.” 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Thesis Overview 
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1.3 MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER (MDD) 
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is characterised by profound and persistent feelings of low 
mood or sadness and loss of interest or pleasure in daily 
activities, which severely alter an individual’s mood, 
thoughts and behaviours. It is associated with an array 
of social, occupational and functional impairments 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5th Edition (DSM-
5), American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013). 
MDD is considered a common mental disorder with a 
global point prevalence estimated at 4.7%, elevated in 
females (5.9%) relative to men (3.8%), and a pooled 
annual incidence at 3.0%, (Ferrari et al., 2013). 
Further, lifetime prevalence rates for mood disorders, a 
group of diagnoses encompassing elevated mood (e.g. 
mania), depressed mood (e.g. MDD) and cyclical 
moods (e.g. bipolar depression) are estimated at 20.8%. 
Typically, the first onset occurs in childhood or early 
adolescence (Kessler et al., 2005). These findings 
emphasise the pervasiveness of depression as a severe 
psychological disorder which develops early with 
potentially detrimental impact. 
However, the heterogeneity of symptoms disrupting multiple domains of functioning 
highlights the difficulty in identifying MDD as a singular categorical entity. Since its first 
introduction, the diagnostic conceptualization of depression has undergone several revisions. 
This includes the introduction of the term Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) in DSM-III, 
formerly described as Melancholia (Figure 1.2), as depicted in Albrecht Durer’s masterpiece 
above. It has also seen the emergence of multiple depressive subtypes, including reactive and 
endogenous depression, as well as atypical and melancholic depression (Dowrick & Frances, 
Figure 1.2. Albrecht Durer’s 
Melancholia still resonates today as the 
object’s loneliness and sadness embodies 
our past and present conceptualisation of 
depression. 
Chapter 1 | Social Processing in Depression – Literature Review and Current Theoretical 
Models 
 
20 
 
2013). Reactive depression refers to depression that stems from situational factors, while 
endogenous depression arises in the absence of obvious environmental precipitants (Kessing, 
2007). However, epidemiological studies suggest that these subtypes occur at much lower 
prevalence rates compared to the majority of depression, which is argued to develop in the 
continuous interplay between genes and stressful experiences (Flint & Kendler, 2014).  
Since DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) diagnostic criteria for MDD include significant changes in 
weight, sleep quality or pattern, activity or energy levels, as well as feelings of guilt and 
worthlessness, difficulty in concentration and suicidality (See Appendix 1.1). A proportion of, 
but not all, symptoms need to be met to fulfil the diagnostic criteria for MDD and the list has 
not changed since the introduction of DSM-5. However, the introduction of DSM-5 allows for 
the characterization of additional symptoms without the assumption that these represent 
aetiologically true subtypes. These include severe depression with or without psychotic 
features, in partial or full remission, with anxious distress, catatonic features, perinatal, 
postpartum or atypical and mixed features (Uher, Payne, Pavlova, & Perlis, 2014). However, 
the ambiguous interpretations of these additional diagnoses in relation to MDD is still under 
discussion (Uher et al., 2014).  
A hallmark symptom of MDD is a deficit in social functioning: an inability to fulfil a variety 
of roles across diverse, complex and dynamic social contexts (Hirschfeld et al., 2000). These 
difficulties are common across several other psychiatric and developmental disorders, for 
which social competency has long been conceptualised as a key diagnostic criterion, such as 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), several anxiety disorders, and Alzheimer’s syndrome (D. 
P. Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). Moreover, risk factors, such as major negative life events 
involving social rejection, loss or failure, and in particular early adverse life stress (Heim & 
Binder, 2012; Luterek, Harb, Heimberg, & Marx, 2004; van Harmelen et al., 2010, 2014) are 
known to precipitate the onset of depressive episodes (Slavich & Irwin, 2014a; Slavich, 
O’Donovan, Epel, & Kemeny, 2010). 
In sum, depression is characterised by: (1) affective symptoms, such as persistent lowered 
mood, loss of pleasure in all or almost all activities, lack of emotional reactivity to pleasurable 
stimuli; (2) cognitive distortions, including negative thoughts about the world, self and future, 
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such as excessive or inappropriate feelings of worthlessness and guilt (Beck, 1987); (3) 
behavioural symptoms, including (social) withdrawal and inactivity, as well as psychomotor 
retardation or agitation; and (4) physical symptoms, which may include disruptions in diurnal 
variation in sleep patterns and significant weight loss or gain, and feelings of lethargy and 
tiredness. Given their high rate of occurrence, mood disorders and comorbid conditions are 
contributing to an increasing economic burden on health care systems worldwide (P. E. 
Greenberg, Fournier, Sisitsky, Pike, & Kessler, 2015; G. Miller, Chen, & Cole, 2009). This 
highlights the urgency for further research aimed at improving early detection, treatment 
interventions and relapse prevention.  
In this chapter, we will discuss the behavioural and neural findings, and gaps in the literature, 
relating to the role of social pain processing within the social brain. We have chosen this as a 
starting point because many of the social difficulties associated with depression revolve around 
narratives of social rejection. Understanding normative models, both psychosocial and neural, 
of the impact of social rejection is thereby likely to be crucial. The discussion of social pain 
will therefore be followed by a discussion of the social functioning impairments observed in 
MDD. These findings will then be discussed in the context of current theoretical perspectives. 
Then, existing intervention approaches will be reviewed before concluding with a summary 
and overarching research questions that have emerged from this review.  
1.4 A SELECTIVE NETWORK FOR SOCIAL PAIN? 
SOCIAL COGNITION 
Social cognition refers to both conscious and non-conscious psychological processes directed 
towards and derived from encounters or interactions with social agents and expressed in social 
behaviour. Impairments in social cognition are thought to result as a function of cognitive 
biases and deficits in emotion recognition at the perceptual-attentional level, and/or from an 
altered neural response to emotional stimuli (C. D. Frith & U. Frith, 2007; U. Frith & C.D. 
Frith, 2010; D. P. Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012a). On a neural level, several large-scale 
interacting networks have been implicated in social cognition (D. P. Kennedy & Adolphs, 
2012). These networks are centred around the amygdala, which is thought to respond 
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selectively to socially salient emotional cues (Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, & Tranel, 2002); the so-
called mentalising network, reflecting the brain while at rest or involved in inferring the mental 
states of others within social interactions (Baetens, Ma, Steen, & Van Overwalle, 2013; 
Centelles, Assaiante, Nazarian, Anton, & Schmitz, 2011); the so-called empathy network, 
involved in the ability to understand and share emotions experienced and/or expressed by 
another (Fan, Duncan, de Greck, & Northoff, 2011; Hein & Singer, 2008); and the so-called 
mirroring network, activated by action-observation and simulation (Barrett & Satpute, 2013; 
D. P. Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). Taken together, these large-scale integrative neural networks 
encompass the notion of a social brain, optimised for social interactions within our social world 
(Barrett & Satpute, 2013; U. Frith & Frith, 2010). These key networks and regions underlying 
social functioning are illustrated in Figure 1.3, which will hopefully guide the reader across the 
anatomical landscape of the social brain in the following sections.   
Chapter 1 | Social Processing in Depression – Literature Review and Current Theoretical 
Models 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Adapted from Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012. The Social Brain from structures (a) to networks 
(b). 
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SOCIAL PAIN DEBATE 
Central to the notion of a social brain is the continuing debate around the neural representation 
of ‘social pain’ - the experience of psychosocial pain following interpersonal exclusion, 
rejection or loss. ‘Cyberball’, a computerised ball-tossing game simulating social exclusion in 
participants by virtue of no longer receiving ball throws from two other virtual characters, has 
emerged as a paradigm of choice to study the relationship between social exclusion and self-
reported distress, both on a behavioural and neural level (Eisenberger, 2012a; Eisenberger, 
Jarcho, Lieberman, & Naliboff, 2006; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003; Masten, Morelli, & 
Eisenberger, 2011a; K. D. Williams, Yeager, Cheung, & Choi, 2012). 
In a seminal study in healthy individuals, the experience of social exclusion (relative to being 
included in the Cyberball game) was associated with increased neural activity in dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC), anterior insula (AI), and the right ventral prefrontal cortex (vPFC) 
(see Figure 1.3), correlated with increased self-reported distress (Eisenberger, 2012a; 
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003). Interestingly, the effect was observable even when 
participants were explicitly informed that the other players were not real but instead computer-
generated (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004), lending further weight to the findings. 
Crucially, the pattern of activation for social exclusion was proposed to share part of the 
underlying neural circuitry of somatosensory pain (Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 
2011), thus leading to the term social pain. The notion of a ‘social pain network’, which co-
opts the physical pain matrix, thus resonated with a populist scientific view on negative social 
interactions. In other words, the initial findings strongly supported the phenomenological 
experience that ‘rejection really does hurt’ (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003). 
However, recent meta-analytical data have raised important questions about the existing social 
pain account (S. Cacioppo et al., 2013). Within the social domain, rather than having an 
exclusive role in social pain processing, the authors suggested that the dACC and bilateral AI 
co-activation may represent a more sophisticated index of the social dynamic at play (S. 
Cacioppo et al., 2013). A more in-depth multivariate fMRI pattern analysis further revealed 
distinct affective representations for physical pain and social pain within the social domain 
beyond the previous findings described at the gross anatomical level (Woo et al., 2014). Since 
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then, the central role of the dACC and its unique contribution to social pain remains the topic 
of much debate. Critical positions include meta-analytic evidence suggesting both dorsal and 
ventral ACC involvement in social pain elicitation and subjective distress (Rotge et al., 2015). 
In addition, authors have argued that activity in dACC in response to social exclusion within 
the Cyberball paradigm may be due to expectancy violation, given the sudden shift from a 
‘baseline’ affiliative status of inclusion to the unexpected exclusion within the paradigm 
(Somerville, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2006). 
Addressing these criticisms, a non-social alternative paradigm, “Cybershape”, in which virtual 
players are replaced by neutral shapes, attempted to account for the notion of expectancy 
violation (Bolling et al., 2011). This revealed activation in ventral ACC and PCC but no 
selective activity in the social pain matrix when a shape was ‘excluded’ within the game. This 
suggests dissociable brain mechanisms for social pain and expectancy violation, with the latter 
activating a similar yet distinct region. Further, a study investigating saliency addressed the 
previous assumption that inclusion within Cyberball may represent a default state of mind. 
Based on this assumption, exclusion represents a departure from the norm and a highly salient 
event, as opposed to the less salient inclusion condition. Explicitly incorporating an 
overinclusion following the initial exclusion period revealed increased activity in dACC and 
right ventrolateral PFC during exclusion over-inclusion, suggesting a distinct role for social 
pain over inclusion (Kawamoto et al., 2012). Thus, these findings have gradually moved away 
from the notion of a selective network responding exclusively to negative social signals.  
An important shift in the literature has suggested that within the domain of social processing 
the ACC may be more generally involved in tracking the motivation of other people (Apps, 
Balsters, & Ramnani, 2012; Apps, Rushworth, & Chang, 2016; Apps & Ramnani, 2014). 
Findings in this context are based on previous animal studies, revealing a role for ACC in social 
evaluation in macaque monkeys (Rudebeck, Buckley, Walton, & Rushworth, 2005). This 
would suggest that both social exclusion and inclusion would activate the ACC, to accurately 
monitor and evaluate social information. Interestingly, a recent study provides encouraging 
support for this suggestion with a novel social feedback paradigm revealing comparable neural 
activity in the dACC and AI in response to positive and negative social evaluation (Dalgleish 
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et al., 2017). This is aided by the finding that pleasure and physical pain may also share a 
common neural substrate in the same way as exclusion and physical pain were previously 
argued to overlap (Leknes & Tracey, 2008). With a particular role for ACC in the processing 
of pleasure (McLean et al., 2009), these results point towards a potential overlap between both 
pain and positive reward processing.  
NO PAIN WITHOUT GAIN? 
In general, the reward system has long been associated with key structures in the anterior 
cingulate cortex, OFC, ventral striatum and ventral pallidum, as well as affective areas in the 
amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus and dorsal PFC (Forbes, 2011; McClure, York, & 
Montague, 2004; Murray, 2007). These areas encompass regions previously described in 
negative emotional processing without specific mention of the social component of the 
affective material. However, when specifically contrasting non-social emotional-processing to 
social emotional processing in healthy controls, findings revealed valence independent 
heightened activity in overlapping areas (Frewen et al., 2011). These included the dorsomedial 
PFC, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), precuneus, bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and 
right amygdala. These regions are crucially involved in social- and self-referential processing 
within the mentalising and empathy networks described within the social brain (see Figure 1.3). 
This suggests that social emotional information evokes comparable activity independent of 
valence in key structures previously highlighted exclusively in negative emotional processing. 
Delving deeper into the neural representation of complex positive social information, a study 
investigating early-stage romantic love asked healthy control participants to recall specific 
positive memories with their romantic partner (Aron, 2005). In doing so, the aim was to induce 
a positive emotional state of social affiliation or inclusion. Interestingly, greater length of time 
in love correlated with increased activity in right mid-insular cortex and ACC. These regions 
echo previous findings of heightened activity in the insula and ACC while experiencing the 
arguably opposite experience of social pain (Eisenberger, 2003; Eisenberger et al., 2006). Thus, 
the recruitment of higher order cognitive processes during complex social-emotional 
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processing highlights areas previously attributed to negative emotional processing alone, in 
particular, social pain processing.  
Interestingly, further drawing on the importance of the social context in processing negative 
emotions, reward processing in response to proximal social targets resulted in increased activity 
in dorsolateral PFC, bordering on the ACC (Fareri, Niznikiewicz, Lee, & Delgado, 2012). This 
is important as it highlights areas responding to inclusive signals, as well as negative social 
signals. Personal significance of social targets further modulated amygdalar responses to facial 
expressions (Vrtička, Andersson, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2008). This was further 
illustrated in a game-show inspired paradigm, in which vicarious social reward revealed 
activity in ventral striatum and ventral ACC, modulated by the perceived interpersonal 
similarity with an unknown other (Mobbs et al., 2009). Thus, it is increasingly feasible to 
assume that altered neural responses to social reward in clinical and non-clinical populations 
are modulated by distinct social contexts and perceived interpersonal closeness, or by 
extension, interpersonal rejection sensitivity. Vrticka (2012) argues that this modulation by the 
social context in social affective processing is represented within an approach-aversion system. 
This system processes positive (social approach) and negative (social aversion) information. 
The former is argued to activate the ventral tegmental area, striatum and ventral medial OFC; 
the latter the amygdala, hippocampus, insula and ACC. See Figure 1.3 for illustration. 
EMPATHIC PROCESSING OF SOCIAL SIGNALS 
The social context and perceived interpersonal closeness are further closely associated with the 
notion of empathy. Empathy for positive and negative social emotions is crucial when engaging 
with and maintaining successful social interactions and can be described as an affective state 
caused by the shared experience of emotions or affective states of another person (Hein & 
Singer, 2008). On a neural level, empathy has been associated with activity in the AI, a key 
region implicated in social pain processing (Lamm & Singer, 2010). Additionally, focal lesions 
within AI cortex were associated with decreasing discrimination accuracy and increasing 
reaction times in response to processing other’s physical pain; however, these deficits were not 
associated with lesions in the ACC (Gu et al., 2012). This is surprising given the earlier finding 
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that individuals high in trait empathy recruited affective areas including the AI and dACC in 
response to observing other’s social pain (Masten et al., 2011a). In fact, this study highlights 
the complex neural pattern that emerges with additional activity in dorsomedial PFC, medial 
PFC and precuneus. These areas are predominately associated with mentalising and theory of 
mind, as described earlier. Empathy for social pain also has been found to activate sensory-
discriminative areas, including posterior insula cortex and secondary somatosensory cortex 
(S2). However, only the subgenual cingulate cortex was recruited during empathic processing 
of both physical and social pain (Novembre, Zanon, & Silani, 2015).  
To complicate matters further, higher levels of empathic concern were also related to increased 
subgenual cingulate activity in response to evoked guilt but not in response to evoked 
compassion (Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, Garrido, & Moll, 2009). This suggests that 
empathy for social pain may be differently mediated by complex social emotions such as guilt 
and compassion, which communicate important yet qualitatively distinct abstract social values 
relating to self and other respectively. Moreover, different components of empathetic pain 
processing may be modulated by distinct affective networks, including areas within the 
bilateral AI cortex, medial cingulate cortex (MCC) and ACC (Singer et al., 2004). For instance, 
concrete compared to abstract information used to elicit empathy revealed differential results. 
Concrete information activated action and perception networks, including somatosensory 
cortices. Abstract information activated mentalising networks, including STG, precuneus, 
vmPFC, and TPJ (Fan et al., 2011; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). These findings point 
towards discrepancies in the literature as a function of different experimental paradigms.  
However, a shortcoming in the literature has been the limited evidence-base regarding the 
empathetic processing of positive emotions, such as social pleasure and social reward. While 
the anterior insula was previously implicated in the empathetic processing of negative social 
emotion, it also emerges in the empathic processing of compassion, compassion, perceived 
fairness and cooperation (Lamm & Singer, 2010). In addition, a novel study investigated 
gustatory empathic responses to negative and positive emotions by exposing individuals to 
both pleased, neutral and disgusted gustatory facial expressions. This revealed AI and adjacent 
frontal operculum (IFO) activity with self-reported empathy scores predictive of activity, 
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particularly within the gustatory IFO both during intense negative and positive information 
(Jabbi, Swart, & Keysers, 2007). This study is unique in exploring empathy in response to both 
negative and positive emotions and suggests valence-independent social affective processing. 
Finally, a study investigating emotional contagion, or the transfer of emotion within a group, 
also revealed that the observation of happy facial expressions resulted in increased activity in 
left anterior cingulate gyrus; further, both happy and sad expressions evoking activity in the 
right inferior frontal gyrus (Harada, Hayashi, Sadato, & Iidaka, 2016). These results point 
towards social affective processing that encompasses positive and negative information and 
questions previous assumptions of a selective network for processing social pain.  
SUMMARY  
In sum, the notion of a selective network for social pain has emerged as a topic of much debate 
and research within the last decade. It falls within the long-held view that “bad trumps good” 
in relation to events spanning everyday and major life events (e.g., trauma), as well as close 
other relationship outcomes, social group hierarchies and interpersonal social interactions 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). However, a further review suggests that 
autobiographical memories are an exception to this “bad trumps good” rule, with stronger 
affect fading biases for negative compared to positive memories (Walker, Skowronski, & 
Thompson, 2003). While the literature on social pain has thus proposed the exclusive co-opting 
of the dACC-AI matrix, recent results have questioned both the unique contribution of dACC, 
as well as the importance of saliency and rule violation in processing social exclusion, within 
the social domain. In addition, results have highlighted the importance of distinguishing 
between non-social and social-emotional processing, independent of valence and the 
overlapping contribution of positive social signals within the social pain network. The social 
context and personal self-relevant significance of social signals are further seen to modulate 
neural activity in key regions. This emerging evidence thus suggests a more distributed social 
network that may respond both to negative and positive social signals and demands a serious 
reconsideration of the literature on social pain processing, as well as providing insights into 
potential disruptions in depression.  
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This section has considered social signals as distinct emotional phenomena which contribute 
to social functioning of individuals. These findings may provide a viable target for 
investigating social functioning with an emphasis on the altered socio-affective profile in 
depression. However, psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the depressed socio-
cognitive profile have yet to be comprehensively examined. The next section, therefore, aims 
at exploring how social signals are processed in depression.  
1.5 HOW ARE SOCIAL SIGNALS PROCESSED IN DEPRESSION? 
Individual differences in detecting and responding to social signals in depression have 
previously been operationalised along a dimension of interpersonal rejection sensitivity, 
encompassing either enhanced or diminished sensitivity to the behaviour and emotions of 
others (Boyce & Parker, 1989). Altered sensitivity further extends to receiving social feedback, 
concern about behaviour and verbal statements of others, and fears of perceived or actual 
criticism. This may result in feelings of inadequacy, inferiority and the misinterpretation of 
social cues signalling rejection and/or inclusion, correlated with low mood (Gilbert & Allan, 
1998). Behaviourally, individuals with high rejection sensitivity tend to socially withdraw in 
an attempt to avoid actual social exclusion (Slavich & Irwin, 2014b). This gradual withdrawal 
may be especially heightened in those already experiencing social anhedonia, the loss or 
decreased interest in engaging in social activities – with depressed individuals reportedly 
experiencing more positive affect and less negative affect in the absence of other people 
(Kwapil et al., 2009). The withdrawal, loss or disconnection from social networks, as well as 
the mere threat of social exclusion, is argued to activate an immune response to adversity in 
the same way as experiencing actual physical threat or injury, thereby protecting the physical 
and emotional integrity of an individual (Slavich & Irwin, 2014b). Thus, social rejection, loss 
or failure represent key risk factors in the development and maintenance of depression (Slavich 
& Irwin, 2014a; Slavich et al., 2010).  
However, cognitive biases towards negative information as well as a reduced reactivity and 
orientation towards positive affective material (Roiser & Sahakian, 2013), difficulties in 
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emotion recognition and differential empathic processing may account for altered interpersonal 
rejection sensitivity in depression.  
COGNITIVE DEFICITS AND BIASES 
Considering cognitive processes first, a distinction is drawn in the literature between ‘hot’ 
(affect-laden) and ‘cold’ (affect-independent or neutral) cognitive processes. Hot cognition 
refers to the cognitive processing of affective material, while cold cognition relates to the 
processing of information independent of any emotional context or motivational demands 
(Roiser & Sahakian, 2013). In depression, emotion-independent ‘cold’ deficits are evident 
throughout the acute phase of the disorder across multiple domains spanning executive 
dysfunction, attention and memory (Hammar & Ardal, 2009; Snyder, Miyake, & Hankin, 
2015). This is illustrated in marked impairments in timed visuospatial attention tasks, (Hammar 
& Ardal, 2009), difficulties in attentional disengagement away from negative stimuli 
(Christopher & MacDonald, 2005) and impairments on pattern and spatial recognition memory 
(i.e. matching to sample, spatial span, spatial working memory and planning (Elliott, 1998; 
Elliott et al., 1996). Interestingly, the latter study also noted a motivational deficit in recovering 
from poor performance on the above measures. In other words, in depressed individuals, failure 
or poor performance on a task detrimentally affected subsequent performance. The authors 
argued that this may reflect heightened sensitivity to negative feedback and/or the activation 
of negative self-schema. This mirrors the notion of heightened interpersonal rejection 
sensitivity in response to negative social feedback. An alternate interpretation is that ‘cold’ 
cognition may ‘turn hot’ in the presence of depression (Roiser & Sahakian, 2013), thus leading 
to deficits traditionally associated with ‘cold’ cognitive tasks. 
Biases in hot cognition are also found across a variety of domains, including attention, 
decision-making, and various aspects of memory functioning, e.g. experience of overgeneral 
memory and intrusive memories (Baddeley, 2013; Whalley, Rugg, & Brewin, 2012). A long-
held view posits that cognitive biases favour the processing of negative affective material while 
promulgating avoidance or neglect of positive affective material, referred to frequently as a 
negative response bias (Roiser & Sahakian, 2013). A body of evidence illustrates this 
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dichotomy in the context of affective facial processing. Depressed individuals exhibit slower 
reaction times for affective face identification overall (Surguladze et al., 2004), require greater 
intensity for happy facial expressions, and lower intensity in response to sad expressions 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2006). This persists into remission (Lemoult & Sherdell, 2010). Aside 
from facial processing, cognitive impairments extend to the processing of affective body 
movements. Depressed individuals rate social interactions, depicted through point-light 
displays, as more negative and more intense for negative compared to positive interactions, 
compared to healthy controls (Kaletsch et al., 2014). However, facial expressions and body 
movements are inherently social in nature beyond their basic affective properties. It is therefore 
perhaps unsurprising that lower-order cognitive deficits observed in affective processing 
extend to higher-order deficits across multiple domains of social cognition. This includes 
theory of mind, social perception and metacognition and is present even in individuals 
experiencing their first depressive episode (Ladegaard, Roj, Videbech, & Lysaker, 2014; Lee, 
Hermens, Porter, & Redoblado-Hodge, 2012).  
ALTERED REWARD SENSITIVITY 
In addition to cognitive biases and deficits, depressed individuals exhibit blunted anticipatory 
reactivity to rewarding (positive) stimuli, but not to non-rewarding (neutral) stimuli or 
(negative) stimuli indicative of punishment (McFarland & Klein, 2009). An altered sense of 
reward derived typically from engaging in pleasurable (social and non-social) activities is 
thought to be driven by a variety of factors. These include reduced reward sensitivity, and 
impairments in reward encoding and positive reinforcement learning (Dillon et al., 2015; Huys, 
Pizzagalli, Bogdan, & Dayan, 2013; Pizzagalli, 2014), persisting beyond recovery (Pechtel, 
Dutra, Goetz, & Pizzagalli, 2013). These findings assume blunted emotional reactivity to 
positive stimuli, such as reward, in contrast to a heightened negative response bias. However, 
an alternative account suggests that depression is characterised by deficits in emotional 
reactivity independent of valence (Bylsma, Morris, & Rottenberg, 2008). Specifically, the 
emotion context-insensitivity hypothesis posits that depressed individuals exhibit overall 
lowered reactivity in response to both negative and positive information (Bylsma et al., 2008; 
Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005).  
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A further interpretation draws on differences in recognition accuracy as a function of emotional 
intensity, correlated with depression severity and difficulty in emotion regulation (Gollan, 
McCloskey, Hoxha, & Coccaro, 2010). Impaired recognition of affective social signals may 
detrimentally impact on an individual’s ability to engage with regulatory goal-directed actions. 
The occurrence, magnitude, duration, and expression of this response may encompass both 
voluntary and automatic processes (Gross, 1998; Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015), including the 
effortful cognitive reappraisal of meaning associated with an emotional context, the active 
attentional disengagement from negative stimuli, as well as labelling emotions, thereby 
reducing subjective distress (Gross, 1998; Moyal, Henik, & Anholt, 2014). In depression, 
individuals tend to engage in maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, such as rumination or 
distraction, intrinsically linked to greater symptom severity and deficits in cognitive 
processing. However, the use of emotion regulation strategies in response to social emotions 
has revealed inconsistent and limited results thus far (see Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010).  
A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE?  
In addition to emotion recognition and regulation, the ability to infer and empathise with other 
people’s mental and affective states, i.e. empathic processing, underpins our ability to engage 
in successful social interactions. In depression, there are varying accounts of empathic 
processing deficits. For instance, there are suggestions that depression is associated with 
heightened levels of empathetic stress, but reduced empathic concern and perspective-taking 
ability (Schreiter, Pijnenborg, & Aan Het Rot, 2013). These findings are frequently correlated 
with greater depressive symptom severity (Cusi, MacQueen, Spreng, & McKinnon, 2011). 
Perspective taking as a mechanism underpinning the ability to infer other’s mental 
representations is crucial to the empathic response with reduced empathic concern thus 
appearing at odds with the observation of heightened empathic stress in depression. One 
possible interpretation of these findings assumes heightened proneness to self-blaming 
emotions in depression (Green, Moll, Deakin, Hulleman, & Zahn, 2012). As such, the presence 
of self-relevant negative emotions, such as guilt, shame or self-contempt within a social 
interaction may increase empathic stress. In contrast, other-relevant social emotions, such as 
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contempt or anger may be more greatly associated with heightened empathic concern, although 
it is worth noting that these emotions can also be directed at the self (Zahn et al., 2015). As a 
result, reduced other-referential processing in depression may account for increased empathic 
stress alongside reduced other-oriented empathic concern.  
This interpretation is aided by evidence suggesting heightened self-focused attention in 
depression, with ruminative self-focused attention (SFA) previously posited as an explanatory 
factor in depressed individuals’ negative response bias (Ingram, 1990). Specifically, SFA is 
the heightened awareness for internally generated or self-relevant information as opposed to 
externally derived information. Interestingly, maladaptive SFA is associated with greater 
negative affect and negative appraisal across multiple psychopathologies, including depression 
(Beck & Clark, 1997; David M. Clark, 2001; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Spurr & Stopa, 2002). 
However, the observation of heightened empathic stress may also merely reflect prior personal 
negative experiences. In an interesting study, the heightened prior exposure to social exclusion 
in depressed individuals was associated with greater levels of empathy during subsequent 
vicarious exposure to other’s social pain of exclusion (Nordgren, Banas, & MacDonald, 2011). 
Discrepancies in the empathy literature in depression may thus reflect altered processing of 
self- (empathic stress) versus other- (empathic concern) relevant affective information. They 
also highlight the importance of the social context in which the interaction is taking place.  
NEURAL BASIS OF SOCIO-AFFECTIVE PROCESSING IN DEPRESSION 
On a neural level, affect-independent processes, such as decision-making and reasoning, are 
argued to activate large areas of the PFC, including OFC, and ACC (Phillips, Ladouceur, & 
Drevets, 2008). However, when processing negative affective information, a voxel-based 
morphometry study revealed a volumetric reduction in the OFC in depression, with increased 
functional activity in the middle frontal gyrus, caudate, precuneus and lingual gyrus 
(Scheuerecker et al., 2010). In addition, regional lesions are associated with emotional 
disturbances (see Levy & Dubois, 2006, for review). This suggests that hyperactivity in 
(extended) limbic areas, such as the ACC and OFC, may underpin abnormalities in processing 
negative affective material in depression (Miskowiak & Carvalho, 2015). In contrast, reward 
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or positive affective processing in depression revealed decreased activity in medial PFC, with 
greater activity in inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), ACC, thalamus, putamen and insula. As already 
noted, this region had previously been associated with (negative) social aversion (Forbes, 2011; 
Forbes et al., 2009; Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2003). In addition, reduced medial PFC activation  
in response to positive social interaction images extended to remitted depressed individuals, 
lending support to the notion of persistent deficits in social processing post recovery (Elliott et 
al., 2012). Thus, areas previously implicated in negative affective processing, including 
reduced prefrontal activation and increased limbic activation extend also to the processing of 
rewarding positive affect in depression.  
This imbalanced neural response in the fronto-limbic network extends to other key regions 
involved in social affective processing. The amygdala has been described as central to the 
recognition of socially salient signals within the social brain (Adolphs et al., 2002). There are 
several lines of evidence supporting this notion. Lesion studies revealed that unilateral and 
bilateral amygdala damage was associated with impairments in recognising basic and complex 
social emotions, such as shame, jealousy, or pride (Adolphs et al., 2002). Further, functional 
evidence revealed that depressed individuals’ perceived negative evaluation by others, 
expressed in feelings of shame, was associated with preferential activation in the amygdala 
(Pulcu et al., 2014). This was juxtaposed to the decreased activity observed in response to self-
referential feelings of guilt, persisting into remission. This suggests that the frame of reference, 
the comparison of self-versus other, and social context impacts on the neural processing of 
emotion in depression, and may maintain depressive vulnerability, as behavioural findings 
have previously suggested (Green, Lambon Ralph, Moll, Deakin, & Zahn, 2012; Green, Moll, 
et al., 2012). Results also suggest a negative response bias, with meta-analytic findings 
revealing heightened functional activation in response to negative facial expressions in the 
amygdala. In contrast, processing positive facial expressions evoked decreased activity in the 
amygdala, as well as the insula, parahippocampal gyrus, fusiform face area, and putamen 
(Stuhrmann, Suslow, & Dannlowski, 2011). However, the research to date may be erroneous 
in its assumption, and in particular, studies contributing to this meta-analysis, as research on 
emotional processing in depression is based almost exclusively on behavioural and neural 
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responses to negative stimuli and not comparably salient positive stimuli. This presents a clear 
gap in the literature and begs further investigation. 
SUMMARY 
In sum, individuals with depressed mood exhibit marked cognitive impairments and biases in 
neutral and affective contexts. These findings reinforce the notion of a negative response bias 
in depression, with greater cognitive attention directed towards negative information, and 
altered sensitivity towards positive signals. These deficits and biases in depression further 
extend to the recognition of socio-emotional stimuli, such as faces, gestures or even 
motivational demands within a social context. This detrimentally affects depressed individuals’ 
ability to effectively maintain or engage with adaptive goal-directed emotion regulation 
strategies. With differential empathic responses to self- and other-referential processing, an 
impaired ability to mentalise other’s emotional states might entail a greater likelihood of 
negative social experiences, and thus correlate with heightened sensitivity to social rejection. 
This raises some interesting questions, as higher-order deficits in socio-cognitive processing at 
the neural level remain to be fully explored. 
Thus, negative cognitive biases in depression are thought to be facilitated by increased 
influence from subcortical emotion processing regions in combination with reduced top-down 
regulation in prefrontal cognitive control regions. This fronto-limbic imbalance is further 
evident in social reward and positive emotion processing, indicating widespread cognitive 
impairments in depression that extend to social and emotional processes. However, 
importantly, emerging findings do not explicitly rule out a comparable pattern of activation in 
response to both positive and negative social signals. Furthermore, no research to date has 
carried the debate around a selective network for social pain into the depression literature, 
despite the obvious functional impairments in social functioning. This requires resolution, as 
underlying psychological and neural insights into social functioning can aid our understanding 
in the context of theoretical accounts of depression, the topic of the next section. 
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1.6 HOW DO THESE FINDINGS RELATE TO THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF 
DEPRESSION? 
The theoretical study of depression underwent a cognitive revolution in the 1960s (G. A. Miller, 
2003). Rather than focusing on analytical psychodynamic approaches, the literature 
experienced a shift toward the adoption of models stressing cognitive mediation. This was 
based on the emerging assumption that cognitive distortions in depression affected behaviour 
and mood, but were nonetheless open to change. This cognitive restructuring involved a 
rigorous focus on negative cognitions about the self, others and the world, frequently 
incorporating impairments from within the social domain. Notable models include the 
cognitive model of depression (Beck, 1967, 1987a; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Ellis, 
1962), Seligman's model of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1972) and its reformulation based 
on the revised attribution theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) and finally, the 
model of self-control (Rehm, 1977). These theories have made significant contributions to the 
understanding and treatment of depression. The social domain is thus the playing field of 
distorted cognitions central to the models noted above. From this, interpersonal theories of 
depression emerged, more closely investigating the contribution of social deficits to the 
development and maintenance of depression. 
EARLY INTERPERSONAL THEORIES  
Contrary to the recent (2016) referendum results voting in favour of Great Britain exiting the 
European Union, humans have commonly been ascribed with a fundamental need to belong, 
motivated by an evolutionary drive for self-preservation and survival within a hierarchy of 
needs (Maslow, 1943). This is accomplished by securing access to limited resources and 
ultimately reproductive privileges within the safety of a social group (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995). However, there exist competing theoretical accounts of how depression has evolved and 
is maintained within the context of this social dynamic. Central to all theories is the notion that 
individuals are highly sensitive to how the social world perceives and values them and that 
there is a dedicated mechanism in place to monitor and regulate human behaviour to satisfy the 
fundamental need to belong. 
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Early interpersonal theories of depression, such as Coyne’s interactional model, argued that 
feelings of low mood in depression result as a function of maladaptive social behaviour which 
in turn entails a greater likelihood of experiencing social rejection and other negative life events 
(Coyne, 1998; Segrin & Dillard, 1992). Similarly, Lewinsohn posited that depressed 
individuals lack social skills, thereby preventing the experience of positive reinforcement or 
social reward (Lewinsohn & Libet, 1972; Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973; Youngren & Lewinsohn, 
1980). This social skills deficit model argues that poor social competency and/or the lack of a 
supportive social environment are essential maintaining factors for depressive symptoms. Poor 
social skills may be attributed to a range of interpersonal characteristics associated with greater 
symptom severity in depression, for instance the automatic expression of negative facial 
expressions (e.g. contempt), less positive expressions (e.g. smiling) (Girard, Cohn, Mahoor, 
Mavadati, & Rosenwald, 2013), and impaired adaptation to other’s emotional expressions, gaze 
direction or social motivational demands (Radke, Güths, André, Müller, & de Bruijn, 2014). 
Impaired perception and understanding of interpersonal social signals and the inability to 
respond appropriately might further account for other’s appraisal of poor social skills in 
depressed individuals (Tse & Bond, 2004), in addition to the dominant negative narrative. 
SOCIOMETER THEORY 
In line with early interpersonal theories, the sociometer theory of depression relies on other’s 
appraisals. Based on our fundamental need to belong, the sociometer theory posits that self-
esteem functions as an internal monitor for interpersonal relationships, guided by perceptions 
of social rejection or acceptance that alert the individual to changes in relational status 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The ability to attend and respond to signals of social rejection and 
inclusion therefore provides a mechanism for the modification and adaptation of various social 
strategies and behaviours in response to negative and positive social feedback. On an intra-
individual level, the quality of relationships has been found to account for short-term 
fluctuations in self-esteem, while higher (and more stable) trait self-esteem was associated with 
higher quality relationships (Denissen, Penke, Schmitt, & van Aken, 2008). Moreover, low 
self-esteem, conceptualised as negative beliefs about the self, has long been posited as a causal 
risk factor for depression, with robust evidence for the predictive power of low self-esteem in 
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depression (Orth & Robins, 2013; Sowislo & Orth, 2012). Tajfel’s social identity theory 
provided early evidence for this inherent human drive to attain social affiliation and positive 
self-identity via in- versus out-group social categorization, followed by in-group favouritism 
on a par with out-group derogation, to maintain said affiliation (Tajfel, 1978). Moreover, the 
threat of social exclusion was associated with greater motivation and attention to cues 
signalling affiliation with novel social targets (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009; Maner, 
DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007). It thus reflects the motivation of individuals to 
maintain a minimum level of group affiliation and modify behaviour in response to the mere 
threat of social exclusion (Leary, 2010; Maner et al., 2007).  
However, other evidence suggests that social exclusion does not consistently motivate 
affiliative behaviour, as originally suggested by the sociometer theory. Such behaviours could 
range from reduced prosocial behaviour (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 
2007) to increased aggressive behaviour towards perpetrators of negative feedback and 
exclusion (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001). Despite being one of the early leading 
theoretical accounts of the function of self-esteem and positive self-regard in interpersonal 
interactions, the sociometer theory has not been consistently supported in the literature. Higher 
levels of self-esteem are not consistently associated with greater subjective interpersonal 
success, positive affect and even health outcomes, while objective measures of self-esteem, as 
opposed to self-reported levels, fail to predict duration or quality of interpersonal relationships 
and social success in other domains. (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). 
Moreover, the sociometer theory requires a medium degree of self-esteem contingency for an 
optimal response, in which greater variability in self-esteem fluctuations is suggestive of a 
miscalibrated system (Leary, 2004; Oosterwegel, Field, Hart, & Anderson, 2001). However, 
there was no evidence for a curvilinear relationship between the contingency of depressive 
symptoms on self-esteem (J. Sowislo, Orth, & Meier, 2014), suggesting that depression may 
be a relatively distal outcome of a potentially miscalibrated sociometer. 
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HIEROMETER AND SOCIAL RANK THEORY 
Thus, a recent challenge to the sociometer theory has come in the form of the hierometer theory 
(Mahadevan, Gregg, Sedikides, & De Waal-Andrews, 2016), which argues that it is not merely 
the fundamental need to belong that drives human behaviour, but rather the fundamental need 
for status (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). This builds on earlier work conceptualised 
within social rank theory, which provides an initial framework for understanding the 
relationship between defensive submissive strategies in depression, anxiety and social rank 
(Gilbert, 2000). The central notion of the hierometer and social rank theories derives from intra-
species competition for physical and social resources which requires the ability to negotiate, 
challenge and ascertain social status within a social hierarchy, operationalised as resource-
holding power (RHP). Furthermore, in line with the hierometer, humans are ascribed a need 
for other’s positive appraisals. This provides an extension of RHP, incorporating social 
attention holding power (SAHP) as a useful tool in maintaining affiliative status and high self-
esteem within a social hierarchy. The absence of SAHP and RHP may contribute to the 
development of depressive symptoms. In fact, low social rank has been associated with a range 
of psychopathologies, including depression, anxiety and psychosis (L. Wood & Irons, 2015). 
Submissive behaviours expressed as a result of low rank in a social hierarchy include many of 
the features described in the social skills deficit model of depression (Lewinsohn & Libet, 
1972; Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973; Youngren & Lewinsohn, 1980), including averting gaze and 
social withdrawal. The latter is perhaps better conceptualised as subordinate or avoidance 
behaviour, with depressed individuals more likely to identify themselves as more inferior than 
others when engaging in social comparisons (Allan & Gilbert, 1995). 
While sociometer theory posits a minimal threshold for inclusion as an evolutionary advantage 
for survival, hierometer and social rank theory argue that higher social rank bestows greater 
evolutionary advantage, including greater reproductive success, increased access to potential 
partners, community-wide allies and deference from competitors (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; 
von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2011). This is achieved not merely by displays of dominance, 
but also by enhancing and exhibiting an individual’s subjective value to a group within a social 
infrastructure, echoing Gilbert’s assertion of the importance of social attention holding power 
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(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). Low self-
esteem in depression is found to inhibit this assertive-affiliative behaviour; while, greater 
submissive behaviour in depression may be preferable to maintain a more stable social rank. 
This approach is the result of an evolutionary driven risk-benefit calculation, considering 
other’s rank and power relative to the self, as well as the likelihood of competitive success.  
A SOCIAL RISK HYPOTHESIS OF DEPRESSED MOOD 
Finally, the social risk (SR) hypothesis of depressed mood (Allen & Badcock, 2003) 
encompasses many of the features described both in the sociometer, hierometer and social rank 
theory, and brings together evolutionary, psychosocial, and neurobiological perspectives. For 
a schematic overview, see Figure 1.4. In the SR hypothesis, the adaptive mechanism is 
conceptualised as the social investment potential (SIP), which represents the ability of an 
individual to successfully invest in socially relevant endeavours. Or in other words, the extent 
to which an individual can maintain beneficial social relationships. An individual’s SIP is 
derived from the ratio between their perceived social value (SV), or benefit to others, and the 
perceived social burden (SB), or the cost or loss of current or potential resources to others 
because of participation in social interactions. These two components are informed by positive 
and negative interpersonal experiences, the perceived control of the social environment, 
achievement or failure of socially relevant or important goals, as well as the perceived SIP of 
others’ or competitors’, and investments gained from others. These, in turn, can be broadly 
categorised into two dimensions of interpersonal relatedness - an individual’s level of agency 
and affiliation. Thus, SIP will fluctuate according to feedback from the social world or the 
context that individuals find themselves in. For instance, if social value exceeds social burden 
in a current relationship, resulting in high estimated SIP, an individual may be motivated to 
extract more resources from social investments using opportunistic social strategies; whereas 
if social value and social burden approach equivalent states, estimated SIP decreases, thereby 
leading to less risky social endeavours and increased sense of failure and lack of agency and 
importantly, threat of exclusion. Phenomenologically, these changes in SIP may be expressed 
as fluctuations in self-esteem and status, as conceptualised within the sociometer and 
hierometer theories.  
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From an evolutionary perspective, depression is argued to evolve because of critically low SIP. 
Similar to the sociometer (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and hierometer theories (Mahadevan et 
al., 2016), the Allen and Badcock (2003) argue that to maintain affiliation within a group, 
individuals have developed a sophisticated capacity to judge their (social) value to others 
against their burden on others. Thus, the SR hypothesis places a greater emphasis on the ratio 
between an individual’s social value and social burden, reflected in fluctuations of SIP, which 
in turn affect behaviour and cognition. In depression, precipitants for low or unsatisfactory SIP 
may include negative interpersonal experiences (such as losses or rejections), as described by 
the sociometer theory (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, 2004; Slavich & Irwin, 2014b); the 
failure to achieve socially relevant goals resulting in perceived or actual loss of social status, 
as described within the hierometer theory (Mahadevan et al., 2016); or perceptions of a lack of 
control, defeat or entrapment in social situations, exemplified in the social rank theory 
(Abramson et al., 1978; Gilbert & Allan, 1998; Gilbert & Gilbert, 2003). Establishing SIP 
further relies on other-relevant processing of competitors perceived SIP, as well as social 
investments gained from others. As a result, critically low SIP motivates the individual to adopt 
a risk-averse approach to social interactions in the context of perceived threat of exclusion (see 
Figure 1.5). Once this risk-averse state of depressed mood has been activated, the individual 
tailors behaviour and cognitive process to the social context, resulting in further low mood and 
anhedonia. Socio-cognitive deficits and impairments in social functioning consistently 
observed in behavioural and neuroimaging findings in depression can be understood in the 
context of this theory.  
To illustrate, deficits in executive function (Hammar & Ardal, 2009; Snyder et al., 2015), 
attention or emotion recognition and regulation (Gollan et al., 2010; Hammar & Ardal, 2009; 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Snyder et al., 2015) may serve to maintain vigilance to indicators 
of further social threat with attentional and inferential biases to negative (social) information. 
Feelings of low mood and anhedonia serve to reduce risk-taking behaviour, which would 
require motivation to engage in (social) activities (Kwapil et al., 2009; Mitterschiffthaler et al., 
2003; Pizzagalli, 2014). Moreover, to further reduce social risk, individuals exhibit social 
withdrawal and/or signal submissiveness and subordination to conspecifics to avoid defeat or 
elicit help (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Kupferberg, Bicks, & Hasler, 2016; Slavich & Irwin, 2014a; 
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Sturman, 2011). This maintains low mood and negative views on self, others and the future. In 
addition, the model emphasises that individual SIP may fluctuate as a result of responding to 
others’ perceived heightened SIP, and others’ received investments. This is a compelling 
component, as depressed individuals may respond with complex social emotions such as guilt, 
shame or disgust relative to the social transaction (Gilbert, 2000; Green, Moll, et al., 2012; 
Pulcu et al., 2014; L. Wood & Irons, 2015). The extent of the reciprocal social transaction 
might also reflect fluctuations in levels of empathic concern and empathic stress, given the 
importance of monitoring and responding to others’ SIP relative to one’s own SIP (Cusi et al., 
2011; Feng et al., 2016; Schreiter et al., 2013; Zahn et al., 2009).  
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Figure 1.4 Adapted from Allen and Badcock, 2003, p987. Hypothesised inputs and the algorithm of 
the depression mechanism. SIP = social investment potential; Sv = social value; Sb = social burden. 
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Figure 1.5. Adapted from Allen and Badcock, 2003, p987. Hypothesised outputs and actions of the 
depression mechanism. SIP = social investment potential; Sv = social value; Sb = social burden. 
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SUMMARY 
In sum, all of the above theories build on the fundamental human need to belong and have 
posited different mechanisms by which individuals with and without depression navigate the 
social straits of group membership and hierarchy. The consensus is that successful social 
interaction requires dedicated and adaptive psychological and neural systems able to detect and 
respond to social signals of inclusion and rejection. The sociometer theory argues that self-
esteem tracks levels of inclusion and regulates affiliative behaviour with the aim of avoiding 
exclusion. The hierometer theory posits that self-esteem tracks social status or rank, and 
regulates assertive behaviour with the aim of matching or exceeding the current social status 
and social attention holding power (SAHP). Finally, the social rank hypothesis conceptualises 
depressed mood as an evolutionary rooted risk-averse motivational state, which is informed by 
the social world, social status or rank and interpersonal experiences. The risk-averse individual 
with depressed mood thus tailors behaviour and cognition to the social context to maintain his 
or her social investment potential (SIP); i.e. the ratio of perceived social value over social 
burden and clinical depression represents a case of being chronically ‘stuck’ in a state of 
perceived low SIP. Thus, the social risk hypothesis provides a compelling framework, 
encompassing concepts and assumptions held within the sociometer, hierometer and social 
rank theories. In addition, behavioural findings appear to provide strong evidence in support of 
the SR hypothesis. The neural territory, however, remains relatively uncharted. This presents 
an important gap in the literature, which the work reported in this thesis will aim to begin to 
address. 
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1.7 INTERVENTION APPROACHES 
In this section, we will briefly review current intervention approaches to the treatment of 
depression. While pharmacological interventions with antidepressant (AD) medication are 
effective in treating acute symptoms of depression, residual symptoms persist in the majority 
of patients, alongside well-documented side-effects (Adams, Miller, & Zylstra, 2008). 
Together, these make non-pharmacological approaches appealing alternatives in preventing 
further depressive episodes, especially when the risk of recurrence and chronicity in depression 
is considered. In addition, incorporating theoretical findings from above sections will aid in the 
development of existing treatment approaches, with the aim of preventing relapse. 
One of the main non-pharmacological or psychological therapies is Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) (Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979; A. Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006). 
It is based on the assumption that emotional distress and behavioural problems are maintained 
by cognitive factors: for example, distortions in core beliefs or assumptions about the world 
and the self would trigger negative automatic thoughts and lead to low mood (Hofmann, 
Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012). More, recently, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy 
(MBCT) has emerged as a third-wave approach (Kuyken et al., 2016) to preventing relapse in 
depression. MBCT is a structured group treatment that incorporates mindfulness training, such 
as body scan meditation, alongside cognitive therapy. The emphasis of MBCT on relapse 
prevention and the psychological benefits of mindfulness have garnered attention both in the 
scientific and general population (Bockting, Hollon, Jarrett, Kuyken, & Dobson, 2015; Teper, 
Segal, & Inzlicht, 2013). Increasingly, transdiagnostic (TD) perspectives have been 
successfully integrated into primary care, evidenced in recent meta-analyses comparing face-
to-face CBT to clinician-guided internet/computerised or face-to-face TD-CBT and 
mindfulness-based treatments. Results revealed that both traditional and TD approaches 
provide comparable efficacy in reducing depression and anxiety (Newby, McKinnon, Kuyken, 
Gilbody, & Dalgleish, 2015; Vollenbroek-Hutten et al., 2015). 
Despite advances in the development of cognitive-based interventions, there is still a lack of 
understanding regarding the underlying cognitive mechanisms contributing to the development 
and maintenance of depressive symptoms, as described in the previous sections (Flint & 
Chapter 1 | Social Processing in Depression – Literature Review and Current Theoretical 
Models 
 
48 
 
Kendler, 2014). Moreover, treatment outcomes do not tend to include improvements in 
cognitive processing, such as decision making and concentration, but predominantly target the 
nature of cognitions themselves: negative thoughts about the self, others and the world 
(McIntyre et al., 2013). This is despite residual deficits being commonly observed in cognitive 
domains following recovery, including attention, executive function or verbal memory  
(Godard, Baruch, Grondin, & Lafleur, 2012).  
The importance of treating cognitive deficits in MDD is particularly pertinent to social 
functioning, as psychosocial impairments in depression are largely mediated by underlying 
cognitive deficits, and not merely by poor social skills as assumed in early interpersonal 
theories of depression (McIntyre et al., 2013). However, unsurprisingly, existing 
pharmacological and non-pharmacological interventions offer only limited or short-lived 
improvements to social functioning. Moreover, measures of social functioning are seldom 
included as functional treatment outcomes (Hirschfeld et al., 2000; N. Kennedy, Foy, Sherazi, 
McDonough, & McKeon, 2007; Park, Cuijpers, van Straten, & Reynolds, 2014; Renner, 
Cuijpers, & Huibers, 2014). This was exemplified in a three-year follow-up highlighting the 
long-term debilitating impairments in social and physical functioning even after recovery from 
depressive disorders, including unipolar MDD, dysthymic disorder and bipolar depression 
(Rhebergen et al., 2010). Thus, existing interventions will improve if we can gain a better 
understanding of the social and cognitive mechanisms involved in depression.  
Noteworthy social interventions, which place a greater emphasis on social functioning include 
interpersonal therapy (IPT) and compassion focused CBT. IPT addresses current or recent life 
events, interpersonal difficulties, and symptoms (Feijo De Mello, De Jesus Mari, Bacaltchuk, 
Verdeli, & Neugebauer, 2005). It is based on the interactional principle put forward by Coyne 
(1998) and discussed above. The interactional perspective on depression emphasises the 
relationship between past personal events, the role of significant others, and depressed 
individuals’ cognitions about themselves in relation to their interpersonal context. While IPT 
shares some phenomenological characteristics with psychodynamic therapy in that it advocates 
an exploratory approach, the two are nonetheless distinct. Instead, IPT shares both the time-
limited, active approach of CBT as well as the diagnostic focus on the “here and now” with 
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some suggestions of greater efficacy in treating depression compared to CBT (Feijo De Mello 
et al., 2005). However, the therapy focuses on active changes and solutions for interpersonal 
problems, primarily acting on reactive as opposed to endogenous processes. While CBT takes 
a wider perspective on both the presenting problem and underlying aetiology, IPT arguably 
provides a more effective approach within the social domain. 
In comparing intervention approaches, there is evidence to suggest that CBT and 
psychodynamic approaches are as effective as pharmacological therapies for treating mild 
depression (Furukawa, McGuire, & Barbui, 2002). One study, in particular, suggested that 
CBT delivered in response to acute MDD can provide prolonged recovery, augmented by 
continued psychological interventions (Bockting et al., 2015). Moreover, a recent meta-
analysis of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) compared the efficacy of psychological 
interventions CBT, MBCT and IPT to treatment as usual and anti-depressant use in preventing 
recurrence. Results indicated that psychological interventions may prolong the recovery or 
reduce the risk of relapse following non-pharmacological intervention over a 12-month period. 
Nonetheless, this meta-analysis still implied greater efficacy following pharmacological 
treatment in the first instance (Biesheuvel-Leliefeld et al., 2015; Clarke, Mayo-Wilson, Kenny, 
& Pilling, 2015). However, a large RCT investigating the effectiveness of MBCT relative to 
maintenance antidepressant medication revealed no evidence that antidepressant medication 
was superior to MBCT in preventing relapse in at-risk individuals (Kuyken et al., 2015). In 
fact, both treatments showed promising positive effects on residual symptoms and quality of 
life, see also Kuyken et al. (2016). This finding contradicts previous results and is of great 
importance, given the well-documented side-effects of pharmacological medication.  
However, the relative benefits and harms of the different approaches outlined above are yet to 
be definitively established (Furukawa et al., 2002). Moreover, in cases where common 
psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological interventions fail to remedy chronic, severe or 
treatment-resistant depression, alternative interventions have been sought. These include deep 
brain stimulation (Mayberg et al., 2005), repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) 
and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) (Pagnin, de Queiroz, Pini, & Cassano, 2004; Schulze-
Rauschenbach, 2005). However, evidence for their respective efficacy remains mixed, with the 
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trade-off between therapeutic doses, treatment response and side-effects confounding the 
benefits and risks of these latter treatment approaches.  
In sum, depression is one of the most common psychiatric disorders marked by a heightened 
risk of relapse and recurrence, amplified in the presence of social risk factors. Despite 
efficacious interventions in response to acute phase depression, the residual deficits observed 
in cognitive and social functioning following recovery warrant further investigation into 
underlying mechanisms. Moreover, incorporating measures of cognitive and social functioning 
would aid in the development of more targeted treatment approaches, allowing for earlier 
identification and treatment of at-risk individuals. This would thereby alleviate the increasing 
global economic health burden that depression and other mood disorders represent today. 
1.8 SUMMARY AND QUESTIONS 
In summary, depression is a debilitating heterogeneous disorder, characterised by an early 
onset, heightened risk of recurrence and vulnerability to a range of risk factors, such as negative 
interpersonal experiences. Impairments in social and cognitive functioning are evident, with 
residual symptoms persisting beyond recovery. However, targeted interventions have yet to be 
developed which incorporate outcome measures specifically addressing the altered socio-
cognitive profile observed in MDD. Furthermore, difficulties in emotion recognition and 
regulation contribute to the systemic biases underlying affective information processing, 
observed both on a behavioural and neural level. However, the literature has largely focused 
on affective processing per se, with less regard given to the complexities of interpersonal or 
socio-affective processing that may account for deficits in social functioning in depression. 
This is despite extensive findings detailing the heightened interpersonal rejection sensitivity 
and contribution of social risk factors to the development and maintenance of depressive 
symptomology.  
Investigating social pain as a key interpersonal phenomenon represents a step in the right 
direction within the context of social functioning in depression. However, this literature has 
also revealed conflicting accounts and the debate surrounding a selective network for social 
pain continues. In addition, theoretical accounts of social processing in depression have to date 
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mostly been implemented on a behavioural level with limited evidence validating these theories 
on a neural level. In particular, within clinical populations, for whom impaired social 
processing is arguably a key deficit. Furthermore, interpersonal theories of social processing 
suggest that social impairments may be as a result of either a mis-calibrated system for tracking 
signals of inclusion and rejection, including emotion recognition, impaired understanding or 
appraisal of these social signals or dysfunctional emotion regulation, and subsequently 
maladaptive social behaviour (Segrin, 2000; Segrin, Mcnelis, & Swiatkowski, 2016; Tse & 
Bond, 2004).  
Finally, there is a lack of ecologically valid paradigms that sufficiently capture and elicit the 
dynamic real-world experiences of social rejection and inclusion or social interaction more 
generally. Despite promising findings in social affective neuroscience, experimental results 
generalise to real life only when they reflect automatic perceptual processes, and not response 
strategies adopted to satisfy the particular demands of laboratory tasks, such as Cyberball (De 
Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). One approach to this problem is the use of autobiographical 
memories. Personal memories serve as a rich repository of social interactions and have in the 
past been used to elicit salient emotions using a script-driven imagery approach. Previously 
used primarily in research on posttraumatic stress disorder, as well as in healthy control 
populations, studies have found this paradigm to be successful at eliciting highly arousing, 
intense emotions in response to recollected real-world social scenarios (Beckham et al., 2007; 
Frewen et al., 2008, 2010, 2011; Kleim, Wilhelm, Glucksman, & Ehlers, 2010; Lanius et al., 
2002, 2003; Lindauer et al., 2004). Within the social pain literature, script-driven imagery has 
been used to investigate whether re-lived experiences of social and physical pain revealing 
heightened self-reported emotional distress and heightened activity in affective pain regions 
(dACC, AI) and mentalising networks (dorsomedial PFC) during the recall of socially painful 
experiences, while recall of physical pain activates the somatosensory system (S1, S2) in the 
absence of self-reported distress (Meyer, Williams, & Eisenberger, 2015). This suggests that 
the use of autobiographical memories may serve as a useful proxy for eliciting real-world social 
emotions both in healthy and clinical populations.  
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Thus, an overall aim of this thesis is to investigate individual differences in detecting and 
responding to interpersonal emotional signals on a behavioural and neural level, as well as 
differences in cognitive mechanisms involved in emotion recognition and emotion regulation. 
This will be achieved by implementing script-driven imagery of autobiographical memories as 
an ecologically valid approach, as opposed to the existing paradigms. This method will be used 
to elicit salient social emotions providing the basis for two neuroimaging studies of social 
rejection and inclusion; these studies will be aimed at elucidating the neural mechanisms 
underlying social processing. Results will be interpreted within explanatory theoretical 
frameworks, with an emphasis on the social risk hypothesis of depression. In the future, gaining 
a richer understanding of the individual differences in processing cues of social rejection and 
social inclusion at the behavioural and neural level in depressed and non-depressed individuals 
will allow for more focused interventions. This is of relevance for therapeutic success given 
the high frequency of residual symptoms in the socio-cognitive domain, with poor social 
functioning indicative of future relapse into depressive episodes. In the next chapter, we will 
address general issues and procedures pertaining to all experimental investigations presented 
in this thesis, as well as describing the first research study on systemic biases in social, 
affective, and cognitive processing in depression. 
  
Chapter 2 | Systemic Biases in Social, Affective and Cognitive Processing in MDD 
 
53 
 
 SYSTEMIC BIASES 
IN SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND 
COGNITIVE PROCESSING IN 
MDD 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 | Systemic Biases in Social, Affective and Cognitive Processing in MDD 
 
54 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to outline general issues and procedures pertaining to the work presented in 
this thesis as a whole, including recruitment procedures, ethical considerations, and the general 
statistical approach to the data. These considerations can be applied to the data presented across 
the remaining chapters, and where different, modifications will be presented. In addition, this 
chapter aims at investigating systemic biases in social affective and cognitive processing in 
MDD and remitted depressed participants based on a battery of social, affective and process 
measures administered across all samples presented in this thesis. This will serve to validate 
the diagnostic screening and recruitment process using established measures of affective and 
cognitive processing, as well as validating existing social measures in a sample of depressed, 
remitted depressed and healthy controls.  
Two of the most well-known measures of low mood and anxiety, the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), are well suited for assessing symptom 
severity, and allow for the identification of residual affective symptoms in remitted depressed 
individuals (Beck, Guth, Steer, & Ball, 1997; Lasa, Ayuso-Mateos, Vázquez-Barquero, Díez-
Manrique, & Dowrick, 2000; Osman et al., 2002; Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004). However, as 
outlined in the general introduction in Chapter 1, depression is further characterised by 
impairments in social functioning attributed to underlying socio-affective and cognitive deficits 
(Hirschfeld et al., 2000; N. Kennedy et al., 2007; Ladegaard et al., 2014), including reduced 
emotional awareness as one of five facets of mindfulness (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, 
& Toney, 2006) and difficulty in emotion regulation (Aldao et al., 2010; Bardeen, Fergus, & 
Orcutt, 2012; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2006).  
Furthermore, central to the work presented in this thesis, social rejection is posited as one of 
the strongest risk factors for developing depression, with early interpersonal difficulties viewed 
as potential psychosocial antecedents (Heim & Binder, 2012; Luterek et al., 2004; Slavich & 
Irwin, 2014b; Slavich et al., 2010; van Harmelen et al., 2010, 2014). In addition, sensitivity to 
social rejection is associated with symptom severity in social anxiety (Harb, Heimberg, Fresco, 
Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2002) and depression (Luty, Joyce, Mulder, F. Sullivan, & McKenzie, 
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2002) and is associated with greater neuroticism (Wilhelm, Boyce, & Brownhill, 2004) and 
higher rates of internal life stressors (Liu et al., 2014).  
The importance of identifying biases in social processing in relation to symptoms of anxiety 
and depression is conceptualised within the social rank theory (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert 
et al., 2007) and social risk (SR) hypothesis of depressed mood (Allen & Badcock, 2003), 
outlined in more detail in the general introduction. According to these theories, depressed mood 
is argued to develop as an evolutionary adaptive coping mechanism to reduce agonistic social 
interactions. In striving to gain access to shared resources, differential behavioural strategies 
might be advantageous when in competition with others. In other words, maintaining low social 
rank could be argued to be evolutionarily advantageous as opposed to challenging the status 
quo. This includes appeasing aggression or threats by a more dominant other, and inhibiting 
socially risky behaviour in response to the perceptions of defeat, inferiority or low social rank. 
The social rank theory thus proposes an internal gauge, which determines the likelihood of 
social defeat or success based on incoming social cues, with the hierometer further advocating 
a need for positive self-regard. Similarly, the SR hypothesis (Allen & Badcock, 2003) 
specifically argues that depressed mood is the result of critically low social investment 
potential, which represents the ratio of perceived social value and social burden. Moreover, 
impairments in social processing in remitted depressed may point towards a ‘learned “lower 
rank” mind-set’, in which the internal gauge of social rank or critically low SIP, once initiated, 
motivates (mal)adaptive behaviour even in the absence of current low mood. Thus, entrenched 
engagement in (mal)adaptive behaviours, such as greater submissiveness and subordinate 
behaviours aimed at restoring optimal social investment potential (SIP) or rank, now heighten 
the risk of chronic depression or depressive relapse.  
Social comparison encapsulates this tendency for monitoring our social position within a 
hierarchy (Giacolini et al., 2013; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Terol, Lledo, Quiles, & Martin-
Aragon, 2015). It is argued that such comparison motivates affiliative behaviour, including 
greater submissiveness and involuntary subordination, to maintain a stable social position 
within the hierarchy rather than risk expulsion (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Gilbert et al., 2007; Leary, 2004). Evidence in support of this notion derives from studies 
observing changes in behaviour when threatened with social exclusion, such as increased 
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attention to positive social targets and motivation to seek novel sources of affiliation (DeWall 
et al., 2009; Maner et al., 2007). It does not, however, fully explain findings observing 
decreases in prosocial behaviour and increased aggression towards both former in and current 
out-group members (Twenge et al., 2007, 2001). 
Previous work aimed at identifying social biases in affective and social processing outlined in 
these theories has led to the development of an array of measures targeting known areas of 
social impairment in depression. These include assessing for social comparisons, such as 
feelings of low rank (Allan & Gilbert, 1995), but extend to submissive behaviour (Allan & 
Gilbert, 1997), striving to avoid inferiority (Gilbert et al., 2007), and involuntary subordination 
(Sturman, 2011). These measures are central to understanding social impairments in clinical 
disorders, with previous studies focusing on perceptions of low social rank associated with 
depression, anxiety (L. Wood & Irons, 2015), paranoid thoughts (Freeman et al., 2005), low 
self-esteem and perceived stigma in adults with intellectual disability (Paterson, Mckenzie, & 
Lindsay, 2012). Insecure striving to avoid inferiority is further associated with fear of rejection, 
submissiveness and depressive symptoms, mediated by external shame and anxious attachment 
in both healthy and depressed populations (Gilbert et al., 2007; Gilbert, McEwan, Bellew, 
Mills, & Gale, 2009). In young adults, self-harm and depression are further found to causally 
relate to insecure striving (K. D. Williams, Gilbert, & McEwan, 2009), which in turn moderate 
low self-perception of rank and importance of thinness in an eating disordered population 
(Ferreira, Gouveia, & Duarte, 2013). Secure non-striving and acceptance are further negatively 
associated with appearance anxiety, fear of rejection and depressive symptoms, again, in an 
eating disordered sample (Bellew, Gilbert, Mills, McEwan, & Gale, 2006). Finally, a measure 
of involuntary subordination was developed with the aim of encompassing previous measures 
of negative social comparison, feelings of inferiority, and submissiveness, revealing high 
correlations with self-criticism, neuroticism, and low self-esteem (Sturman, 2011). The 
involuntary subordination scale predicts short-term changes in social anxiety symptoms, and 
mediates the relationship between defeat and depressive symptoms in healthy undergraduate 
students (Sturman, Rose, McKeighan, Burch, & Evanico, 2015), but has not been further 
validated in samples of depressed or remitted depressed individuals per se, despite defeat and 
entrapment in particular being associated with symptoms of depression, anxiety, suicidality 
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and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Siddaway, 2013), and increased suicidal ideation 
amongst men who have sex with men (Li et al., 2016).  
In addition, these deficits in social functioning persist beyond recovery (Elliott et al., 2012; N. 
Kennedy et al., 2007; Pechtel et al., 2013), with biases in social affective processing in remitted 
depressed individuals previously described in reward sensitivity (Pechtel et al., 2013), and 
emotion recognition and regulation (Lemoult & Sherdell, 2010). In fact, greater self-reported 
difficulties in emotion regulation in recovered populations have been highlighted as a risk 
factor for future depressive episodes (Ehring, Fischer, Schnülle, Bösterling, & Tuschen-
Caffier, 2008; Muntingh et al., 2011). However, the literature has yet to fully examine the 
extent of residual social impairments in remitted depressed individuals. Identifying residual 
deficits in social processing on specific measures of submissive behaviour, involuntary 
subordination or interpersonal rejection sensitivity in remitted depressed would therefore point 
towards potential risk factors from within the social domain specifically. This presents an 
important gap that needs addressing, as partial remission or the presence of residual symptoms 
in individuals with a past history of depression presents an important problem given the high 
rate of relapse and chronicity, with recurring depressive episodes further contributing to the 
economic and mental health burden (P. E. Greenberg et al., 2015; Paykel, 2008).  
Implementing the measures of social processing outlined above in samples of depressed and 
remitted depressed individuals may therefore shed important light on how impairments in 
perceived social status and subsequent defensive behaviours negatively impact the ability to 
form or maintain positive social relationships within social hierarchies, even in the absence of 
marked current depressive symptoms. Few studies have directly administered the existing 
measures in clinically depressed samples, and much less often in remitted depressed 
participants, despite significant overlap in social deficits across psychopathologies (D. P. 
Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). However, a recent review highlighted the difficulty in accounting 
for potential biases when implementing subjective measures of social functioning per se, due 
to the heterogeneity of comparable measures across different studies (Santini, Koyanagi, 
Tyrovolas, Mason, & Haro, 2015). Reducing the variability of subjective social measures by 
identifying meaningful underlying constructs may help to address this heterogeneity and 
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identify functional treatment outcomes, alongside targeting well-established symptoms of 
depression, anxiety and difficulties in emotion dysregulation. 
In sum, this chapter aims to directly test the hypothesis that depression is characterised by 
systemic biases in social and affective processing compared to the presentation of healthy 
controls, as well as seeking to further investigate the pattern of residual social impairments in 
remitted depressed individuals, using the battery of measures outlined above. This serves to 
further validate and replicate findings from existing measures assessing submissive behaviour, 
subordination, striving to avoid insecurity, interpersonal sensitivity, mindfulness and emotion 
dysregulation. Following the outline of general issues and procedures pertaining to the work 
presented in this thesis, the array of social, affective and process measures, administered across 
all studies, will be outlined and results presented towards the end of this chapter. 
The hypotheses for the present study were as follows; 
HYPOTHESES 
• Depressed individuals will show significant impairments on affective, social and 
process measures, compared to remitted depressed and healthy controls 
• Remitted depressed individuals will be impaired on social and process measures 
relative to controls and to depressed individuals, and on affective measures compared 
to depressed individuals but not to controls. 
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2.2 GENERAL METHODS AND MATERIALS USED ACROSS ALL STUDIES 
PARTICIPANTS  
Forty-one participants experiencing a current Major Depressive Episode (MDE) and meeting 
criteria for a diagnosis of MDD (31 female; 37.12±13.63 years), 82 healthy controls who had 
never met criteria for MDD (47 female; 33.54±15.35 years) and 27 remitted depressed 
participants who had previously experienced at least one previous MDE but currently did not 
meet diagnostic criteria for MDD (19 female; 38.73±14.92 years) were recruited into the 
studies described within this thesis. These participants also comprise the samples for the current 
study described in this chapter.  
RECRUITMENT 
Healthy control participants were recruited from the department mainstream participant panel 
at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (CBU) and the University of Cambridge. The 
mainstream participant panel volunteers had previously been recruited via local advertisement, 
through the MRC CBU website, open days, science fairs and word-of-mouth. Healthy control 
participants had no history of significant mental health problems, such as depression or anxiety. 
Depressed participants were recruited from the research group depression panel and met 
diagnostic criteria for current MDD. The depression panel contains the details of individuals 
who had previously agreed to take part in research conducted by the research group on 
cognition, emotion and mental health at the MRC CBU and who had previously met criteria 
for a diagnosis of MDD in a structured clinical interview. Remitted depressed participants were 
recruited from the same depression panel, had experienced at least one previous Major 
Depressive Episode (MDE), but did not currently meet diagnostic criteria for MDD.  
Participants were not eligible for the depression research panel if they had a diagnosis of 
psychosis, bipolar disorder, current or past drug or alcohol problems, or a personality disorder. 
Moreover, the co-occurrence of multiple psychological disorders (comorbidity) is a common 
problem when recruiting participants in social affective neuroscience, with 7.7% and 17.3% 
lifetime prevalence for 2 or more and 3 or more disorders, respectively (Kessler et al., 2005, 
2012). In line with the existing literature, it would be unfeasible to exclude all participants with 
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additional diagnoses if these are not thought to impact largely on, for instance, the phenomenon 
of interest. Thus, participants with common co-morbidities (past or present) were not excluded. 
See Table 2.1. 
All participants were aged between 18-65, were right-handed, were native or near-native 
English speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no self-reported hearing 
impairments, as the tasks required auditory presentation of stimuli. Additional exclusion 
criteria included the presence of head injury or neurological impairments, as this may have 
confounded the interpretation of the neuroimaging findings. All recruited participants 
completed either neuroimaging experiments (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6), or the 
behavioural experiment (Chapter 7). Full demographics for all participants can be found in 
Table 2.5, with demographics for each specific study presented in each respective chapter. For 
all behavioural studies, participants were paid an honorarium to reimburse them for their time 
at a rate of £6/hour (minimum £12 guaranteed) and £2.50-£3 to cover travel expenses (rate 
depending on living proximity from the research unit). This was anticipated to amount to a 
maximum of 2 hours for each subject (£12 per subject) plus travel expenses. For all studies 
involving neuroimaging, participants were paid £10/hour (minimum £20 guaranteed) and 
£2.50-£3 to cover travel expenses. This was anticipated to amount to £20 per subject plus travel 
expenses. This was the standard method of recruitment applied across all studies contained 
within this thesis which had previously been approved by the Cambridge Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee (CPREC) (Appendix 2.1). 
MEDICATION USE ACROSS ALL STUDIES 
Identifying significant abnormalities in functioning on a behavioural and neural level within 
clinical samples that are generalizable, relies on recruiting a representative sample. However, 
the heterogeneity of symptoms in depression and sample selection issues more generally at 
times impede the generalisability of the findings (Hughes-Morley, Young, Waheed, Small, & 
Bower, 2015). While this thesis aimed to recruit a representative sample, it is important to note 
the potentially limited representativeness given the effects of medication use when interpreting 
neuroimaging findings. Having said this, 44% of the MDD group reported currently using 
medication, compared to 26% of the remitted depressed sample. The use of medication and 
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range of dosages within the remitted depressed and currently depressed sample are presented 
below. Healthy control participants indicated no current or past use of antidepressant 
medication (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.1  
Co-morbidities in MDD participants across studies  
Co-morbidity Presence Chapter 4 Chapter 5 & 6 Total 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Current 1 6 7 
Past 0 1 1 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Current 1 1 2 
Past 0 2 2 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Current 1 1 2 
Past 0 1 1 
Social Anxiety Disorder Current 1 1 2 Past 0 1 1 
Panic Disorder Current 1 1 2 Past 0 2 2 
Eating Disorder Current 0 0 0 Past 1 1 2 
Total Current 5 10 15 Past 1 8 9 
 
Table 2.2  
Medication use in MDD and remitted depressed across all studies 
 Remitted (N=27) 
MDD  
(N = 41) Total  
Min Dosage 
(mg) 
Max Dosage 
(mg) 
Citalopram 3 3 6  10 40 
Venlafaxine 2 2 4  150 375 
Fluoxetine 2 2 4  20 60 
Mirtazapine 0 4 4  15 30 
Sertraline 0 3 3  100 100 
Zopiclone 0 1 1  3.75 3.75 
Propranolol  0 1 1  30 30 
Other 0 2 2  - - 
Total 7  18 25    
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ACROSS ALL STUDIES 
Much of the research contained within this thesis involved the recall or presentation of negative 
memories, a procedure which may elicit negative emotions. To reduce the likelihood that 
participants may recall overly upsetting personal memories as part of the script-driven imagery 
procedure outlined in the following chapters, participants were asked to identify memories 
which feel personally relevant but which they would feel comfortable thinking or talking about 
in the study context. The recall of negative memories was preceded and followed in fixed order 
by neutral and positive memories respectively to counteract any negative emotion and ensure 
mood repair prior to the end of the experiments. The use of questionnaires and measures 
enquiring about emotions including mood and stress symptoms may also be difficult for some 
participants, particularly those who are experiencing low mood. Nonetheless, script-driven 
imagery is a widely-used procedure for symptom provocation in PTSD research with no long-
term negative outcomes reported in clinical and control populations (Lanius et al., 2006). In 
the present thesis, no trauma-related memories were probed, with social memories being much 
lower in valence and arousal.  
These studies were conducted under the supervision of on-site clinical psychologists (Dr. Tim 
Dalgleish, Dr Caitlin Hitchcock), in case any participant became distressed or other clinical 
issues arose. In the unlikely case that a participant did become distressed, we had a protocol in 
place to ensure their wellbeing. A full description of this protocol is included in Appendix 2.6. 
In brief, in case of distress the participants were provided with a safe space, were offered a 
confidential consultation with a clinical psychologist, were ensured safe transport home and 
were followed up if necessary. In the event of clinical issues arising from the structural MRI 
data, the following summarised procedure was put in place with a full description of this 
protocol found in Appendix 2.7. In the event that a significant abnormality was noticed by the 
qualified MRI operator, this was brought to the attention of the CBSU medical monitor, who 
was responsible for acting on this information. If a volunteer later contacted a researcher to ask 
about possible abnormal findings, the researcher only took their contact details, and then told 
the medical monitor and radiographers, one of whom contacted the volunteer if requested. The 
behavioural data were stored in a locked filing cabinet and imaging data continue to be stored 
on the secure server located at the CBU which only the investigators have access to. The 
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information on the computers is linked to personal information only via ID number and is fully 
encrypted. The data will be retained for a minimum of 5 years. Data collected during the study 
were stored and used in compliance with the UK Data Protection Act. 
For all studies, participants were told they were participating in projects investigating the 
processing of social emotions in response to autobiographical memories of rejection and 
inclusion memories. In Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 participants were explicitly 
informed that the studies involve fMRI. No information was withheld that was not made 
available to participants in the respective information sheets detailed in  Appendix 2.4 (Chapter 
4 and Chapter 7), and Appendix 2.5 (Chapter 5 & Chapter 6). Participants were fully debriefed 
at the conclusion of the respective study with ample opportunity to ask questions (see Appendix 
2.8). To ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of participants, participant numbers were 
allocated to each person, and data were recorded in a database according to this number (i.e., 
not participants’ personal information). The analysis between groups depends on average 
differences between numerical scores and statistical parametric maps on the imaging data, as 
do publication of results, thereby protecting the anonymity of participants. 
CLINICAL INTERVIEW AND SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND PROCESS SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
USED ACROSS ALL STUDIES 
Across all studies, a comprehensive diagnostic interview and a battery of social, affective and 
process self-report measures were undertaken with respect to all participants, preceding and 
following participation in the studies outlined in this thesis. These are detailed below. The 
behavioural data obtained from these measures form the basis for the research study described 
in this chapter. 
AFFECTIVE AND DIAGNOSTIC MEASURES 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Axis-IV Disorders (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, 
Gibbon., & Williams, 1996). 
The SCID-I is a standardised diagnostic interview schedule designed to assist clinicians and 
researchers in making reliable DSM-IV Axis I psychiatric diagnoses. The SCID-I involves a 
series of questions concerning current and past symptoms of a range of psychological disorders 
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and usually takes between ½ and 1 hour. The SCID is only administered by experienced 
research staff who have undergone comprehensive SCID training. The mood module is used 
to verify whether participants are currently experiencing low mood of clinical severity or not. 
See Appendix 2.9. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II: Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996).  
The BDI-II is a 21-item multiple-choice self-report measure assessing depressive 
symptomatology including low mood. It is one of the most widely used instruments for 
measuring the severity of depression with good internal consistency, test-retest reliability and 
convergent validity with standardised clinician assessments (Beck et al., 1997; Richter, 
Werner, Heerlein, Kraus, & Sauer, 1998; Storch et al., 2004), enabling comparison across 
studies. The internal consistency has been estimated at around 0.9, with retest reliability 
ranging from 0.73 to 0.96, as well as high correlations between BDI-II and the BDI-I (Wang 
& Gorenstein, 2013). The BDI-II is widely used as an assessment tool by health care 
professionals and researchers in a variety of settings and is well-suited as a screening 
instrument for depression in the general population sample, with high predictive diagnostic 
value (Lasa et al., 2000). As this thesis included the recruitment of remitted and currently 
depressed individuals, the BDI was used to assess current and residual symptoms of depression. 
See Appendix 2.10. 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988).  
The BAI is a 21-item self-report measure assessing current or state anxiety symptomatology. 
Like the BDI-II, the BAI it is widely used in research and has well-established psychometric 
properties, reliability and validity (Osman et al., 2002), including the ability to assess the 
severity of anxiety in adult and adolescent populations (Muntingh et al., 2011) and a relatively 
good ability to discriminate anxious from depressive presentations (Beck et al., 1988). 
Participants indicate the extent to which they have experienced anxiety symptoms over the 
previous week. Scores on the BAI indicate change in mood symptoms over time. As this thesis 
recruited MDD and remitted depressed individuals, the BAI was used to assess the presence of 
anxiety symptoms in addition to current depressive symptoms assessed by the BDI-II. 
See Appendix 2.11. 
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Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS: Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).  
The PANAS is a 20-item mood scale with good internal consistency and convergent validity 
(Watson et al., 1988) which can be used to measure state positive and negative affect, 
respectively. The items are derived from a principal components analysis of Zevon and 
Tellegen’s (1982) mood checklist; Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which they have 
experienced each particular emotion within a specified time period, with reference to a 5-point 
scale. The scale points are: 1 ‘very slightly or not at all’, 2 ‘a little’, 3 ‘moderately’, 4 ‘quite a 
bit’ and 5 ‘very much’. The PANAS is shown to have high internal consistency, and good test-
retest reliability. Factorial analysis confirmed independent loading of the adjectives on the two 
scales. A longer, extended version also assesses specific, embedded emotional states such as 
fear, joviality, shyness, attentiveness and serenity (Watson & Clark, 1994). The PANAS was 
used in this thesis to check that participants’ baseline emotional state did not vary significantly 
across individuals within each group, as well as to compare participants’ baseline emotional 
states between groups over the last week. See Appendix 2.12. 
PROCESS MEASURES 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation (DERS: Gratz, K. L., & Roemer, L., 2004). 
The DERS is a brief, 36-item, self-report questionnaire designed to assess multiple aspects of 
emotion regulation and dysregulation. The DERS items reflect difficulties within the following 
dimensions of emotion regulation: (a) awareness and understanding of emotions (e.g., “I pay 
attention to how I feel” [reversed]); (b) non-acceptance of emotions (e.g., “When I’m upset, I 
feel guilty for feeling that way”); (c) the ability to engage in goal-directed behaviour (e.g., 
“When I’m upset, I have difficulty concentrating”) and refrain from impulsive behaviour (e.g., 
“When I’m upset, I become out of control”), when experiencing negative emotions; and (d) 
access to emotion regulation strategies perceived as effective (e.g., “When I’m upset, it takes 
me a long time to feel better”). Participants rate how often statements such as “I feel at ease 
with my emotions” apply to them on a 5-point scale (1=‘almost never’, to 5=‘almost always’). 
The scale demonstrates good psychometric properties, with good internal consistencies (α’s > 
.80) and stabilities (ρtt’s > .69) across its subscales and significant correlations with other 
emotion regulation measures (Ehring et al., 2008; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). As greater 
difficulties in emotion regulation contribute to generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) (Roemer et 
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al., 2013), borderline personality disorder (Gratz et al., 2006), and PTSD symptoms (Tull, 
Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer, 2007), this well-established measure was used to further assess 
the presence of emotion regulation deficits in depression. See Appendix 2.13. 
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ: Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Hopkins, 
J., Krietemeyer, J., & Toney, L., 2006).  
The FFMQ is a 39-item measure based on a factor analytic study of five independently 
developed mindfulness questionnaires, encompassing the five facets of observing, describing, 
acting with awareness, non-judging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner experience. 
Participants are asked to indicate what ‘best describes your own opinion of what is generally 
true for you’ on a 5-point scale (5 = Always or Very Often True to 1 = Never or Very Rarely 
True). This measure was used to assess aspects of mindfulness in healthy controls in Chapter 
7 only, as the study involved comparing emotion regulation strategies based on mindfulness 
principles. See Appendix 2.14.  
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg, et al., 2003).  
The SUIS is a 12-item questionnaire aimed at measuring the spontaneous use of imagery during 
daily life. Participants use a 5-point scale to rate the degree to which each item is appropriate 
for them (from “never appropriate” to “always completely appropriate”). A sample item is: 
“When I think about visiting a relative, I almost always have a clear mental picture of him or 
her”. A total score can be calculated by summing the 12 item scores, resulting in a total score 
ranging from 12 to 60 with higher scores indicating more use of mental imagery in everyday 
life. As this thesis implements a script-driven imagery paradigm, which relies on using vivid 
imagery of autobiographical memories, this measure allows for between-group comparisons of 
baseline differences in everyday use of imagery. See Appendix 2.15. 
National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982).   
The NART consists of participants reading aloud 50 difficult-to-pronounce words and is scored 
based on pronunciation errors made. The NART is widely used in clinical and research settings 
to estimate a person’s premorbid level of intellectual ability as a function of verbal intelligence, 
in neuropsychological research (Bright, Jaldow, & Kopelman, 2002). In addition, Nelson and 
O’Connell (1978) showed the NART to be a robust predictor of premorbid levels on the 
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Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS, Wechsler, 1955), suggesting that it has high 
construct validity as a measure of general intelligence, even when used in populations with 
neurological or psychiatric disorders (Crawford, Stewart, Cochrane, Parker, & Besson, 1989; 
McGurn et al., 2004). A study comparing participants’ NART scores at age 80 with intelligence 
scores collected at age 11 demonstrated the robustness of the NART at estimating verbal IQ 
across the lifespan (McGurn, et al., 2004). In the present thesis, the NART was used to measure 
verbal IQ and to enable matching across groups. See Appendix 2.16. 
SOCIAL MEASURES 
Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure (IPSM: Boyce, P., & Parker, G., 1989).  
The IPSM is a 36-item measure assessing excessive sensitivity to the interpersonal behaviour 
of others, to social feedback and to (perceived or actual) negative evaluation by others. The 
IPSM generates a total score as well as five sub-scale scores: interpersonal awareness, need for 
approval, separation anxiety, timidity and fragile inner-self. Its reliability is demonstrated by 
high internal consistency in two separate groups, and by stability in scores over time in a non-
clinical group: in a clinical sample of depressed patients and a non-clinical student sample, 
internal consistency estimates for the total score were 0.86 and 0.85, respectively, and a six-
week retest reliability of 0.70 in the student sample. Moreover, this measure has separately 
been implemented in social anxiety (Harb et al., 2002) and depression (Luty et al., 2002). 
Moderate to high correlations with neuroticism (r=0.66), self-esteem (r=0.39), and a low 
correlation with emotional arousability (r=0.11) highlight the convergent and divergent validity 
of the IPSM (Harb et al., 2002). The 36 items are completed on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1= 
‘very unlike me’, 2=’moderately unlike me’, 3=’moderately like me’, 4=’very like me’). As 
this thesis is investigating individual differences in responding to experiences of social 
rejection and inclusion on a neural level, this measure provides a baseline measure of sensitivity 
to social signals and allows for group comparisons. See Appendix 2.17. 
Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire (ISQ: Sturman, E. D., 2011).  
The ISQ is a 32-item questionnaire designed to interrogate involuntary subordination, indexing 
tendencies of feeling stuck (entrapment), defeated, inferior, and seeing the self as submissive. 
Involuntary subordination may be adaptive in species that compete for resources as a 
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mechanism to switch off fighting behaviours when loss is imminent (thus saving an organism 
from injury). In humans, major depression is thought to occur when involuntary subordination 
becomes prolonged. In healthy individuals, scores on the involuntary subordination scale are 
found to predict short-term changes in social anxiety symptoms, and mediates the relationship 
between defeat and depressive symptoms (Sturman et al., 2015). This measure has 
predominantly been implemented in healthy undergraduates (Sturman et al., 2015), PTSD 
populations (Siddaway, 2013), and amongst men who have sex with men (Li et al., 2016), but 
not with depressed samples per se. As this thesis involves the recruitment of currently and 
remitted depressed samples, this measure was included to further validate its use within clinical 
groups. See Appendix 2.18. 
Striving to Avoid Inferiority Scale Part I and Part II (SAIS-I/II: Gilbert, et al., 2007).  
Part I of the SAIS is a 31-item scale to measure beliefs about striving to compete to avoid 
inferiority (e.g., ‘If I don’t strive to achieve I’ll be seen as inferior to other people’) and feelings 
of acceptance by others whether one succeeds or fails (e.g., ‘Others will accept me even if I 
fail’). Part II of the SAIS focuses on the reasons for people feeling under pressure to compete 
and avoid inferiority. Participants respond to statements on a 10-point scale ranging from ‘don’t 
agree’ to ‘completely agree’. Parts I and II of the SAIS have shown good reliability with 
Cronbach’s alphas of .84 - insecure striving; .69 - secure non-striving; .84 - losing out; .80 - 
overlooked and .79 - rejection (Gilbert et al., 2007). This measure has been implemented in 
healthy and depressed populations (Gilbert et al., 2007, 2009), young adults with depressive 
symptoms g (K. D. Williams et al., 2009), and eating disordered populations (Bellew et al., 
2006; Ferreira et al., 2013). This thesis aimed to further validate this measure in depressed and 
remitted depressed samples. See Appendix 2.19. 
Submissive Behaviour Scale (SBS: Allan, S. & Gilbert, P., 1997).   
Derived from the work of Buss and Craik (1986), the Submissive Behaviour Scale was 
developed by Gilbert and Allan (1994) and refined by Allan and Gilbert (1997). It consists of 
16 examples of submissive behaviour (e.g. “I agree that I am wrong even though I know I’m 
not”) which people rate as a behavioural frequency (from 0 = Never to 4 = Always). The scale 
has good reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89, and four-month test-retest reliability of r 
= .84, p < .001 with a student population (Gilbert et al., 1996). This scale has predominantly 
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been used in studies examining social comparison (social ranking) and evolutionary theory 
(Gilbert and Allan, 1994), and has been previously validated in a limited number of depressed 
samples (O’Connor, Berry, Weiss, & Gilbert, 2002). This thesis aimed to further validate this 
measure in depressed and remitted depressed samples. See Appendix 2.20. 
Social Comparison Scale (SCS: Allan, S. & Gilbert, P., 1995).  
The SCS was developed by Allan and Gilbert (1995) to measure self-perceptions of social rank 
and relative social standing. This scale uses a semantic differential methodology and consists 
of 11 bipolar constructs. Participants are required to make a global comparison of themselves 
in relation to other people and to rate themselves on a ten-point scale. The 11-items cover 
judgements concerned with rank, attractiveness and how well the person thinks they ‘fit in’ 
with others in society. Low scores point to feelings of inferiority and general low-rank self-
perceptions. The scale has been found to have good reliability, with Cronbach alphas of .88 
and .96 with clinical populations and .91 and .90 with student populations (Allan and Gilbert, 
1995, 1997) and in cross-cultural comparisons (Terol et al., 2015). This thesis aimed to further 
validate this measure in depressed and remitted depressed samples, as previous work found 
that self-perceptions of low rank resulting from social comparisons may result in depression, 
anxiety and psychosis (L. Wood & Irons, 2015). See Appendix 2.21. 
PROCEDURE ACROSS ALL STUDIES 
This section describes the procedure as it pertains only to the administration of the social, 
affective and cognitive measures across all studies. Specific procedures for the remaining 
studies and main experimental tasks are outlined within their respective chapters.  
Immediately prior to the main experimental task, outlined in detail within each respective 
chapter, all participants provided informed consent and were then administered the BDI and 
BAI, as well as the National Adult Reading Test (NART). At the end of each session, 
participants were provided with the battery of social, affective and process self-report measures 
to be completed and returned in their own time, by post or email. Finally, participants were 
thanked for their time and debriefed. Informed consent was obtained from the participants, and 
the studies and consent procedures were approved by the Cambridge Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee (Appendix 2.1).  
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ACROSS ALL STUDIES 
Exploratory data analysis was carried out across all studies to assess whether the data met 
requirements for parametric data analysis, and where this was not the case, non-parametric 
statistics were implemented. For all behavioural data, an alpha level of p = 0.05 was set as the 
statistical threshold of significance. For neuroimaging data, the majority of results are reported 
at p = 0.001, uncorrected with an extent cluster threshold of k=20, unless otherwise indicated 
in the neuroimaging chapters. 
Demographic data were analysed using Pearson’s chi-squared significance test to assess for 
differences between populations using frequency of cases and Fisher’s exact test when the cell 
size count was below 5. Self-report affective, process and social measures were analysed using 
Pearson and Spearman correlation analyses and independent samples t-tests, as well as one-
way analyses of variance (ANOVA) with group (controls/MDD/remitted) as the between-
subjects factor. Mixed between- and within-subject ANOVAs were used to investigate between 
group differences and within-group variability in response to different memory types or 
emotion regulation strategies as outlined in the relevant chapters.     
Cases with missing values pose a significant challenge during data collection (Scheffer, 2002). 
However, when present, missing cases for individual items on a measure were considered to 
be missing at random, therefore the univariate analyses of variances implemented list wise 
deletion, followed by a missing value analysis using EM (expectation-maximisation) (Dong & 
Peng, 2013). This method assumes a distribution for the partially missing data and bases 
inferences on the likelihood under that distribution, considering the conditions under which 
missing data occurred. Each iteration consists of an E step and an M step. The E step finds the 
conditional expectation of the “missing” data, given the observed values and current estimates 
of the parameters. These expectations are then substituted for the “missing” data. In the M step, 
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are computed as though the missing data have 
been filled in. “Missing” is enclosed in quotation marks because the missing values are not 
being directly filled in. Instead, functions of them are used in the log-likelihood.  
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POWER AND EFFECT SIZE ACROSS ALL STUDIES 
In setting up behavioural and neuroimaging experiments, a priori power analyses are the 
preferable approach to determining the sample sizes required to detect an existing effect within 
the data. However, in neuroimaging experiments, this approach is hampered by lengthy 
simulations and statistical constraints (Desmond & Glover, 2002). Further difficulties in 
controlling the sample size are due to limited time and/or logistical resources, heightened given 
the unique demands of recruiting vulnerable groups (Phillips, 2012). Nonetheless, sample sizes 
reported in this thesis fall well within the range of reported sample sizes within the clinical and 
social affective neuroscience literature (Linden, 2012). Specifically, the sample sizes meet the 
demands when implementing specific analyses, such as the Intersubject Correlation Analysis 
(ISC) described in Chapter 6 (Pajula & Tohka, 2016). As a result, post-hoc power analyses 
were conducted and calculated using the given sample size, probability level and a medium 
effect size, as described by (Cohen, 1992). This analysis was implemented using the software 
package GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).  
The achieved power for detecting a medium sized effect (0.25) employed the traditional 0.05 
statistical significance criterion and uses the respective sample sizes for each study (Table 2.2). 
For example, the post hoc analysis for the battery of measures to investigate systemic biases 
presented in this chapter achieved a statistical power of 79% using an alpha level of p < .05 
and an overall sample size of 150. However, given cases of missing data, less respective power 
was seen with respect to specific measures: BAI (0.73), BDI-II (0.75), DERS (0.73), FFMQ (0.55), 
IPSM (0.73), ISQ (0.75), PA (0.75), NA (0.75), SAIS-I/II (0.75), SBS (0.75), SCS (0.75), and SUIS 
(0.75). The behavioural study in Chapter 7 achieved a power of 81% in the post-hoc analysis 
for the repeated measures ANOVA. The behavioural results of the neuroimaging study 
in Chapter 4 achieved a power of 86%, while the neuroimaging studies Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6 achieved a respective power of 97% when including and 88% when excluding the remitted 
sample from the post-hoc analysis (Table 2.2).   
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Table 2.3  
Sample sizes and post-hoc power analyses for key analyses across all studies 
Study Chapter N Controls MDD Remitted Power 
Systemic Biases 
(Behavioural) Chapter 2 150 82 41 27 79% 
‘Self’ Memory 
(fMRI) Chapter 4 39 21 18 - 86% 
‘Others’ Memory 
and ISC of Social 
Interactions (fMRI) 
Chapter 5 & 6 77 27 23 27 97% 
Emotion Regulation 
(Behavioural) Chapter 7 34 34 - - 81% 
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2.3 CROSS-STUDY RESULTS PERTAINING TO SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
PARTICIPANTS CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the sample characteristics of healthy controls, remitted depressed 
and currently in episode MDD participants recruited as part of this thesis. Chi-squared analyses 
revealed significant associations between group and ethnicity (χ(2) = 30.55, p = .000), with a 
greater frequency of individuals of Caucasian ethnicity within the healthy control population, 
compared to MDD and remitted depressed group. There was no significant association between 
group and employment type (χ(4) = 6.98, p = .137), employment status (χ(6) = 4.51, p = .609), 
education (χ(10) = 17.92, p = .056), marital status (χ(6) = 8.58, p = .199), or gender (χ(2) = 
5.23, p = .073) (see Table 2.5). Participant groups did not differ in terms of age (F[2,130]=1.58, 
p=0.210) or reading ability assessed using the NART (F[2,130]=1.119, p=0.330), commonly 
used to estimate premorbid intelligence levels (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4  
Demographic characteristics across all studies. Numbers are ns unless otherwise stated. 
  Group N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
NART 
Control 73 9.62 6.11 0.72 8.19 11.04 
MDD 37 9.43 6.40 1.05 7.30 11.57 
Remitted 21 11.95 9.17 2.00 7.78 16.13 
Total 131 9.94 6.76 0.59 8.77 11.11 
Age 
Control 82 33.54 15.36 1.70 30.16 36.91 
MDD 41 37.12 13.63 2.13 32.82 41.42 
Remitted 26 38.73 14.92 2.93 32.71 44.76 
Total 149 35.43 14.89 1.22 33.02 37.84 
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Table 2.5 
Demographic characteristics across all studies cont’d. Numbers are ns unless otherwise 
stated. 
  Controls n=82 
MDD 
n=41 
Remitted 
n=27 
Total 
N=150 X
2 p 
Sex  5.23 .073 
 Male 35 10 8 53   
Female 47 31 19 97   
Age, years    
 Mean 33.54 37.12 38.73 35.43    
  SD 15.36 13.63 14.92 14.89    
National Adult Reading Test  
 Mean 9.62 9.43 11.95 9.94    
  SD 6.11 6.40 9.17 6.76    
Ethnicity  30.55 <0.001 
 Other 22 23 23 68    
Caucasian 60 18 4 82    
Marital Status  8.58 .199 
 Single / 
Unmarried 
56 21 11 88    
Married 12 9 8 29    
Separated / 
Divorced 
6 4 2 12    
Other 8 7 6 21    
Education  17.92 .056 
 Completed 
Year 10 
2 4 2 8    
 Completed 
Year 12 
27 16 7 50    
 Completed 
Bachelors  
33 7 6 46    
 Completed 
Masters  
9 4 2 15    
 Completed 
PhD 
0 2 2 4    
 Other 11 8 8 27    
Employment Status     4.51 .609 
 Employed 50 23 11 84    
Unemployed 19 12 9 40    
Student 7 2 3 12    
Other 6 4 4 14    
Employment Type     6.98 .137 
 Full Time 27 20 8 55   
Part Time 23 6 4 33   
Other 32 15 15 62   
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SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND PROCESS MEASURES 
Table 2.6 presents the univariate results across groups for the battery of social, affective and 
process measures. Results reveal significant group differences between remitted depressed, 
MDD and healthy control participants on all measures except for the Spontaneous Use of 
Imagery Scale (p=0.274). In terms of affective measures, MDD participants were significantly 
more anxious (BAI), depressed (BDI) and exhibited significantly dampened positive affect and 
heightened negative mood (PANAS) compared to remitted depressed and followed by healthy 
control individuals. In terms of process measures, MDD revealed higher scores on the DERS 
suggesting greater problems with emotion regulation, greater interpersonal rejection sensitivity 
(IPSM), again followed by remitted and then control participants. MDD also exhibited lower 
levels of mindfulness (FFMQ) compared to healthy controls, while this measure was not 
administered in the final study and therefore no data are available for remitted depressed 
participants. Finally, social measures revealed higher levels of involuntary subordination 
(ISQ), greater scores on striving to avoid inferiority (SAIS-I/II), higher scores on the 
submissive behaviour scale (SBS) indicating more submissive behaviour, and lower scores on 
the social comparison scales (SCS), suggesting greater feelings of inferiority and low rank self-
perceptions in MDD compared to both remitted and healthy controls. 
PLANNED COMPARISONS 
Planned comparisons revealed that MDD participants were significantly different from control 
participants on all measures (all p<0.001). In comparison to the remitted sample, MDD 
participants were only significantly different on affective measures (p<0.001), with greater 
scores on the BAI (8.49±2.11), BDI-II (13.52±2.03), NA (8.59±1.89) and IPSM (12.34±3.85), 
indicating higher levels of anxiety, depression, negative affect and interpersonal rejection 
sensitivity. MDD participants were not significantly different from the remitted sample on the 
DERS (8.10±6.36, p=0.62), ISQ (10.36±4.49, p=0.07), SAIS-I (0.53±5.15, p=1.00), SAIS-II 
(1.75±5.16, p=1.00), SBS (7.43±2.33, p=0.15), SCS (-9.13±4.80, p=0.18), SUIS (3.60±2.35, 
p=0.38), and PA (1.57±2.20, p=1.00). This suggests residual deficits in social processing 
following recovery not evident from purely affective measures. Conversely, remitted depressed 
participants were not significantly different from control participants on BAI (-3.16±1.92, 
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p=0.31), BDI-II (-3.18±1.85, p=0.26), SAIS-I (-8.96±4.72, p=0.18), SCS (10.52±4.40, 
p=0.05), SUIS (3.17±2.16, p=0.38), and NA (-2.50±1.72, p=0.44). In contrast, healthy controls 
were significantly different to the remitted sample on the DERS (-32.32±5.83, p=0.001), IPSM 
(-10.33±3.50, p=0.01), ISQ (-22.08±4.13, p=0.001), SAIS-II (-14.75±4.73, p=0.01), SBS (-
7.43±2.33, p=0.01), and PA (10.82±2.01, p=0.001).  
As the remitted and control groups differed on levels of depression, the other differences 
between these groups could be a function of this elevated symptomatology in the remitted 
sample. A further sensitivity analysis was carried out after seeking to match the groups more 
closely. Outliers were removed from the analysis, whereby individuals who scored zero on the 
BDI-II were set aside from the control group. This sensitivity analysis revealed an identical 
pattern of results, as described above, with one exception reported here. See Appendix 2.22 for 
full descriptive and ANOVA results of the sensitivity analysis. Results now revealed no 
significant difference between groups on the SAIS-I (F[2,133]=2.56, p=0.08). This suggests 
that remitted depressed, matched in levels of depression with the control group, retained their 
pattern of results with regards to the consistent residual deficits observed across measures of 
social processing when compared to control participants. See Appendix 2.23 for full table of 
planned comparisons of the sensitivity analysis results. 
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Table 2.6  
Descriptive and ANOVA results for all measures across all studies. 
  Group Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval     
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound df F Sig. 
BAI 
Controls 5.09 0.55 4.00 6.18 [2,132] 29.38 .000 
MDD 16.74 1.91 12.88 20.60       
Remitted 8.25 1.47 5.17 11.33       
Total 8.89 0.79 7.33 10.46       
BDI-II 
Controls 6.72 0.61 5.52 7.93 [2,139] 65.97 .000 
MDD 23.43 1.63 20.13 26.72       
Remitted 9.90 1.83 6.09 13.72       
Total 11.97 0.89 10.22 13.73       
DERS 
Controls 71.78 2.42 66.96 76.60 [2,134] 46.18 .000 
MDD 112.10 3.60 104.81 119.39       
Remitted 104.00 6.58 90.18 117.82       
Total 87.96 2.53 82.95 92.97       
IPSM 
Controls 98.77 1.70 95.38 102.15 [2,134] 34.33 .000 
MDD 121.55 2.05 117.40 125.70       
Remitted 109.10 2.74 103.37 114.83       
Total 106.71 1.47 103.81 109.62       
ISQ 
Controls 71.13 1.88 67.38 74.88 [2,135] 57.17 .000 
MDD 103.58 2.45 98.62 108.53       
Remitted 93.21 3.59 85.67 100.76       
Total 83.76 1.87 80.06 87.46       
SAIS-I 
Controls 55.79 1.94 51.93 59.66 [2,136] 4.13 .018 
MDD 65.28 3.51 58.17 72.38       
Remitted 64.75 4.03 56.32 73.18       
Total 59.87 1.64 56.62 63.12       
SAIS-II 
Controls 43.95 2.04 39.88 48.02 [2,136] 12.08 .000 
MDD 60.45 2.92 54.55 66.35       
Remitted 58.70 5.10 48.03 69.37       
Total 50.92 1.74 47.49 54.35       
SBS 
Controls 22.17 1.00 20.17 24.17 [2,136] 24.81 .000 
MDD 34.65 1.71 31.19 38.11       
Remitted 29.60 1.67 26.11 33.09       
Total 26.90 0.92 25.08 28.72       
SCS 
Controls 59.32 2.18 54.98 63.67 [2,136] 16.92 .000 
MDD 39.68 2.20 35.23 44.12       
Remitted 48.80 3.93 40.57 57.03       
Total 52.05 1.66 48.76 55.34       
SUIS 
Controls 38.52 0.95 36.63 40.41 [2,136] 1.31 .274 
MDD 38.95 1.38 36.17 41.73       
Remitted 35.35 2.08 30.99 39.71       
Total 38.18 0.74 36.73 39.64       
FFMQ Controls 127.89 2.81 122.25 133.52 [1,69] 5.32 .024 
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MDD 114.94 4.64 105.11 124.77       
Total 124.74 2.48 119.79 129.69       
PA 
Controls 34.27 0.86 32.56 35.98 [2,138] 24.24 .000 
MDD 25.03 1.29 22.41 27.64       
Remitted 23.45 2.30 18.68 28.23       
Total 29.90 0.81 28.29 31.51       
NA 
Controls 14.64 0.62 13.39 15.88 [2,138] 32.29 .000 
MDD 25.73 1.45 22.79 28.66       
Remitted 17.14 1.70 13.61 20.67       
Total 18.22 0.73 16.78 19.66       
Note: BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale; FFMQ, Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire; IPSM, Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure; ISQ, 
Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire; PA, NA, Positive and Negative Affect Scale; SAIS-I/II, Strive to Avoid 
Inferiority Scale Part I and II; SBS, Submissive Behaviour Scale; SCS, Social Comparison Scale; SUIS, 
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. All tests, variances of groups assumed equal.  
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CORRELATION MATRICES  
Next, to address the heterogeneity of comparable social measures used across different studies 
(Santini et al., 2015), correlations between the different social measures were explored.  
Results revealed that in depressed participants, the IPSM, ISQ, SAIS-I, SAIS-II, SCS and SBS 
were strongly inter-correlated, although the SCS was not correlated with the SAIS-I (Appendix 
2.26). In remitted depressed participants, the IPSM was significantly correlated with the SAIS-
I and the SCS; the ISQ was significantly correlated with the SAIS-I, SAIS-II, SBS and SCS 
and the SAIS-I was additionally correlated with the SBS, and SCS. Finally, the SBS was 
correlated with the ISQ, SAIS-I, SAIS-II and SCS, while the SCS was correlated with IPSM, 
ISQ, SAIS-II, and SBS (Appendix 2.27). In healthy controls, the IPSM, ISQ, SAIS-I, and 
SAIS-II were significantly correlated, while the SBS was only significantly correlated with the 
IPSM, ISQ and SAIS-II. The SCS was significantly correlated with IPSM and SBS only 
(Appendix 2.28). Finally, for all participants’ data combined, all social measures were 
significantly intercorrelated (Appendix 2.29). For an overview of correlational matrices and 
results for all social, affective and process measures, see Appendix 2.25-Appendix 2.29.  
Given these high correlations, we sought to further explore the heterogeneity between the social 
measures by using a principal component factor analysis to reduce the data into a meaningful 
“social” construct, alongside the affective and process measures. The scores on the social 
measures IPSM, ISQ, SAIS-I, SAIS-II, SBS and SCS were entered into a Principal 
Components Factor Analysis using an oblique rotation in all participants combined. The aim 
was to extract meaningful latent structures consolidating the range of social measures 
encompassing submissiveness, social rank and inferiority behaviours that could be 
implemented in subsequent analyses to minimise multiple testing of overlapping measures. 
Principal components analysis is based on the correlation matrix of the variables involved, and 
correlations usually need a large sample size before they stabilize. A sample size between 100-
200 is considered fair (Osborne & Costello, 2004). The social measures loaded significantly 
onto one component explaining 59.14 % of the variance, best described by involuntary 
subordination and submissiveness (see Appendix 2.24). 
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Finally, we correlated the resulting ‘social factor’ with the main affective and process 
measures, specifically, the BAI, BDI-II, and DERS. This aimed to explore the relationship 
between symptoms of anxiety, depression, and emotional dysregulation and social functioning 
within and across groups (see Table 2.7), as outlined in the literature (see introduction). 
In healthy controls, results revealed a significant correlation between the social factor, and the 
BAI, BDI-II, and DERS. In remitted depressed, the social factor was significantly correlated 
with the BDI-II and DERS only, while in depressed participants the social factor was 
significantly correlated with the BAI, BDI-II and the DERS. Finally, across all participants 
combined, results revealed significant positive correlations between the social factor and all 
remaining measures. See Figure 2.1 for a correlation plot of the social factor and affective and 
process measures, across all groups and studies combined. These results suggest that the social 
component, encompassing greater involuntary subordination and submissiveness, is associated 
with an increase in symptoms of anxiety, depression and emotional dysregulation. This 
provides strong evidence for the relationship between depressive symptoms and involuntary 
subordination and submissiveness, as the main measures contributing to the social factor 
derived from the PCA.  
Table 2.7  
Correlation matrix of social factor with affective and process measures across all groups and 
studies 
Measure  MDD Remitted  Controls All Participants 
BAI  
Pearson's r  0.34 0.29 0.40 0.53 
p-value  0.03 0.17 < .001  < .001  
BDI-II  
Pearson's r  0.40 0.54 0.45 0.63 
p-value  0.01 0.01 < .001  < .001  
DERS  
Pearson's r  0.71 0.67 0.58 0.77 
p-value  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  
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Figure 2.1. Correlation plot of the ‘social factor’, and the main affective and process measures (BAI, 
BDI-II and DERS) across all studies and groups combined. Results reveal significant correlations 
between the latent social component indicating involuntary subordination and submissiveness, and 
measures of anxiety, depression and difficulty in emotion regulation. 
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2.4 DISCUSSION  
This chapter presented the general methods including recruitment and assessment procedures, 
measures used, ethical considerations and issues pertaining to the statistical analyses and power 
for all studies presented in this thesis. In addition, we explored the hypothesis that depression 
is characterised by significant systemic biases in social and affective processing compared to 
healthy controls, and investigated the pattern of residual social impairments in remitted 
depressed individuals, using a series of self-report measures. In line with our hypotheses, 
results highlight significant impairments in social, affective and cognitive processing between 
MDD and control participants, with persistent residual deficits in social and cognitive 
processing exhibited in remitted participant relative to controls. In addition, correlational 
results revealed significant relationships between symptoms of anxiety, depression and social 
measures, including involuntary subordination and submissiveness within- and across-groups. 
Finally, this chapter reduced the heterogeneity of existing social measures to better account for 
potential biases in social functioning (Santini et al., 2015). This revealed submissiveness and 
involuntary subordination as the main candidate maladaptive behaviours, significantly 
correlated with symptoms of depression, anxiety and difficulties in emotion regulation.  
Furthermore, findings from this study replicate previous results highlighting the usefulness and 
validity of the BDI and BAI as reliable indicators of symptom severity and as screening tools 
within the general population (Beck et al., 1997; Muntingh et al., 2011; Osman et al., 2002; 
Storch et al., 2004). In the current thesis population, depressed individuals fell well within the 
moderate range of depression and anxiety, with remitted depressed individuals scoring within 
the normal range of mood fluctuations, bordering on a mild mood disturbance and anxiety, 
alongside healthy controls. Additional sensitivity analyses confirmed the suitability of our 
screening and recruitment process to ensure matching across groups. Moreover, our results 
reveal a significant relationship between depressive symptom severity and difficulties in 
emotion regulation, in line with previous studies (Aldao et al., 2010; Bardeen et al., 2012; Gratz 
& Roemer, 2004; Gratz et al., 2006). Broad impairments on affective and process measures 
thus validate the distinct groups outlined within this thesis as a function of symptom severity 
and allow for mood-dependent interpretations based on subsequent between-group 
comparisons on a behavioural and neural level.  
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In addition, our findings extend the relationship between well-established deficits in affective 
and cognitive processing to incorporate systemic biases in social processing on a range of social 
measures in remitted depressed and currently depressed samples. Our findings suggest that for 
instance, across all groups, but most strongly for those with MDD, difficulty in emotion 
regulation is significantly associated with a range of social measures, including submissive 
behavior, interpersonal sensitivity, involuntary subordination, striving to avoid inferiority and 
perceptions of low social rank. This suggests that emotion regulation is strongly linked to 
inherently social affective contexts, with social behaviours fulfilling regulatory goals, 
including submissiveness and subordination. Interestingly, greater difficulties in emotion 
regulation in depressed and remitted depressed individuals compared to healthy controls further 
highlights the importance of residual impairments in a remitted population (Ehring et al., 2008; 
Muntingh et al., 2011).  
As described within the social rank theory (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert et al., 2007) and in 
line with the social risk hypothesis of depression (Allen & Badcock, 2003), depressed 
individuals with low perceptions of social rank are argued to employ a range of defensive 
behavioural strategies in response to internalised feelings of inferiority and low self-esteem 
(Gilbert, 2000). Findings from this chapter emphasise this notion, as depressed individuals 
experience significant low rank self-perceptions, and feelings of inferiority, they engage in 
greater levels of involuntary subordination and submissiveness. Further, perceptions of 
insecure relationships, encapsulated in measures assessing defensive and regulatory 
behaviours, such as involuntary subordination, and submissive behaviour, were highly 
correlated with interpersonal rejection sensitivity, and depressive symptoms. These findings fit 
will within the existing literature, which identifies an association between negative social 
comparisons and increased rumination and depressive symptoms (Feinstein & Hershenberg, 
2013), eating disorder (Troop, Andrews, Hiskey, & Treasure, 2014), chronic illness (Terol et 
al., 2015), increased stigma in intellectual disability (Paterson et al., 2012) and increases in 
paranoid thoughts (Freeman et al., 2014).  
Similarly, remitted depressed individuals within this study exhibited impairments on measures 
of submissive behaviour, involuntary subordination and interpersonal rejection sensitivity. 
This emphasises the notion of a ‘learned “lower rank” mind-set’, in which maladaptive 
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behaviour even in the absence of current low mood is initiated by systemic biases in social 
processing. Similarly, in line with the social risk hypothesis (Allen & Badcock, 2003) persistent 
submissive and subordinate behaviours aimed at restoring optimal SIP contribute to the 
maintenance and risk of depressive relapse. This underscores the importance of these findings 
in the current study, given the deficits in social functioning in depressed and remitted depressed 
samples previously described across a variety of socio-affective domains (Elliott et al., 2012; 
N. Kennedy et al., 2007; Pechtel et al., 2013), including emotion recognition and regulation 
(Lemoult & Sherdell, 2010), reward sensitivity (Pechtel et al., 2013), and altered neural 
responses to social interactions (Elliott et al., 2012).  
In sum, depressed individuals are found to be more sensitive to social rejection, and engage in 
negative social comparisons, submissive behaviour and involuntary subordination, while 
striving to avoid inferiority, discussed within the framework of the main social theories of 
depression. Moreover, the results within the remitted sample point towards a need for a more 
complex index of social functioning to account for socio-cognitive deficits even in the absence 
of a current clinical diagnosis. These findings may indicate vulnerability to future episodes as 
well as providing a scientific rationale for incorporating functional treatment outcomes from 
within the social domains into existing intervention approaches to alleviate and maintain 
recovered symptoms of low mood and anxiety. Thus, this chapter has served to validate and 
replicate well-established findings using common affective and process measures, and extend 
these findings to other measures of social relevance within currently depressed and remitted 
depressed individuals. Finally, this chapter outlined the general issues and procedures 
pertaining to the work presented in this thesis, starting with the next chapter.   
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenological qualities of autobiographical 
memories of social rejection, inclusion and emotionally-neutral social experiences generated 
and recalled for use in the script-driven imagery paradigm in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7. The 
validation of the script-driven imagery paradigm may present a viable experimental approach 
to understanding the relationship between specific psychological processes underlying 
complex social interactions. However, a long-cited challenge in social affective neuroscience 
is the low ecological validity of existing paradigms (Bem & Lord, 1979; Bronfenbrenner, 
1977), where the research to date has relied on the presentation of experimentally constrained 
emotional stimuli (Amodio, 2010; Burgess et al., 2006; Poldrack, 2008). The benefits and costs 
of real-life or naturalistic approaches, compared to traditional or laboratory-based approaches, 
are outlined in more detail in Chapter 8; however, the gist of the debate concerns the trade-off 
between the need for experimental control and the drive to preserve the psychological 
phenomenon of interest (Burgess et al., 2006).  
Topical reviews suggest the implementation of a variety of tasks and stimuli to capture the 
social dynamic (Amodio, 2010; Poldrack, 2008). Efforts to address these suggestions have 
embraced novel methodological approaches to increase ecological validity, ranging from 
individual experience sampling (Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009), virtual reality environments 
(Parsons, 2015), and brain-as-predictors approaches, in which brain activity complements self-
report and other physiological measures to predict real-world outcomes and inform 
interventions (Berkman & Falk, 2013). One further approach to the problem of limited 
ecological validity is to reflect real-world social encounters as closely as possible through the 
use of highly self-relevant autobiographical memories (Whalley et al., 2012).  
Autobiographical recollections are temporary mental representations derived from an 
underlying knowledge-based system with varying levels of specificity, which are guided by 
goals and beliefs currently held within a working model of self (M. A. Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). Retrieval within the autobiographical memory model is initiated by executive 
control processes, which in turn activate sensory perceptual episodic concepts (M. A. Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Moreover, memory representations feed into person and event 
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schemas, which provide templates for interpersonal relationships and patterns of response 
within role-relationship models (Horowitz, 1989). With interpersonal schemas being inherently 
affective in nature (Horowitz, 1989), there is a preferential recall of affective experiences over 
more descriptive memories (M. A. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Autobiographical 
memories thus encompass multifaceted affective environments and socially salient negative 
and positive emotions (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009).  
The use of autobiographical memories also allows for the investigation of complex neural 
processes, including the distinct phenomenological qualities of emotion, emotion recognition 
and regulation (Gross, 2015). For instance, a study investigating emotion regulation strategies 
in response to (negative) emotional memories revealed novel patterns of activity in regions 
relevant to affective disorders, including depression (Kross, Davidson, Weber, & Ochsner, 
2009). These regions had not previously been identified in traditional ‘laboratory’ paradigms 
using isolated normative stimuli. Autobiographical memories may therefore further provide an 
ecologically valid alternative route to elucidating patterns of brain activity relevant for both 
emotional and social processing (Kross et al., 2009). However, understanding the functional 
neuroanatomy of our personal past and present requires innovative methods for eliciting 
personal memories in the scanner and may be subject to idiosyncratic limitations. 
A paradigm which has thus specifically adapted the recall of autobiographical memory for use 
in fMRI research is script-driven imagery. This paradigm consists of the prompted recall of 
one or multiple specific autobiographical memories with an emphasis on sensory, visceral and 
affective characteristics aimed at eliciting salient emotions (Lanius et al., 2002). These 
memories generated in an initial interview session are then presented to participants in a second 
memory presentation session. Initial studies investigated dissociative responses in PTSD 
through the explicit recall and script-driven imagery of traumatic memories in individuals with 
sexual-abuse related PTSD (Lanius et al., 2002). However, the elicitation of less severe more 
‘everyday’ negative and positive memories has also successfully evoked socially salient 
emotions (Frewen et al., 2010, 2011a). To date, script-driven imagery has been successfully 
implemented in both clinical and non-clinical groups, to examine social and emotional 
processes at the behavioural and neural level (Lanius et al., 2003; Lindauer et al., 2004; 
Beckham et al., 2007; Frewen et al., 2008, 2010, 2011b; Kleim et al., 2010).  
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It is important to consider potential limitations to the feasibility of implementing script-driven 
imagery within the context of depression. Depression is associated with distinct alterations in 
memory functioning, such as mood-congruent recall, intrusive memories and negative biases 
in autobiographical memory recall (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Dalgleish & Brewin, 2007; Kuyken 
& Howell, 2006; Whalley et al., 2012; J. M. G. Williams et al., 2007), such as the tendency to 
recall over-general memories (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Raes, Hermans, de Decker, Eelen, & 
Williams, 2003; J. M. G. Williams et al., 2007). Overgeneral memory, the reduced ability to 
retrieve specific autobiographical memories, presents perhaps the biggest challenge in 
implementing script-driven imagery in depressed samples (J. M. G. Williams & Broadbent, 
1986). This is thought to be due in part to a faulty retrieval process in response to cue words 
which involuntarily invokes dysfunctional schemas in depression, thereby preventing the 
specific recall of memories (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Dalgleish & Brewin, 2007; Kuyken & 
Howell, 2006; J. M. G. Williams et al., 2007). 
Alongside the tendency to recall over-general memories (Dalgleish & Brewin, 2007; J. M. G. 
Williams et al., 2007), depressed individuals are also found to recall memories at a slower pace, 
thereby lengthening the time required per individual per memory within a memory generation 
session (Liu, Kraines, Massing-Schaffer, & Alloy, 2014). In contrast to the recall of single 
traumatic memories as part of the original script-driven imagery study in PTSD populations 
(Lanius et al., 2002), the recall of multiple memories may therefore interfere with successful 
memory generation, especially in clinical populations. Other common autobiographical 
memory deficits in depression describe biases towards preferentially recalling events of 
negative emotional valence; difficulty in retrieving positive memories and the role of 
rumination and avoidance when recalling autobiographical memories (Koehler et al., 2015). 
These considerations should be taken into account when designing studies implementing 
script-driven imagery, as they might interfere with successful memory generation. 
However, research also suggests that the ability to retrieve specific memories when explicitly 
prompted eliminates the overgeneralising effect and negative response bias (Watkins et al., 
2000). Specifically, over-general memory in depression has been found to be modifiable 
through cognitive interventions and manipulations reflecting a dynamic cognitive style, thus 
highlighting the importance of executive control for autobiographical memory recall (Watkins 
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et al., 2000; Dalgleish et al., 2007). It is important to emphasize the latter point as over-general 
memory relates to the cued recall of voluntary memories, as opposed to the prompted recall of 
specific autobiographical memories within the script-driven imagery paradigm. These findings 
suggest that the script-driven imagery paradigm may be implemented even in clinical contexts, 
where memory functioning presents a contributing factor to the aetiology and maintenance of 
depressive symptoms. 
In addition, while the notion of ecological validity and memory deficits in depression may be 
addressed more satisfactorily, a further consideration concerns the stability and intensity of 
emotions over time. Considerations regarding the temporal latency between memory recall and 
original experience are conceptualised within the affective fading bias literature. The fading 
affect bias refers to the observation that the affective intensity for unpleasant events fades faster 
or to a greater degree than the affect associated with pleasant events (Walker et al., 1997, 2003, 
2014; Lindeman et al., 2016). The term was first coined by Cason (1932) who asked 
participants to rate the affective intensity at the time of experiencing a positive or negative 
event, followed by ratings of affect when recalling the event at a later point in time. Taking the 
affect fading bias into account, an observed attenuation in affect, intensity, and vividness 
between experience and recall as a function of memory type would further speak to the validity 
of the script-driven paradigm overall. Moreover, recent findings suggest that positive events 
are recalled more vividly compared to negative events (Lindeman et al., 2016), suggesting that 
that vividness may be a plausible mediator between the valence of an event and its degree of 
affective fading. The fading bias is further modulated by the type of audience to which the 
memory is disclosed, in this case, the experimenter. Social disclosure to an interactive listener 
decreased the affective intensity of unpleasant events, while non-responsive listeners prompt 
an increase in affective intensity (Muir et al., 2017). This is important in the context of script-
driven imagery, given the interactive nature of the memory generation session.  
Overall, the fading affect bias is thought to lessen the impact of negative experiences, 
simultaneously emphasising the impact of positive experiences (Walker et al., 2003; Ritchie et 
al., 2009; Lindeman et al., 2016). The bias thus reflects a healthy coping mechanism pertaining 
to autobiographical memory, which may be disrupted in clinical disorders, including 
depression, dysphoria and anxiety (Walker et al., 2003, 2014). In particular, low mood was 
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found to diminish the effect with unpleasant and pleasant emotions fading comparably over 
time, correlated with dysphoric symptom severity (Walker et al., 2003). Similarly, increased 
levels of trait anxiety diminished the fading affect bias across both positive and negative events, 
although not eliminating it altogether (Walker et al., 2014). In the context of script-driven 
imagery, it is therefore unclear to what extent this bias may interfere with the memory 
generation process, especially considering the importance of matching memories in emotional 
saliency across groups. 
In sum, social neuroscience has strived towards bridging the gap between experimentally 
constrained presentations of stimuli to investigate tightly controlled psychological phenomena, 
while preserving the ecological qualities of the phenomenon in question. The use of 
autobiographical memories within the script-driven imagery paradigm, appears as a potential 
approach in this context, with the recall of rich multi-faceted affective environments allowing 
for the investigation of complex psychological constructs. However, memory disturbances in 
depression, the affect fading bias and sensitivity regarding personal disclosure may provide 
stumbling blocks for the successful implementation of this paradigm. 
The aims of the present chapter were, therefore, two-fold: (i) to validate the experimental use 
of autobiographical memory recall and script-driven imagery to manipulate mood in depressed 
and non-depressed individuals across the experimental studies in this thesis; (ii) to deepen our 
understanding of the carry-over over effects between initial memory recall and script-driven 
imagery with respect to valence, vividness and intensity, as markers of saliency. This chapter 
will address these aims by comparing affective, vividness and intensity ratings of the rejection, 
inclusion and neutral memories obtained in the initial memory generation sessions between 
groups and between the time of experience and time of recall within session. 
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HYPOTHESIS 
• Memories generated involving social rejection, inclusion, and emotionally-neutral 
social experiences in an initial memory generation session will reliably modify mood 
across participants, with the recall of rejection memories resulting in more negative 
mood, the recall of inclusion memories resulting in more positive mood, and neutral 
memories resulting in relatively unchanged mood. This will validate the script-driven 
imagery paradigm, in line with previous implementations (Lanius et al., 2002). 
3.2 METHODS AND MATERIALS 
PARTICIPANTS 
This chapter will report analyses on pooled data obtained from two separate samples described 
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, respectively. This serves to ensure that the memories obtained from 
the initial memory generation sessions within these studies meet the demands of the script-
driven imagery paradigm with respect to eliciting salient memories, which modify mood as a 
function of valence. Thus, participants for “sample 1” were recruited as part of the 
neuroimaging study investigating psychological and neural processes in response to 
autobiographical memories of rejection and inclusion in depressed and healthy controls 
(Chapter 4). Participants for “sample 2” were recruited for the behavioural study investigating 
emotion regulation strategies in response to autobiographical memories of rejection and 
inclusion in healthy controls only (Chapter 7). Both samples were recruited from volunteer and 
research panels at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit and the University of 
Cambridge. For details on recruitment and inclusion and exclusion criteria see Chapter 2. All 
participants completed two research sessions, an initial behavioural memory generation session 
described here, followed by either i) a neuroimaging memory presentation session described 
in Chapter 4 or ii) a behavioural memory presentation session described in Chapter 7. This 
chapter will describe the memory-generation procedure in the initial session only. 
fMRI study – Sample 1 (Chapter 4) 
The neuroimaging study involved eighteen participants experiencing a current Major 
Depressive Episode and meeting criteria for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD; 
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13 female; 34.11±10.9 years) and 21 healthy controls who had never met criteria for MDD (10 
female; 35.30±16.1 years). Full demographics are presented in Table 4.2 and a full description 
of the study procedure can be found in Chapter 4.  
Behavioural study – Sample 2 (Chapter 7) 
The behavioural study involved the recruitment of thirty-four healthy participants (22 female; 
39.32±16.73 years) with no history of Major Depressive Disorder or other mental health 
problems. Full demographics are presented in Table 7.2 and a full description of the study 
procedure can be found in Chapter 7.  
CLINICAL INTERVIEW AND SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND PROCESS SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
A comprehensive diagnostic interview and battery of social, affective and process self-report 
measures was undertaken with respect to all participants in each sample. See Chapter 2 for a 
full description. 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
Memory Generation Session 
In the memory-generation session, participants provided autobiographical memories consisting 
of social rejection memories, social inclusion, memories and neutral social memories, and 
affective ratings with respect to current mood state at the time of memory recall and mood state 
at the time of the original experience. In the neuroimaging study (sample 1 - Chapter 4), the 
number of memories to be recalled consisted of 18 autobiographical memories and extended 
to both healthy controls and currently depressed individuals. In the behavioural study (sample 
2 - Chapter 7), healthy control participants provided 9 autobiographical memories consisting 
of three memories in each category of social rejection (e.g. being romantically rejected by a 
partner), social inclusion (e.g. being elected team captain), and neutral social memories (e.g. 
shopping in the presence of other people). See Table 3.1 for overview of memories obtained.  
For all memories, participants were asked to verbally provide a social personal memory from 
their life that they very clearly remember and that still feels important to them, which was 
audio-recorded by the experimenter and later transcribe. Participants were asked to recall a 
memory that involves other people, with at least one other person, and a memory that still 
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evokes strong feelings even when remembering it in the present. Participants were encouraged 
using a series of prompts (see Figure 3.1) to emphasise sensory details and visceral reactions 
to maximise the emotiveness when recalling the narratives. For a full protocol of the memory 
generation session, see Appendix 3.1. A description of what constitutes a social compared to a 
non-social memory, as well as examples of each memory category were provided to 
participants on cue cards (see Table 3.2). See Appendix 3.2 for example memories obtained 
within the memory generation session. The generated memories were then later used in the 
script-driven imagery paradigm designed to elicit the salient emotional experiences and 
adapted for fMRI (Frewen et al., 2008, 2011; Lanius et al., 2002). The procedure for the 
memory presentation session is described in Chapter 7 and Chapter 4, respectively.  
Participants rated each memory on vividness and intensity, and with respect to four elicited 
subjective mood states (distress, rejection, inclusion, positivity) with respect to current mood 
state at the time of memory recall and mood state at the time of the original experience to ensure 
that memories were elicited with comparable emotional salience across time and groups. All 
affective ratings were obtained on Likert scales ranging from 0 (“Not at all”) to 10 
(“Extremely”). The four subjective mood states were compiled into a negative mood index (the 
reverse scored average of the distress and rejection ratings), and a positive mood index (the 
average of the inclusion and positivity ratings). The negative mood index was then subtracted 
from the positive mood index, resulting in an overall composite measure of affect ranging from 
-10 (very negative/rejected) to +10 (very included/positive). Following the memory generation 
session, each memory narrative was transcribed and edited down into a 30-second transcript 
narrated in the first person, present tense. These transcripts were used to generate audio-
recordings with memories narrated by a research assistant gender-matched to the participant 
and where possible matched geographically to account for regional varieties in language. These 
recordings were then used as individualised stimuli in the memory presentation session 
described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7. 
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Table 3.1 
Numbers of social memories obtained in the memory generation sessions for each sample 
Sample Chapter Group Rejection Inclusion Neutral Total (Session) 
Total 
(Study) 
1 Chapter 4 MDD & Controls  6 6 6 18 702 
2 Chapter 7 Controls 3 3 3 9 304 
Note: MDD = Major Depressive Disorder; samples pooled for analysis 
 
 
 
A (social) personal memory … 
• Is a memory from your life that you very clearly remember and that still feels 
important to you 
• Is a memory that involves other people, with at least one other person 
• Evokes strong feelings 
Describe the situation in your own words – what happened? 
• How long ago was it? 
• Where did it happen? 
• What kind of day was it?  
• What did your surroundings look like? 
• What did you say? How did you act? 
• Were other people there? What where they saying? How were they acting? 
• Any sensations: Sights, Sounds, Smells, Touch? 
• How long did it last? 
Figure 3.1 Memory generation cue card and prompts used in the memory generation session 
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Table 3.2 
Examples of social compared to non-social memories used in memory generation sessions 
 Social Memories Non-Social Memories 
Inclusion 
- Being elected class representative 
- Receiving a (surprise) birthday party by 
your friends 
- Travelling together in a group 
- Being asked to be the best man/maid of 
honour 
- Starting a relationship with someone you 
feel very strongly about OR Getting 
married 
- Scoring the winning goal in a football 
match 
- Academic achievement, such as 
passing your exam 
- Being promoted at work 
- Getting a job you really wanted 
 
Rejection 
- Being rejected by your romantic partner 
- Having a group of friends turn on you / 
not invite you 
- Being humiliated by your boss in front 
of everyone 
- Bereavement 
- Getting your divorce papers through 
- Failing an exam 
- Being fired from your job 
- Losing at an important tennis match 
Neutral 
- Standing in a queue in the supermarket 
- Waiting in a group for the bus 
- Standing on the platform waiting for a 
train/underground 
- Commuting on a packed train 
- Sitting in assembly at school 
- Being part of the school class  
- Being part of a sports team 
- Having a new kitchen installed 
- Landscaping the garden 
- Reading a book in a café 
- Buying groceries 
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PROCEDURE 
In the 1.5-hour memory generation session, participants provided informed consent and were 
then asked to recall a series of autobiographical memories. For all memories, participants were 
asked to emphasise sensory details and visceral reactions. Participants rated their memories on 
vividness and intensity, and with respect to four subjective mood states (distress, rejection, 
inclusion, positivity). At the end of the session participants were thanked for their time and 
reminded of the scheduled second research session.  
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The composite affective ratings and vividness and intensity scores acquired in the memory-
generation sessions for both samples were pooled and averaged for each memory type. 
Composite affective ratings, vividness and intensity scores between time of experience and 
time of recall were entered into a series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with 
memory type (rejection/inclusion/neutral) and time (experience/recall) as within-group factors 
and group (MDD/controls) as a between-group factor. This served to validate that the 
emotional saliency of the memories had been maintained over time as had been outlined in the 
instructions to the participant (‘…should be a memory that still evokes strong emotions even 
when remembering it in the present…’) with respect to vividness and intensity, and could thus 
be reliably re-elicited in the memory presentation task in session two. It also served to validate 
that mood is modified non-significantly differently across depressed and non-depressed 
participants recruited as part of this thesis, with changes in mood differing significantly as a 
function of the valence of the memories recalled, in line with our hypothesis, but not as a 
function of group.  
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3.3 RESULTS 
For participant characteristics and social, affective and process measures for the individual 
samples please refer to Chapter 4 and Chapter 7. In the pooled sample, we investigated whether 
the memories recalled in the memory-generation sessions had maintained their emotional 
saliency over time since the original event had been experienced considering both memory type 
and group. For this purpose, differences between affective ratings of mood, vividness and 
intensity were investigated both at time of experience and recall.  
Firstly, exploratory data analysis ensured that the data met the criteria for parametric analysis 
for subsequent between-groups and within-group analyses. Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s test of 
normality and Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance, as well as assumptions of sphericity 
were assessed and any deviations reported accordingly. Where data violated the assumption of 
sphericity, Greenhouse-Geisser or Huynh-Feldt corrections are reported, depending on the 
value of the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate. If the estimate was less than 0.75, Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used, otherwise Huynh-Feldt, if the estimate exceeded 0.75 (Field, 
2005). Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s test of normality and Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance 
revealed that affective ratings were normally distributed and homogenous across groups. 
For the affective ratings, the within-subject factor memory type (x2=38.31, p=0.001) and the 
interaction between time and memory type (x2=24.36, p=0.001) violated Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity and will be reported using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Similarly, for vividness 
and intensity ratings, memory type (vividness: x2=12.55, p=0.002; intensity: x2=17.41, 
p<0.001) and the interaction between time and memory type (vividness: x2=13.59, p=0.001; 
intensity: x2=10.29, p=0.006) violated Mauchly’s test of sphericity and will be reported using 
a Greenhouse-Geisser correction.  
BEHAVIOURAL RATINGS 
Affective Ratings  
Mean composite mood ratings by memory type are presented in Table 3.3, suggesting that 
mood was most positive following inclusion memories, followed by neutral and lastly rejection 
memories, across groups and time. Moreover, mean mood ratings by time (Table 3.4) suggests 
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that overall mood was slightly elevated at recall compared to experience irrespective of 
memory type and group. Finally, the interaction of group, memory type and time is presented 
in Table 3.5. Mean descriptives for the raw non-composite affective ratings are presented 
in Appendix 3.3. 
ANOVA results revealed a significant main effect for memory type (F[1.39,134]=392.40, 
p<0.001, ηp2=0.85). Planned comparisons indicated that mood ratings in response to rejection, 
neutral and inclusion memories all differed significantly from each other (all p<0.001). Mood 
following inclusion memories was significantly elevated relative to neutral (3.80±0.41) and 
rejection memories (11.19±0.41), followed by neutral memories relative to rejection memories 
(7.39±0.41), the latter resulting in lowest (most negative) mood. There was also a main effect 
of time (F[1,67]=68.48, p<0.001, ηp2=0.51), with significantly more positive mood ratings at 
time of recall compared to time of experience (1.05±0.13), across groups. There was no main 
effect for group (F[1,67]=3.38, p=0.07, ηp2=0.05).  
There was a significant interaction between memory type and time (F[1.53,134]=69.20, 
p<0.001, ηp2=0.47). On closer inspection, this revealed that across both groups inclusion 
memories were rated as marginally less positive at time of recall compared to time of 
experience, while rejection memories were rated as significantly more positive at time of recall 
compared to time of experience (see Figure 3.2). This is line with the fading affect bias 
discussed in the introduction ((Ritchie, Skowronski, Hartnett, Wells, & Walker, 2009; Walker 
et al., 2003)). There was a significant interaction between memory type and group 
(F[1.39,93.03]=20.56, p<0.001, ηp2=0.26), suggesting that MDD participants relative to 
controls reported greater negative mood in response to rejection memories, as well as greater 
positive mood in response to inclusion memories, with marginal differences for neutral 
memories (see Figure 3.3). There was no significant interaction between time and group 
(F[1,67]=0.14, p=0.71, ηp2=0.002) or a three-way interaction between time, memory and group 
(F[1,67]=0.43, p=0.60, ηp2=0.006).  
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Figure 3.2 Mean ± 1SE of the mean interaction of time and memory type for composite affective ratings 
reveals a positive shift in mood for rejection memories over time, as compared to marginal changes in 
mood for neutral and inclusion memories, respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Mean ± 1SE of the mean interaction of group and memory type for composite affective 
ratings reveals greater negative mood for rejection and greater positive mood for inclusion memories in 
MDD relative to controls across time, with marginal differences in mood for neutral memories.  
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Table 3.3 
Mean composite affective ratings by social memory type across memory generation sessions 
Memory Type Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Neutral 2.58 0.22 2.14 3.03 
Rejection -4.80 0.27 -5.35 -4.26 
Inclusion 6.38 0.30 5.78 6.99 
NB: Lower scores represent more negative mood with a range of -10 to +10 (most positive) 
Table 3.4 
Mean composite affective ratings by time across memory generation sessions 
Time Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Experience .87 .13 .61 1.12 
Recall 1.91 .16 1.59 2.23 
NB: Lower scores represent more negative mood with a range of -10 to +10 (most positive)  
 
Table 3.5  
Mean composite affective ratings by group, memory type and time across memory 
generation sessions 
Group Memory Type Time Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Controls Neutral Experience 2.50 0.24 2.01 2.98 
Recall 2.82 0.22 2.37 3.27 
Rejection Experience -4.56 0.29 -5.13 -3.99 
Recall -1.82 0.33 -2.47 -1.17 
Inclusion Experience 5.44 0.30 4.84 6.04 
Recall 5.38 0.31 4.75 6.01 
MDD Neutral Experience 2.18 0.43 1.32 3.03 
Recall 2.84 0.39 2.06 3.62 
Rejection Experience -7.84 0.50 -8.85 -6.84 
Recall -4.99 0.57 -6.13 -3.85 
Inclusion Experience 7.48 0.52 6.43 8.53 
Recall 7.24 0.55 6.14 8.34 
NB: Lower scores represent more negative mood with a range of -10 to +10 (most positive)  
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Vividness and Intensity Ratings 
Mean ratings of vividness and intensity obtained for each memory are summarised by memory 
type (Table 3.6), suggesting comparably high vividness and intensity scores across rejection 
and inclusion memories and dampened scores for neutral memories. Ratings at time of recall 
compared to time of experience (Table 3.7) similarly reveal comparable high scores of 
vividness and intensity, while group comparisons reveal a similar pattern as that across time, 
with marginally higher scores for vividness compared to intensity across both MDD and 
controls (Table 3.8). The interaction of group, memory type and time is presented in Table 3.9.  
Vividness ratings revealed a significant main effect for memory type (F[1.71,114.22]=57.45, 
p<0.001, ηp2=0.46). Planned comparisons deconstructing the main effect of memory type, 
indicated that vividness ratings for neutral memories were significantly (p<0.001) lower 
compared to both rejection (-1.22±0.19) and inclusion memories (-1.68±0.16), with rejection 
memories also significantly different in vividness from inclusion memories (-0.46±0.13, 
p=0.002). There was a main effect for time (F[1,67]=5.12, p=0.03, ηp2=0.07), with memories 
rated marginally more vivid at the time of experience than at time of recall (0.35±0.16). There 
was no main effect for group (F[1,67]=1.18, p=0.28, ηp2=0.02), suggesting that independent of 
memory type, there was no support for vividness ratings differing over time and between 
groups. There no significant interaction between time and group (F[1,67]=0.11, p=.74, 
ηp2=0.00). However, there was a significant interaction between memory type and time 
(F[1.69,112.98]=20.50, p<0.001, ηp2=0.23). Ratings at time of recall revealed memories being 
rated as most vivid for inclusion, followed by rejection memories relative to neutral memories, 
while vividness ratings at time of experience exhibited greater distinctions between memory 
types, with sharp increases in vividness for rejection and inclusion memories relative to neutral 
memories. Neutral memories were rated as more vivid at time of recall compared to time at 
experience (see Figure 3.4). There was no significant interaction between memory type and 
group (F[1.71,114.22]=1.29, p=0.28, ηp2=0.02), nor a three-way interaction between group, 
memory type and time (F[2,134]=1.71, p=0.19, ηp2=0.03). 
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Intensity ratings also revealed a significant main effect for memory type 
(F[1.63,110.67]=190.62, p<0.001, ηp2=0.74) with planned comparisons revealing that neutral 
memories were rated as significantly less intense compared to rejection (-3.94±0.24, p<0.001) 
and inclusion memories (-3.73±0.26, p<0.001), which in turn were comparably intense to 
rejection memories (0.21±0.17, p=0.63). There was also a significant main effect for time 
(F[1,68]=45.47, p<0.001, ηp2=0.40), with pairwise comparisons across groups revealing that 
memories were rated as significantly more intense at time of experience compared to time of 
recall (1.03±0.15). There was no main effect for group (F[1,68]=2.21, p=0.14, ηp2=0.03) or 
interaction between time and group (F[1,68]=0.01, p=.94, ηp2=0.00). A significant interaction 
between memory type and time (F[1.75,119.06]=15.20, p<0.001, ηp2=0.18), suggested a 
similar trend to vividness, in that memories are comparable low in intensity for neutral 
memories, and marginally lower at time of experience (Figure 3.5). Memories are rated as most 
intense at time of experience for both rejection and inclusion, with slightly lower intensity 
ratings at time of recall. However, the overall trend nonetheless suggests increased intensity 
and vividness for valenced compared to neutral memories. There was no significant interaction 
between memory type and group (F[2,68]=0.68, p=0.51, ηp2=0.01), or three-way interaction 
(F[2,136]= 0.29, p=0.75, ηp2=0.04). 
 
 
Table 3.6 
Mean vividness and intensity ratings by social memory type across memory generation sessions 
Measure Memory Type Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Vividness 
Neutral 6.49 0.19 6.12 6.86 
Rejection 7.71 0.16 7.39 8.02 
Inclusion 8.17 0.13 7.90 8.43 
Intensity 
Neutral 3.93 0.23 3.47 4.40 
Rejection 7.87 0.15 7.58 8.16 
Inclusion 7.66 0.19 7.28 8.04 
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Table 3.7 
Mean vividness and intensity ratings by time across memory generation sessions 
   Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval Measure Time Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Vividness Experience 7.63 0.16 7.32 7.95 Recall 7.28 0.15 6.99 7.57 
Intensity Experience 7.00 0.14 6.72 7.29 Recall 5.97 0.18 5.61 6.33 
 
Table 3.8 
Mean vividness and intensity ratings by group across memory generation sessions 
Measure Groups Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Vividness MDD 7.31 0.14 7.04 7.59 Controls 7.60 0.22 7.15 8.04 
Intensity MDD 6.28 0.15 5.98 6.57 Controls 6.70 0.24 6.21 7.19 
Table 3.9  
Mean vividness and intensity ratings by memory type and time across memory generation 
sessions 
 
Measure 
Memory 
Type 
  
Time Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Vividness 
Neutral Experience 6.18 0.27 5.65 6.71 
  Recall 6.80 0.17 6.47 7.14 
Rejection Experience 8.23 0.21 7.82 8.64 
  Recall 7.19 0.20 6.79 7.58 
Inclusion Experience 8.48 0.15 8.19 8.77 
  Recall 7.85 0.16 7.53 8.17 
Intensity 
Neutral Experience 4.13 0.28 3.57 4.69 Recall 3.74 0.23 3.28 4.19 
Rejection Experience 8.73 0.15 8.44 9.03 Recall 7.01 0.21 6.58 7.44 
Inclusion Experience 8.15 0.20 7.76 8.55 Recall 7.17 0.23 6.72 7.62 
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Figure 3.4 Mean interaction ± 1SE of the mean of time and memory type for vividness ratings. Rejection 
and inclusion memories are rated as more vivid overall than neutral memories. 
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Figure 3.5 Mean interaction ± 1SE of the mean of time and memory type for intensity ratings. Rejection 
and inclusion memories are rated as more intense relative to neutral memories, with intensity at recall 
lower than at experience overall.  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ACROSS SAMPLES 
Findings for the pooled data for depressed and healthy control participants obtained from the 
neuroimaging study (sample 1) and the behavioural study (sample 1), reveal that mood, 
intensity and vividness differed as a function of memory type, and but not, importantly, as a 
function of group. Thus, both groups appeared to experience comparable changes in mood, 
vividness and intensity as a function of memory type, despite mood, intensity and vividness 
ratings declining from the time the individual experienced the event to the time of recall as 
reported retrospectively within the memory generation session. The successful memory 
manipulation and sufficient saliency in emotion across groups thus indicates that the memory 
generation sessions met the conditions necessary in the script-driven imagery paradigm, as 
outlined in the introduction. The memories generated were therefore assumed to be suitable 
stimuli for the memory presentation sessions reported in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7. 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
This chapter reported the procedure for validating the recall of autobiographical memories of 
social rejection, inclusion and neutral social experiences for use in the script-driven imagery 
paradigm described in the two studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5. In line with our predictions, 
the recall of social rejection memories resulted in greater negative mood, while recall of 
inclusion memories improved mood, and neutral memories revealed no change in mood. We 
further established that mood manipulations were comparable across depressed and non-
depressed participants recruited as part of this thesis, and maintained sufficient saliency in 
terms of mood, intensity, and vividness over time. 
The present study aimed at validating the script-driven imagery paradigm using socially salient 
autobiographical memories of rejection and inclusion within the context of depression. As 
such, our findings are twofold; firstly, this chapter illustrates that salient social 
autobiographical memories can be generated across depressed and non-depressed samples with 
comparable phenomenological qualities regarding intensity, vividness and valence. Secondly, 
generated memories can be successfully employed to manipulate mood within an ecologically 
valid framework, again both in depressed and non-depressed individuals.  
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This latter finding is of particular importance, given the memory deficits previously described 
in depression. The tendency to recall over-general memories (Dalgleish & Brewin, 2007; J. M. 
G. Williams et al., 2007), preferential recall of negative relative to positive memories (Koehler 
et al., 2015) and attentional limitations were previously noted as potential barriers to the 
process of memory generation in a depressed sample. However, despite an increase in numbers 
of memories retrieved in each sample and sessions lasting up to two hours, these potential 
limitations were not found to interfere with successful memory generation. However, it is worth 
noting that these disturbances are more likely to be encountered when spontaneously recalling 
memories, as opposed to the recall of explicitly generated, and where necessary, cued, 
memories. 
In line with the affect fading bias described in the introduction, our results reveal an attenuation 
in affect, intensity, and vividness between experience and recall, in particular for healthy 
controls. This is consistent with previous findings that affective intensity decreases more for 
rejection compared to inclusion memories (Lindeman, Zengel, & Skowronski, 2016; Ritchie et 
al., 2009; Walker et al., 2003), despite participants being explicitly asked to report memories 
with current affective impact. In addition, reductions in vividness over time exhibited a 
valence-independent effect, although inclusion memories were rated as more vivid overall. 
This mirrors recent findings that positive events are recalled more vividly compared to negative 
events (Lindeman et al., 2016). Finally, as outlined in the introduction, this paradigm 
instrumentally relies on personal (social) disclosure. In the context of the work presented in 
this thesis, the interviews were all carried out by the main experimenter; however, future 
implementations may want to be mindful of the interactive effect, when using multiple 
experimenters. However, in our findings, both groups maintained comparable emotional 
saliency of the recalled memories over time, despite marginally elevated mood in controls 
relative to depressed participants across memories. Thus, importantly, our findings overall 
suggest that the fading affect bias was present with respect to memory type but not as a function 
of group, due to the explicit instructions about recalling memories with current emotional 
salience. In future, while this study ensured saliency across sessions, the latency between 
experience and recall should be incorporated more explicitly into the memory generation 
session, as there might be phenomenological differences between more or less recently 
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experienced events. As part of the script-driven imagery paradigm this omission was apparent 
when reviewing previous studies implementing this approach, with limited reference either to 
the time since the original event or saliency across sessions (Lanius et al., 2003, 2006; Beckham 
et al., 2007; Frewen et al., 2008, 2011a; Kleim et al., 2010).  
However, the question at the forefront of these studies is whether the recalled memories can 
reliably elicit salient emotions in the present and that the saliency can be comparable across 
groups and valence. Considering our findings from this very specific perspective, our results 
strongly suggest that in line with other script-driven imagery paradigms, autobiographical 
memories of both positive and negative valence serve to powerfully elicit salient emotions for 
use in behavioural and neuroscience social affective research. Previously, recalling trauma 
memories triggered high levels of negative affective intensity and vividness (Lanius et al., 
2002, 2006; Frewen et al., 2008). However, this was the first time this paradigm was 
implemented using multiple social autobiographical memories. Contrary to the notion of ‘bad 
is stronger than good’ (Baumeister et al., 2001), as outlined in the introduction in Chapter 1, 
autobiographical memories of both rejection and inclusion experiences revealed comparable 
intensity and vividness ratings compared to memories describing neutral or low-level social 
interactions. This suggests that the generation of socially salient memories in depression for 
use in a script-driven imagery paradigm is thus both feasible and ecologically valid. 
In sum, when comparing mood, affective intensity, and vividness ratings in response to 
recalling autobiographical memories of rejection and inclusion, both depressed and healthy 
controls were able to successfully retrieve and elicit memories that provoked salient emotions 
in the present. Further, affective fading effects were present for both groups between the 
retrospective ratings for the time of the event being experienced to the contemporary ratings at 
the time of recall within the memory generation session, but there was no support for 
differential affective fading across groups. Critically, therefore, the memories elicited 
sufficiently heightened mood, affective intensity, and vividness required for script-driven 
imagery. Given the comparable saliency across groups, the generated memories were thus 
deemed suitable as stimuli for use in the subsequent memory presentation sessions described 
in more detail in the subsequent chapters.    
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter determined the suitability of social autobiographical memories for use in 
the script-driven imagery paradigm. This chapter will present the first neuroimaging 
experiment to implement this paradigm to examine individual differences in detecting and 
responding to social signals at the behavioural and neural level in response to autobiographical 
memories of social rejection, inclusion and neutral social experiences, with depressed and 
healthy samples. 
Interpersonal rejection sensitivity encompasses both enhanced or diminished sensitivity to the 
behaviour and emotions of others as they pertain to the perceived level of inclusivity within a 
social group or relationship (Boyce & Parker, 1989). At the behavioural level, this involves 
heightened sensitivity to the receipt of social feedback, concern about behaviour and verbal 
statements of others, and fears of perceived or actual criticism. Enhanced rejection sensitivity 
may result in feelings of inadequacy, inferiority and the misinterpretation of social cues 
signalling rejection and/or inclusion, correlated with low mood (Gilbert & Allan, 1998). 
Behaviourally, individuals with high rejection sensitivity tend to modify their interpersonal 
behaviour and socially withdraw in an attempt to avoid actual social exclusion (Slavich & 
Irwin, 2014b), with the mere threat of social exclusion increasing selective attention to social 
signs of acceptance (DeWall et al., 2009), and the motivation to forge novel social affiliations 
(Maner et al., 2007). See Chapter 1 for more detailed discussion. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, at a neural level, processing of interpersonal rejection signals in 
healthy individuals has been investigated using the virtual ball-tossing game ‘Cyberball’ 
(Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003), designed to generate feelings of social exclusion. Results 
revealed increased activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), anterior insula (AI), 
and the right ventral prefrontal cortex (vPFC) regions alongside qualitatively distinct self-
reported feelings of ‘social pain’, as opposed to physical pain (Eisenberger, 2012a; Eisenberger 
& Lieberman, 2003). It was further argued that inducing a state of social distress may result in 
a diminished sensitivity to pain (Eisenberger, 2012b; Eisenberger et al., 2006). Finally, patients 
with somatoform pain disorders and fibromyalgia who experience pain with no medical 
explanation also reported greater levels of early social trauma, including emotional abuse or 
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family conflict (Imbierowicz & Egle, 2003).This suggests a similar underlying neural circuitry 
as somatosensory pain regions (Kross et al., 2011).  
On a theoretical level, these findings provided empirical support for the sociometer theory 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995, see also Chapter 1, page 38), which posits that perceptions of 
social rejection and acceptance are translated into state self-esteem, which serves as a gauge of 
interpersonal relationship status, alerting individuals to the threat of exclusion. This proposed 
neural ‘alarm system’ or ‘sociometer’ may provide the mechanism for the modification and 
adaptation of social strategies and behaviours (Eisenberger, Inagaki, Muscatell, Byrne Haltom, 
& Leary, 2011). However, more in-depth multivariate fMRI pattern analysis has revealed 
distinct affective representations for physical pain and social pain beyond the previous findings 
described at a gross anatomical level (Woo et al., 2014). Moreover, a meta-analysis that 
specifically focused on the contribution of the dACC in processing social pain suggested a 
more distributed pattern of activation including both dorsal and ventral ACC (Rotge et al., 
2015). Additionally, reconciling findings from the pain and reward processing literatures, there 
have been suggestions that physical pleasure and physical pain may similarly share a common 
neural substrate (Leknes & Tracey, 2008). Further, recent meta-analytical data investigating 
social rejection paradigms revealed distinct activations in the left ACC, bilateral AI and inferior 
orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) suggesting a more sophisticated index of the social dynamic than 
the dACC-AI co-activation initially proposed (S. Cacioppo et al., 2013). Finally, Somerville et 
al. (2006) argued that the ‘Cyberball’ paradigm (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003) is limited by 
its brief social inclusion condition, which precedes the salient exclusion event. Activity in 
dACC may therefore reflect expectancy violation rather than affective responses to social 
rejection per se (Somerville et al., 2006). This limitation may be addressed with a paradigm, 
which more adequately addressed the saliency across social conditions, such as the recall of 
highly emotionally salient autobiographical memories. 
Therefore, while the underlying neural mechanism of the social pain account had previously 
been discussed only with respect to processing of social rejection in healthy individuals 
(Eisenberger, Inagaki, Muscatell, Byrne Haltom, & Leary, 2011), emerging evidence warrants 
further investigation as to whether this social pain network may be similarly implicated in the 
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processing of inclusive social signals, considering the comparable saliency of social signals. 
Recently, a study investigating social processing in a population of healthy adolescents 
provided encouraging support for this notion of a common neural circuitry underlying positive 
and negative social evaluation with a novel social feedback paradigm (Dalgleish et al., 2017). 
Results revealed comparable activation in the dACC and AI to inclusive social feedback 
provided by virtual ‘peers’, suggesting that the social pain network may respond to socially 
salient information regardless of valence.  
This social pain debate is of importance in depression, as it begs the question of how social 
pain regions may respond to signals of inclusion in depression on a neural and psychological 
level. As described in Chapter 2, our behavioural findings suggest that depressed participants 
are significantly elevated in their sensitivity to interpersonal rejection compared to healthy 
controls. This builds on previous suggestions that individual differences in interpersonal 
rejection sensitivity mediate the relationship between early adverse life events, and depressive 
symptoms in later adult life (Luterek et al., 2004). Further, higher self-reported need for social 
acceptance and high investment in interpersonal relationships is associated with greater 
vulnerability to depression (Ayduk, Downey, & Kim, 2001). While early interpersonal theories 
of depression argued that feelings of low mood resulted as a function of maladaptive social 
behavior or poor ‘social skills’, greater  rejection sensitivity may increase the likelihood of 
experiencing social rejection in the first place (Coyne, 1998; Segrin & Dillard, 1992), alongside 
impairments in recognition and response to interpersonal social signals (Tse & Bond, 2004). 
However, Beck’s cognitive model (Beck, 1987) posits that emotional distress and behavioural 
problems are maintained by distortions in core beliefs or assumptions about the world, others 
and the self, which in turn trigger negative automatic thoughts, once activated. The experience 
of rejection thus sustains people’s view of themselves as unworthy of love and acceptance, 
thereby maintaining self-directed hostile cognitions and negative core beliefs in depression 
(Breines & Ayduk, 2015). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, heightened interpersonal sensitivity in depression is conceptualised 
within the social risk hypothesis of depressed mood (Allen & Badcock, 2003), which posits 
that both positive and negative interpersonal experiences are computed within a zero-sum 
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game, in which the trade-off between social value and social burden determines an individual’s 
social investment potential (SIP). This in turn impacts the extent to which an individual 
maintains beneficial social relationships, with critically low SIP triggering a range of 
behavioural coping strategies. The SR hypothesis suggests that depressed individuals may 
exhibit a heightened sensitivity to social cues of rejection, or inclusion aimed at restoring the 
optimal ratio of social value relative to social burden, as this would cease or maintain the 
adaptive social behaviours. Empirical support comes from recent findings suggesting a social 
processing network dedicated to evaluating social signals independent of valence. For instance, 
a study in a depressed community sample investigated expectations and affective responses to 
positive and negative social interactions using a social evaluation “Chatroom” task (Caouette 
& Guyer, 2015). Initial results suggested a dampened affective response to social acceptance; 
however these findings were modulated by the source of the evaluation (Steger & Kashdan, 
2009). Thus, tasks with an emphasis on social evaluation by a familiar source as opposed to 
unknown others revealed a heightened sensitivity to positive and negative social cues, in line 
with the SR hypothesis. This suggests that a threat to the social investment potential may be 
amplified in the presence of close other’s, as opposed unfamiliar others.  
At the neural level, recent evidence suggests heightened vulnerability to social signals in 
previously depressed women, with hyperactivity in dACC in response to repeated negative 
social evaluation (Dedovic, Slavich, Muscatell, Irwin, & Eisenberger, 2016), in line with the 
social pain account. However, emotional processing in depression is also associated with 
heightened amygdala response and attenuated dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
activation (Hamilton et al., 2012), alongside hyperconnectivity within the brain’s default 
network associated with internally oriented and self-referential processing (R. H. Kaiser, 
Andrews-Hanna, Wager, & Pizzagalli, 2015). Further, findings have revealed large-scale 
network dysfunction in fronto-parietal and midline cortical structures involved in attentional 
control, emotion and salience processing (R. H. Kaiser et al., 2015). This is seemingly at odds 
with the notion of heightened sensitivity to external signals of social salience. These network 
dysfunctions may reflect the maladaptive tendency for ruminative self-focus in the context of 
social evaluation, centred around negative self-schema communicating feelings of 
worthlessness in relation to others (B. Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Swallow & Kuiper, 1988). 
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This negative self-schema within a depressed individual’s cognitive framework acts to interpret 
events and may lead to distorted interpretations (Beck et al., 1979), such as negative appraisals 
of social signals. It might further account for previous findings of a negative response bias and 
reduced reward sensitivity described in more detail in the introduction (Chapter 1).  
In sum, it can thus be argued that the experience of social rejection can be both the cause and 
the consequence of depression, with implications both at the behavioural and neural levels. 
However, the psychological and neural processing of social signals pertaining to inclusivity 
have received less attention within the literature in healthy controls. In the context of 
depression, this question deserves particular attention, given the dysfunctions in emotional and 
social processing at the behavioural and neural levels and suggestions of heightened rejection 
sensitivity in depression. This chapter draws on self-generated autobiographical memories as 
a repository for salient social experiences and emotions that can inform, establish or maintain 
our current social narrative and interpersonal relationships and consequently, our emotional 
state. Autobiographical memories are explicit personal experiences, which can powerfully re-
elicit salient emotions experienced in the past in both healthy and depressed individuals using 
a script-driven imagery approach (Lanius et al., 2002). This would also address the notion of 
self-relevance and familiarity in the context of social evaluation, as autobiographical memories 
provide a platform for the elicitation of salient social emotions from highly self-relevant 
personal social narratives within distinct cultural and social contexts (Wilbers, Deuker, Fell, & 
Axmacher, 2012).  
The aim of the present study is thus to investigate the differential processing of social rejection 
and social inclusion information at behavioural and neural levels, in individuals with a 
diagnosis of clinical depression and those who have never been depressed. This will be 
achieved by using the script-driven imagery paradigm to elicit salient social emotions in the 
present and to investigate the neural and behavioural response while listening to and imagining 
a series of previously self-generated autobiographical memories of social rejection, social 
inclusion and socially neutral experiences, as described in the previous chapter.  
Our hypotheses were as follows;  
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HYPOTHESES 
Behavioural Hypotheses 
• Behavioural ratings of mood, vividness and intensity obtained in the memory 
presentation session will differ as a function of memory type, but not with respect to 
group, consistent with the findings in the memory generation session described in the 
previous chapter. 
Neural Hypotheses 
• We hypothesise that a common neural architecture exists for processing memories of 
social rejection and social inclusion (relative to neutral memories) within the previously 
described ‘social pain’ network, replicating previous findings in healthy controls 
(Dalgleish et al., 2017) and building on an emerging consensus (S. Cacioppo et al., 
2013). This consists of affective areas including the dACC and AI, as well as the OFC, 
consistent with the meta-analytic evidence (S. Cacioppo et al., 2013; Rotge et al., 2015). 
We aimed to replicate findings experimentally inducing feelings of social rejection and 
to extend this to the experience of social inclusion. 
• Individuals with depression will show heightened activation to cues of social rejection 
and social inclusion, relative to healthy controls within the same ‘social pain’ network 
(dACC, AI, OFC) described above, in line with the SR hypothesis and sociometer 
theory. 
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4.2 METHODS AND MATERIALS 
PARTICIPANTS 
Eighteen participants experiencing a current Major Depressive Episode and meeting criteria 
for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD; 13 female; 34.11±10.9 years) and 21 
healthy controls who had never met criteria for MDD (10 female; 35.30±16.1 years) were 
recruited from volunteer panels at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit and the 
University of Cambridge. All participants completed two research sessions, a behavioural 
memory generation session (described in Chapter 3) and a neuroimaging memory presentation 
session. All participants were right-handed, with no history of brain injury, normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and no hearing impairments. MDD participants previously 
underwent a structural clinical interview to confirm their diagnosis and current episode. Full 
demographics can be found in the results section in Table 4.2. For further information on 
general methods and recruitment see also Chapter 2.  
CLINICAL INTERVIEW AND SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND PROCESS SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
A comprehensive diagnostic interview and battery of social, affective and process self-report 
measures was undertaken with respect to all participants. See Chapter 2 for a full description. 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
Stimuli 
In the initial behavioural memory-generation session, participants provided 18 
autobiographical memories consisting of 6 social rejection memories, 6 social inclusion, 
memories and 6 emotionally neutral social memories (e.g. shopping in the presence of other 
people) and affective ratings with respect to current mood state at the time of memory recall 
and mood state at the time of the original experience. See Chapter 3 for memory generation 
methodology and data. The generated autobiographical memory scripts represented the stimuli 
for the following memory presentation session. Audio scripts of the autobiographical memories 
were recorded and edited using Adobe® Audition® (2009 Adobe Systems, version 3.0).  
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‘Self’ Memory Presentation (SEMP) Task  
In the neuroimaging session, participants were presented with the memory audio-scripts 
generated within the initial memory-generation session. In the present ‘self’ memory 
presentation task, the autobiographical memory scripts were presented within fMRI utilising a 
block-design comprising two functional runs with three blocks of three memories per block, in 
each run. The blocks were presented in a fixed order – social neutral, social rejection, and 
finally, social inclusion to facilitate overall mood repair (Figure 4.1). This gives six memories 
of each type. During the three 30-second memory audio scripts within each of the three blocks, 
participants were instructed to close their eyes and listen carefully to the memory. After each 
audio script, there was a 20-second period  of silence  during which participants were asked to 
mentally elaborate on the emotionally salient aspects of the previous memory (Lanius et al., 
2002). This ‘silent imagery period’ was the event of interest for our main analyses, in line with 
the previous script-driven imagery studies (Lanius et al., 2002).  
A tone cue followed each silent imagery period to indicate to participants to open their eyes 
and provide baseline and post-script mood ratings. Participants rated their current mood prior 
to each block following a brief 30-second closed-eye baseline period and following each audio 
script. Participants rated levels of current subjective distress, rejection, inclusion and positivity 
on the same 11-point Likert scale as in the initial behavioural session. The positive and negative 
scores were combined for the analyses into composite mood scores (See Chapter 3). An 
additional 30-second washout clip depicting an ocean sunset was presented between the 
rejection and inclusion blocks to facilitate mood repair. The order of individual scripts within 
each block was randomised. The total approximate duration was 25 minutes per run.  
Auditory presentation of the stimuli inside the scanner was delivered via Sensimetric’s S14 
headphones following the application of a custom equalization filter (© 2010 Sensimetric 
Corporation – www.sens.com, version 2.1) in combination with ear defenders to attenuate 
scanner noise. The headphones were connected via a desktop PC running Matlab (Mathworks) 
and presented using the psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  Simultaneously, 
participants were asked to provide mood ratings on a Likert scale using a button box. Visual 
presentation was provided via a custom-built mirror stereoscope, with the participant’s head 
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stabilised by a chin-and-head rest. The effective viewing distance was 50 cm with a resolution 
of 1024 x 768 and a visual angle of 16.7 degrees.   
 
 
Figure 4.1. Script-driven imagery paradigm for ‘Self’ Memory Presentation (SEMP) task adapted for 
fMRI (Lanius et al., 2002). 
 
PROCEDURE 
The procedure for the memory generation session is described in Chapter 3. One week later, in 
this 1.5-hour memory presentation session, participants provided informed consent once more 
and then performed the fMRI memory presentation task within the scanner. A practice run 
outside of the scanner preceded the experimental block to familiarise participants with the 
procedure. In the scanner, participants were instructed to keep their eyes closed throughout the 
baseline, listening and silent imagery periods. Following the tone cue, participants were 
instructed to open their eyes to provide the affective ratings. Immediately after the fMRI 
session, participants provided post-scanning ratings of overall intensity and vividness for each 
memory category, followed by a battery of social, affective and process self-report measures 
(described in Chapter 2). At the end of the session participants were thanked for their time and 
debriefed. 
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FMRI DATA ACQUISITION 
A 3T Siemens Tim Trio MRI scanner with a 32-channel head coil was used to acquire a 
structural T1-weighted MPRAGE image (1-mm isotropic voxels) and functional data of ~600 
whole-brain T2*-weighted EPI volumes with 32 oblique axial slices that were 3.5 mm thick, 
and an in-plane 64×64 matrix with resolution of 3×3 mm, TR 2 s, and TE 30 ms (two runs). 
FMRI data were pre-processed and analysed using MATLAB R2013a (Mathworks, Sherbon, 
Massachusetts) and SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping Software, Wellcome Trust Centre 
for Imaging Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom;  
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/). For details on fMRI preprocessing and 
analysis see below. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Behavioural Ratings 
Affective ratings acquired in the memory-generation session (‘session I’) at time of recall were 
compared to the ratings obtained during the memory presentation session (‘session II’) 
acquired within the scanner. See Appendix 4.2. In session II, the affective ratings acquired in 
the fMRI session were averaged for each memory type and change in affective ratings 
calculated. These affective ratings of current mood, as well as ratings of vividness and intensity 
were analysed in a series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with group 
(MDD/controls) as a between-group factor and memory type (rejection/inclusion/neutral) as a 
within-group factor. Self-report measures of affective, process and social processing were 
analysed using Pearson and Spearman correlational analyses and independent samples t-tests. 
fMRI Pre-processing and analysis 
Raw Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine (DICOM) images were converted to 
Neuroimaging Informatics Technology Initiative (NIFTI) format, realigned within and across 
both runs to correct for motion, and then each of the images was matched/resliced to the first 
image of the time series and a mean of these aligned images was generated. The mean BOLD 
image was co-registered with the T1 image, segmented and spatially normalised to Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) template space. The resulting warps were applied to all volumes, 
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with a 3mm isotropic voxel interpolation, followed by a 3D 8mm isotropic Gaussian kernel 
smoothing. For fMRI statistical analysis we ran a two-level RFX analysis using SPM12. At the 
first level, a linear convolution general linear model (GLM) was applied to the time series 
within each voxel across both runs. For each run, the blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) 
response was modelled by convolving a canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF) to 
each memory type (neutral, rejection, inclusion) during listening, silent imagery, closed-eye 
baseline, baseline ratings, post-script ratings, washout movie clip, and text instructions. At the 
second level, these contrasts were then entered into independent-samples t-tests and a full 
factorial ANOVA with group (2 levels: controls, MDD) and memory type (3 levels: neutral, 
rejection, inclusion) as the conditions of interest with separate sets of regressors generated per 
run for the separately modelled listening and silent imagery periods respectively, as well as six 
additional regressors generated per run to account for rigid-body movement (realignment 
parameters). Contrasts of these parameters were generated for negative rejection and positive 
inclusion memories relative to neutral social memories, as well as contrasts of negative 
rejection relative to positive inclusion memories for each participant during the listening and 
silent imagery periods. These silent imagery contrasts were taken to the second level for group 
level analysis. All whole-brain results were thresholded at p<0.001 uncorrected (k=20). It is 
important to note that this level of thresholding reduces the power to detect subtle differences 
of interest when correcting for multiple comparisons (Han et al., 2017). However, at this 
exploratory stage of the field, the statistical approach is in line with the previous literature (c.f. 
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003) and is further strengthened by the region of interest analysis 
described below. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the increased likelihood for Type I 
error when interpreting neuroimaging findings. 
Region of Interest Analyses 
For region of interest (ROI) analyses, peak voxel coordinates were obtained from a meta-
analysis examining the virtual ball-tossing game Cyberball and Romantic Rejection paradigms 
(S. Cacioppo et al., 2013), as described in the introduction and Chapter 1. In addition, further 
independent ROIs were obtained from a meta-analysis more closely examining the contribution 
of the ACC to social pain (Rotge et al., 2015), also described in the introduction. These 
functionally independent ROIs were defined by 10mm spheres centred on the respective peak 
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voxels. Anatomically overlapping ROIs were combined into conglomerate ROIs. ROI 
extraction was carried out using the MARsBaR toolbox within SPM (MARSeille Boîte À 
Région d’Intérêt; Brett et al., 2002). MARsBaR treats all voxel values within the region as 
repeat samples of the identical signal and calculates a single summary value to represent all the 
voxels in the ROI, resulting in a single ROI summary value per image on which the statistical 
model is run, extracting the signal using a finite impulse response (FIR) deconvolution. The 
contrast value represents the effect size. The uncorrected p is the one-tailed p value for the t 
statistic given the degrees of freedom for the analysis. The corrected p is the uncorrected p 
value with a Bonferroni correction for the number of ROIs analysed. MARsBaR does not 
correct the p value for the number of contrasts as the contrasts may not be orthogonal and this 
will make a Bonferroni correction too conservative. However, as the activity in the given ROI 
is assumed to be relatively homogenous, MARsBaR is the preferred analysis compared to small 
volume correction, which assumes potentially different responses in different part of the 
defined ROIs. See Table 4.1 for an overview of the ROIs examined here. 
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Table 4.1 
Peak coordinates for region of interest (ROI) analyses derived from meta-analyses on social 
pain 
Meta-Analysis Description x y z Labels     
Cacioppo et al. 
2013  
Rejection by a 
stranger during 
Cyberball 
paradigms 
38 18 -6 Right Anterior Insula*1 
38 18 -6 Right Anterior Insula *1 
34 14 -6 Right Anterior Insula *1 
-36 20 -10 Left Anterior Insula *4    
-2 52 10 Left ACC 
-32 16 -20 Left Inferior Orbito-Frontal Cortex   
0 48 38 Superior Medial Frontal region   
Cacioppo et al. 
2013  
Feelings of 
rejection by a 
significant other 
10 40 16 Right ACC*2 
10 38 12 Right ACC*2 
10 40 18 Right ACC*2 
12 12 -2 Right Caudate Nucleus*3 
18 20 6 Right Caudate Nucleus*3 
-42 30 10 Left Inferior Frontal Lobe 
-34 32 -12 Left Inferior Orbito-Frontal Cortex*4 
32 26 8 Right Anterior Insula   
Rotge et al. 
2015  dACC social pain 
4 36 -4 Dorsal ACC 25/32   
8 24 24 Dorsal ACC 24/32   
Note: * and superscript numbers indicate combined (anatomically overlapping) ROIs in final 
MARsBaR analysis.  
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4.3 RESULTS 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 4.2 shows the demographic characteristics of healthy controls and MDD 
participants. Appendix 4.1 presents the descriptives and group comparison of social, affective 
and process measures for the current sample. All measures revealed significant group 
differences between MDD and healthy controls, except for the Spontaneous Use of Imagery 
Scale (p=0.12). Our groups were well matched in age (t(37)=0.51, p=0.61), reading ability 
(NART (t(37)=.21, p=0.83), and in other characteristics (see Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2 
Demographic Characteristics for Chapter 4. Numbers are ns unless otherwise stated. 
       Controls  n=21  
MDD 
n=18 
Total  
N=39 X
2 p 
  Sex               
    Male    11   5 16 2.43 0.12 
    Female   10   13 23   
  Age, years 
    Mean   35.05   34.11 34.62    
    SD   15.68   10.92 13.53   
 National Adult Reading Test        
 Mean   8.71   7.78 8.28   
 SD   5.90   5.48 5.66   
  Ethnicity            
    Caucasian   20   16 36 1.4* 0.72 
    Other   1   2 3   
  Marital Status            
    Single/Unmarried   17   8 25 6.29* 0.05 
    Married   2   7 9   
    Separated/Divorced   1   2 3   
    Other   1   1 2   
 Education        
 Completed HSC/Yr 12   9   8 17 4.37* 0.57 
 Other   2   0 2   
 Employment Status            
    Employed   17   13 30 1.75* 0.43 
    Unemployed   4   5 9   
  Employment            
    Full-Time   12   12 24 2.45* 0.89 
  Part-Time   5   3 8   
  Other   4   3 7   
Note: * indicates Fisher’s Exact Test 
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BEHAVIOURAL RATINGS 
Memory Generation (Session I) 
In the first step, we investigated whether the memories recalled in the memory-generation 
session had maintained their saliency over time since the original event considering both group 
and memory type. These results are presented in Chapter 3. Results suggested both groups 
maintained comparable emotional saliency of the recalled memories over time. Then, session 
I and session II were compared in a further manipulation check to ensure comparable saliency 
across sessions. See Appendix 4.2 for results. The generated memories were deemed 
appropriate for use in the neuroimaging memory presentation session. 
‘Self’ Memory Presentation Task (Session II) 
To investigate the response to the emotional memories within the neuroimaging session, we 
compared the change in affect during the memory presentation session immediately before and 
after each memory was presented (see Table 4.3), as well as vividness and intensity ratings 
(see Appendix 4.9). Affective change ratings were analysed using a series of univariate 
ANOVAs with group (MDD/controls) as a between-group factor and memory type 
(rejection/inclusion/neutral) as the within-group factor. Normality and homogeneity 
assumptions were met. Within-subject factor memory type violated Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity (x2=13.26, p=0.001) and will be reported using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction.  
Affective ratings are presented as a function of memory type and group in Table 4.4. Results 
revealed a significant main effect for memory type (F[1.51,52.91]=188.91, p<0.001, ηp2=0.84). 
Planned comparisons of the main effect of memory type corrected using a Bonferroni 
adjustment, indicated significant differences in mood ratings between memory types (all 
p<0.001). Mood was significantly more negative for rejection memories relative neutral  
(-8.11±0.59) and inclusion memories (-12.63±0.82), while inclusion memories were rated as 
highest in positive mood relative to neutral (4.52±0.52). Overall, mood across groups was 
significantly decreased following rejection memories compared to relatively unchanged mood 
following neutral and significantly increased mood following inclusion memories (see 
Table 4.3). This is further illustrated in Figure 4.2. There was no main effect for group 
(F[1,35]=0.155, p=0.70, ηp2= 0.004). The same pattern of results emerged when run was 
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included as a variable in the analysis, suggesting an absence of practice effects across runs. 
This was therefore not reported in the final analysis. There was no significant interaction 
between memory type and group (F[2,70]= 0.46, p=0.63, ηp2 = 0.01), suggesting change in 
mood solely differed as a function of memory type and not group, in line with our expectations 
based on the comparability of memories across groups in the initial memory generation session 
(see Table 4.4).  
Vividness ratings obtained in the neuroimaging session between groups and across memories 
revealed a main effect for memory type (F[2,58]= 52.52, p<0.001, ηp2=0.64). Planned 
comparisons revealed a significant difference (p<0.001) between neutral memories and both 
rejection (-1.54±0.20) and inclusion memories (-1.86±0.21), while rejection and inclusion 
memories were not significantly different from each other (0.32±0.17, p=0.214). There was no 
significant main effect for group (F[1,29]= 0.42, p=0.52, ηp2=0.01) nor an interaction between 
memory type and group (F[2,58]=0.25, p=0.78, ηp2=0.01). See Appendix 4.9. 
Intensity ratings revealed that Mauchly’s assumption of sphericity had been violated, x2(9.49), 
p<0.009), therefore results will be reported using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction. The results 
show that there was a main effect for memory type (F[1.55,45.05]=72.89, p<0.001, ηp2=0.72), 
but no main effect for group (F[1,29]=1.84, p=0.19, ηp2=0.06) and no significant interaction 
(F[1.55,45.05]=0.45, p=0.59, ηp2=0.02). Planned comparisons revealed a significant difference 
(p<0.001) between neutral memories and both rejection (-.437±0.38) and inclusion memories 
(-4.06±0.50), while rejection and inclusion memories were not significantly different from each 
other (-0.31±0.31, p=1.000). This suggests comparable vividness for valenced memories 
compared to neutral memories across groups. See Appendix 4.9. 
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Table 4.3 
Mean mood ratings by memory type (Chapter 4)  
Memory Type Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Neutral -7.55 0.63 -8.82 -6.28 
Rejection 0.56 0.24 0.06 1.05 
Inclusion 5.08 0.47 4.13 6.03 
NB: Lower scores represent more negative mood with a range of -10 to +10 (most positive) 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Interaction between group and memory type (Chapter 4) 
Group 
Memory 
Type Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
MDD 
Neutral .78 .35 .07 1.50 
Rejection -7.20 .90 -9.02 -5.38 
Inclusion 4.83 .67 3.47 6.19 
Controls 
Neutral .33 .34 -.37 1.02 
Rejection -7.90 .87 -9.68 -6.13 
Inclusion 5.32 .65 4.00 6.65 
NB: Lower scores represent more negative mood with a range of -10 to +10 (most positive) 
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Figure 4.2. Mean change ± 1SE in mean positive and negative mood in response to autobiographical 
memories from the fMRI session. Results showed significant mood deterioration and mood 
enhancement following social rejection and social inclusion memories, respectively with mood 
remaining unchanged following neutral memories. There were no significant group differences in 
mean change in mood.  
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FMRI RESULTS 
Region of Interest Analyses 
The first analysis was designed to look at differential patterns of activation across all 
participants and within groups in response to silent imagery of rejection relative to neutral and 
inclusion relative to neutral memories across a group of selected ROIs. The two main contrasts 
of interest of rejection relative to neutral and inclusion relative to neutral were derived from 
previous studies investigating ‘social pain’ (S. Cacioppo et al., 2013; Eisenberger, 2012b; 
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003; Rotge et al., 2015). The ROIs were derived from meta-
analyses investigating the neural basis of social pain and are presented in Table 4.3. 
One-sample t-test results are presented in Table 4.5. It is important to note that one MDD and 
three healthy participants were excluded from the final ROI and whole-brain fMRI data 
analyses due to acquisition difficulties. Analysis of all remaining participants revealed 
activation in dACC during inclusion versus neutral and inclusion and rejection versus neutral, 
but not for rejection versus neutral or rejection versus inclusion and vice versa. Next, we 
investigated the pattern of activation within each group separately. One-sample t-tests in MDD 
participants suggest the results from all participants might be driven by MDD participants, who 
revealed greater activation in dACC and right caudate nucleus during rejection relative to 
neutral memories and significant activity in dACC, inferior orbito-frontal and left AI during 
inclusion relative to neutral memories. as well as in the bilateral AI and left inferior orbital 
frontal cortex during rejection and inclusion relative to neutral for MDD. For control 
participants, one-sample t-tests did not reveal significant activity within the selected ROIs. 
We then sought to explore between-group differences at the second level with independent 
sample t-tests between MDD and controls (see Table 4.5). Results revealed greater bilateral AI 
and dACC activation in MDD compared to controls for inclusion relative to neutral and 
inclusion and rejection relative to neutral, as well as dACC activation only in rejection relative 
to neutral again heightened in MDD relative to controls. A full factorial with group 
(MDD/controls) and memory type (neutral, rejection, inclusion) is presented in Appendix 4.13. 
Across all levels of analysis there were no significant activations across ROIs for inclusion 
compared to rejection and rejection compared to inclusion and no significant interactions.
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Table 4.5 
Region of interest analysis for one sample T-tests of silent imagery of autobiographical memories of rejection and inclusion 
  MNI Coordinates   Rejection > Neutral   Inclusion > Neutral   
Rejection & Inclusion > 
Neutral   
Region of Interest x y z   Controls MDD All    Controls MDD All    Controls MDD All    
Right Anterior Insula 38 18 -6   1.00 0.11 0.72   1.00 0.08 0.88   1.00 0.08 0.75   
Left ACC   -2 52 10   1.00 0.05 0.20   0.30 0.05* 0.01*   0.81 0.03* 0.02*   
Left Inferior Orbito-Frontal Cortex   -32 16 -20   1.00 0.41 0.90   1.00 0.03* 0.23   1.00 0.04* 0.43   
Left Anterior Insula    -36 20 -10   1.00 0.24 0.90   1.00 0.22 0.99   1.00 0.19 0.95   
Superior Medial Frontal Gyrus   0 48 38   1.00 0.43 0.81   0.99 0.30 0.41   1.00 0.23 0.53   
Right ACC 10 40 16   1.00 0.05 0.47   1.00 0.32 0.53   1.00 0.08 0.37   
Right Caudate Nucleus 12 12 -2   1.00 0.05* 0.33   1.00 0.16 0.85   1.00 0.05 0.51   
Left Inferior Frontal Lobe 
(Trigerminalis) -42 30 10   0.86 0.15 0.13   0.99 0.72 0.71   0.94 0.31 0.26   
Right Anterior Insula   32 26 8   1.00 0.09 0.84   1.00 0.06 0.99   1.00 0.04* 0.90   
Left Anterior Insula  -34 32 -12   1.00 0.31 0.90   1.00 0.04* 0.67   1.00 0.08 0.75   
dACC 25/32 4 36 -4   0.86 0.00* 0.08   0.34 0.02* 0.01*   0.67 0.00* 0.02*   
dACC 24/32 8 24 24   0.80 0.02* 0.08   0.86 0.00* 0.03*   0.84 0.01* 0.03*   
*denotes p-values significant at p<0.05 
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Table 4.5 cont’d. 
  Coordinates   Rejection > Inclusion   Inclusion > Rejection 
Region of Interest x y z   Controls MDD All   Controls MDD All 
Right Anterior Insula 38 18 -6   0.98 1.00 0.97   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Left ACC   -2 52 10   1.00 1.00 1.00   0.48 1.00 0.82 
Left Inferior Orbito-Frontal Cortex   -32 16 -20   1.00 1.00 1.00   0.99 0.95 0.91 
Left Anterior Insula    -36 20 -10   0.91 1.00 0.97   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Superior Medial Frontal Gyrus   0 48 38   1.00 1.00 1.00   0.99 0.99 0.98 
Right ACC 10 40 16   1.00 0.97 1.00   0.99 1.00 1.00 
Right Caudate Nucleus 12 12 -2   0.98 0.97 0.90   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Left Inferior Frontal Lobe (Trigerminalis) -42 30 10   0.90 0.98 0.84   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Right Anterior Insula   32 26 8   0.86 1.00 0.97   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Left Anterior Insula  -34 32 -12   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 0.97 1.00 
dACC 25/32 4 36 -4   1.00 0.96 1.00   0.86 1.00 1.00 
dACC 24/32 8 24 24   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 0.50 0.92 
*denotes p-values significant at p<0.05 
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Table 4.6 
Regions of interest for two-sample T-tests during silent imagery of autobiographical memories of rejection and inclusion  
  
MNI 
Coordinates   Rejection > Neutral   Inclusion > Neutral   
Rejection & 
Inclusion > Neutral   
Rejection > 
Inclusion   
Inclusion > 
Rejection 
Region of Interest x y z   
Controls 
> MDD 
MDD > 
Controls   
Controls 
> MDD 
MDD > 
Controls   
Controls 
> MDD 
MDD > 
Controls   
Controls 
> MDD 
MDD > 
Controls   
Controls 
> MDD 
MDD > 
Controls 
Right AI 38 18 -6   1.00 0.19   1.00 0.02*   1.00 0.04*   0.99 1.00   1.00 1.00 
Left ACC -2 52 10   1.00 0.15   1.00 0.69   1.00 0.23   1.00 0.81   0.81 1.00 
Left Inferior OFL  -32 16 -20   1.00 0.30   1.00 0.04*   1.00 0.04*   0.99 1.00   1.00 0.99 
Left AI -36 20 -10   1.00 0.21   1.00 0.02*   1.00 0.04*   0.94 1.00   1.00 0.97 
Superior MFG  0 48 38   1.00 0.77   1.00 0.77   1.00 0.69   1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 
Right ACC 10 40 16   1.00 0.12   1.00 0.46   1.00 0.15   1.00 0.93   0.95 1.00 
Right Caudate 
Nucleus 12 12 -2   1.00 0.15   1.00 0.18   1.00 0.09   1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 
Left IFG  -42 30 10   1.00 0.88   1.00 0.84   1.00 0.81   1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 
Right AI 32 26 8   1.00 0.10   1.00 0.00*   1.00 0.01*   0.92 1.00   1.00 0.96 
Left AI -34 32 -12   1.00 0.24   1.00 0.01*   1.00 0.03*   0.95 1.00   1.00 0.97 
dACC 25/32 4 36 -4   1.00 0.02*   1.00 0.11   1.00 0.02*   1.00 0.74   0.78 1.00 
dACC 24/32 8 24 24   1.00 0.05*   1.00 0.00*   1.00 0.01*   0.72 1.00   1.00 0.81 
*denotes p-values significant at p<0.05 
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Whole-Brain Analyses 
In addition to ROI analyses derived from specific social pain paradigms (S. Cacioppo 
et al., 2013; Eisenberger, 2012b; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003; Rotge et al., 2015), 
we further explored the underlying signal using a whole-brain analysis, given our 
novel social script imagery paradigm. At the first level within one-sample t-tests, we 
explored the neural pattern of activation in response to silent imagery of rejection 
compared to neutral and inclusion compared to neutral memories within each group 
individually. This is pertinent, given the focus of the literature to date on investigating 
the neural response to social pain in healthy controls only.  
Thus, one-sample t-tests in healthy controls in Appendix 4.10 revealed activity in 
bilateral post central gyrus (p<0.001 uncorrected) during silent imagery of rejection 
relative to neutral memories. Inclusion memories compared to neutral memories 
revealed bilateral post central gyrus activity. There were no significant differences 
for rejection relative to inclusion memories during silent imagery in healthy controls. 
One-sample t-tests in MDD participants in Appendix 4.11 revealed activations in 
right amygdala, anterior hippocampus, subgenual PFC, bilateral insula, inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) and ventral striatum (VS) for rejection versus neutral memories 
during silent imagery. During inclusion compared to neutral silent imagery, we found 
the same areas as above, except for VS and subgenual PFC. There were no significant 
activations for rejection relative to inclusion memories during silent imagery.  
In line with our ROI analysis, we next sought to explore between-group differences 
in response to silent imagery of memories in two-sample t-tests. See Appendix 4.12 
and Figure 4.3. MDD participants compared to controls showed increased activation 
in the subgenual PFC, bilateral insula, dACC and inferior frontal lobe for rejection 
relative to neutral memories. During inclusion, relative to neutral memories MDD 
participants, relative to controls, showed increased activation in the dACC (2,26,42, 
z=3.44) and bilateral insula. There was no significant difference between groups for 
social inclusion relative to rejection or vice versa.  
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Finally, we explored silent imagery more closely with a conjunction analysis of 
rejection versus neutral imagery and inclusion versus neutral imagery within and 
across both groups, inclusively masked by a functionally defined pain meta-analytic 
map derived from neurosynth (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 
2011). This map was used to highlight the heightened sensitivity to pain and to more 
closely investigate the relationship between physical pain and social pain initially 
reported in the mainstream literature (Eisenberger et al., 2006; Eisenberger & 
Lieberman, 2003; Kross et al., 2011; Woo et al., 2014). Conjunction results 
thresholded at p<0.05, uncorrected, for all participants revealed bilateral postcentral 
gyrus activation (-48,-22,28, z=3.59 & 48,-22,38, z=3.47). For healthy controls only, 
results showed bilateral activation in postcentral gyrus (-52,-22,28, z=4.22, & 48,-
24,30, z=3.87), while for MDD participants, rejection versus neutral and inclusion 
versus neutral revealed significant activation within left AI (-34,0,8, z=3.17),  
bilateral thalamus (18, -6, 10, z=2.48 & -14, -12, -4, z=2.32), bilateral putamen 
(30,4,8, z=3.25 & 20,6,-2, z=1.91), and anterior cingulate gyrus (0, 32, 24, z=2.27). 
Finally, to investigate the hypothesis that the common neural substrate for inclusion 
and rejection processing is heightened within MDD, we explored the conjunction of 
rejection versus neutral and inclusion versus neutral in MDD relative to controls. This 
revealed greater activity in bilateral AI (28,16,-14, z=2.31 & -34,12,-12, z=2.17), 
dACC (2,34,22, z=1.93), right IFG (36,34,-4, z=2.49) and middle frontal 
gyrus/postcentral gyrus (54,12,42, z=2.44). 
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Figure 4.3. Two-sample whole-brain fMRI analysis results. (A) Silent imagery of 
rejection>neutral memories and (B) inclusion>neutral memories for MDD compared to 
controls revealed significant activations in bilateral insula, IFG, subgenual PFC and dACC, 
uncorrected at p<0.001, k=20. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Conjunction analysis results. A logical ‘AND’ conjunction analysis of inclusion 
and rejection (relative to neutral memories) and MDD relative to controls revealed bilateral 
AI, dACC, MFG and IFG activation. All conjunction analyses were inclusively masked by a 
FDR thresholded neurosynth pain mask, uncorrected at p<0.01, k=20 (Yarkoni et al., 2011).  
 
A  Inclusion > Neutral AND Rejection > Neutral, Conjunction analysis
MDD
Bilateral Precentral Gyrus
Bilateral Anterior Insula
B Inclusion > Neutral AND Rejection > Neutral, MDD > Controls
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Supramarginal Gyrus
Bilateral Anterior 
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Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex
Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus
Middle Frontal 
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4.4 DISCUSSION  
This chapter reports a study involving the recall of emotionally salient 
autobiographical memories of social rejection and social inclusion compared to 
neutral social memories in depressed participants and healthy controls. Results 
revealed a common neural substrate for both social inclusion and social rejection 
(relative to neutral) in affective regions previously associated with social rejection in 
healthy controls only, in line with our predictions. These results point towards a 
shared neural architecture for processing social rejection and social inclusion 
experiences (relative to neutral) in line with recent findings (Dalgleish et al., 2017). 
In addition, as predicted, this shared pattern of activation in the traditional 'social 
pain' network, including the dACC and AI, was heightened in depressed individuals 
relative to healthy controls.  
These findings challenge previous suggestions that the dACC-AI social pain network 
exclusively responds to the psychological experience of social pain, as posited in 
previous Cyberball paradigms (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003). Central to this 
social pain account is our fundamental need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), 
supported by empirical evidence that individuals high in interpersonal rejection 
sensitivity tend to modify their interpersonal behaviour to avoid social exclusion and 
maintain social acceptance (Slavich & Irwin, 2014b). As discussed in the main 
introduction (Chapter 1.6), the sociometer theory provides a compelling explanatory 
framework reconciling both behavioural and neuroimaging findings investigating the 
processing of socially relevant information (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Eisenberger 
et al., 2011). However, in the social pain account, the sociometer was re-
conceptualised as a ‘neural alarm’ system, in which the ‘social pain’ network of 
activation selectively responds to socially salient cues alerting us to the perceived or 
actual threat of social exclusion (Eisenberger, 2012a, 2015; Eisenberger et al., 2011).  
However, in the context of our findings, we suggest that the 'social pain' network of 
activation responds more generally to both inclusive and exclusive socially salient 
cues as a gauge of interpersonal relationships. In other words, a neural sociometer 
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that continuously monitors and evaluates incoming social information and alerts us 
to potential changes to our social status. The processing of both positive and negative 
social signals thus serve to inform and maintain our interpersonal relationships and 
social standing, as measured by moment to moment fluctuations in our self-esteem 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995).  
In the social risk hypothesis of depressed mood (Allen & Badcock, 2003), this is 
further illustrated in the trade-off between social value and social burden estimation, 
which determines an individual’s social investment potential (SIP). Monitoring social 
cues of both negative and positive information is critical to restoring optimal SIP. 
This suggests that depressed individuals may exhibit a heightened neural sensitivity 
to social cues of rejection, or inclusion, relative to healthy controls, alongside 
attentional and behavioural attunements, described in Chapter 2. Our findings thus 
extend the existing social pain account, reflected in increased motivation to enhance 
and maintain social connectedness. They also contribute to the emerging 
neuroimaging literature pointing towards a common neural substrate for social pain 
and social gain, underscoring the notion of a more complex representation of social 
signals in the social pain network (S. Cacioppo et al., 2013; Dalgleish et al., 2017; 
Eisenberger et al., 2011; Leknes & Tracey, 2008; Woo et al., 2014). This is further 
complemented by a recent study by Dalgleish et al. (2017), where a novel social 
evaluation task revealed common activations in the insula and dACC derived from a 
conjunction analysis of positive versus neutral and negative versus neutral social 
feedback.  
However, the literature on neural and behavioural responses to affective cues of social 
acceptance remains divided. One line of evidence suggests that greater depressive 
symptoms are associated with decreased affect in response to positive cues (Feeser et 
al., 2013). Other findings indicate that social cues and memories involving social 
acceptance elicit greater positive affect in depressed individuals (Bylsma et al., 2008). 
This suggests that depressive symptoms may increase sensitivity to experiences of 
social acceptance (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; DeWall et al., 2009; Steger & 
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Kashdan, 2009). However, a recent study in a depressed community sample results 
suggested a dampened affective response to social acceptance using a social 
evaluation “Chatroom” task (Caouette & Guyer, 2015); modulated by the source of 
the evaluation (Steger & Kashdan, 2009). This suggested that tasks with an emphasis 
on social evaluation by a familiar source as opposed to unknown others revealed a 
heightened sensitivity to positive and negative social cues, in line with our results. In 
using autobiographical memories to elicit salient social emotions, our design thus 
employed a highly self-relevant task with sources of rejection stemming from familiar 
others or at the very least from rehearsed and thereby familiar experiences. This 
suggests a potential role for familiarity in social processing in depression, which will 
be further explored in the next chapter. The recollection of these emotionally salient 
autobiographical memories further provided an ecologically valid measure of social 
experiences and provided insight into the underlying neural processing of social 
signals in depressed compared to healthy individuals. 
Challenges to this approach include the difficulty in clearly delineating socially 
inclusive from socially neutral interactions. This limitation extends to previous 
paradigms, including investigating social rejection in the ‘Cyberball’ paradigm 
(Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003), in which the social inclusion condition may be 
better conceptualized as a default ‘neutral’ condition (Somerville et al., 2006). 
However, as our memories elicited comparably salient emotions, as previously 
validated in Chapter 3, this argument may not apply in our script-driven imagery 
paradigm. Firstly, and importantly, despite baseline differences in memory retrieval 
in depression, we found no difference in the use of spontaneous imagery between 
groups. This may have accounted for baseline differences in silent imagery and hence 
brain activation. In addition, comparable changes in affect following each memory 
lend weight to the notion that both groups were comparably able to imagine salient 
emotional experiences and that differences in brain activation are not due to 
difference in imagery or affect. Although accounts of salience cannot be fully 
discounted, given the prior memory interview, all memories were recalled in depth 
and rehearsed and therefore comparably salient when presented back to participants 
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in the scanner in the fixed order as before. Therefore, future study designs should 
incorporate both social and non-social positive and negative conditions to fully 
account for sociality as opposed to saliency as the core process driving these common 
activations. This presents a limitation to the current study, as well as other Cyberball 
paradigms described previously. Further discussion of the limitations within the 
current literature are outlined in Chapter 1. 
In sum, it remains to be explored whether the current literature has fully addressed 
the neural and affective response to events explicitly signalling social inclusion, 
warranting further investigation into existing accounts of social pain processing. 
However, our conjunction analysis revealed additional affective and physical regions 
within the traditional social pain network activated by social rejection and inclusion 
memories. This study further extends existing findings by revealing a heightened 
response in MDD, thus representing the first of its kind to explicitly address the social 
pain debate in the context of depression. However, the ‘social pain’ network may 
represent a misnomer within the literature and instead represent a more sophisticated 
index of social processing. Given our findings we firstly argue that the so-called 
social pain matrix may share common representations at the gross anatomical level 
with social inclusion. As a result, in our understanding, the social pain network would 
be more accurately conceptualized as a dedicated social processing network tasked 
with monitoring and evaluating socially relevant signals in our environment, 
reflecting the more complex framework being brought forward by emerging research 
findings (S. Cacioppo et al., 2013; Leknes & Tracey, 2008; Rotge et al., 2015; Woo 
et al., 2014). Secondly, our findings shed light on the heightened neural response and 
hypersensitivity to social signals in depression in the absence of behavioural 
differences in affective responses from controls, which carry important implications 
for the observed downstream cognitive biases underlying the development and 
maintenance of depressive symptoms. However, social proximity and self-relevance 
may have mediating effects on the findings discussed above and warrant further 
investigation.   
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter investigated the neural and behavioural responses to listening 
and imagining emotionally salient personal experiences from the past in currently 
depressed and healthy control individuals. Recalling autobiographical memories of 
social rejection and inclusion compared to neutral social memories activated a 
common neural substrate including affective regions previously uniquely associated 
with the dACC-AI ‘social pain network’ (Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2003; 
Eisenberger, 2015). Further, conjunction analyses of rejection compared to neutral 
AND inclusion compared to neutral memories revealed a heightened response within 
the same dACC-AI network in depressed participants compared to healthy controls. 
This points towards a heightened neural sensitivity towards socially salient 
information in depression rather than selective neural sensitivity towards negatively 
valenced social information, as previously assumed. These findings integrate well 
into recent evidence suggesting a common neural substrate for complex 
representations of both positive and negative social signals (S. Cacioppo et al., 2013; 
Dalgleish et al., 2017). 
However, important questions remain concerning the personal relevance of a given 
social context in activating these neural circuits (Steger & Kashdan, 2009). We know 
that self-referential information is processed differently from other-relevant 
information in healthy controls and depressed alike (Wisco, 2009). This gives rise to 
questions regarding the psychological and neural bases of how we process other-
relevant social experiences. In healthy controls, the presentation of self-relevant 
stimuli is associated with better memory recall, greater speed of processing and 
greater attentional shifts in autobiographical memory specificity (Symons & Johnson, 
1997; J. M. G. Williams et al., 2007; N. Wood & Cowan, 1995). This has been 
conceptualised as the ‘self-reference effect’ (Klein, 2012). However, heightened self-
focused attention can give way to negative self-referential thinking and rumination. 
Thus, in depression, negative self-coherence is maintained over more adaptive 
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thinking styles (M. A. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), suggesting a detrimental 
impact of heightened self-referential thinking in depression.  
At a neural level, neuroimaging evidence suggests that self-referential processing, 
including self-evaluation of traits, beliefs and preferences, is associated with 
increased activity in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and the medial PFC (Frewen et al., 
n.d.; Kelley et al., 1989; Schmitz et al., 2004; D’Argembeau, 2013; Kim and Johnson, 
2013). In depression, heightened attention to self-referential information revealed 
conflicting results, with both increased and decreased mPFC activation, compared to 
healthy controls (Lemogne et al., 2012). Further, a study investigating resting-state 
activity, argued to reflect self-referential processing, suggested greater activity in 
ventromedial PFC, ventral striatum, and thalamus with reduced activity in postcentral 
gyrus, fusiform gyrus, and insula in depression compared to controls, suggestive of 
resource allocation away from externally-oriented cognitive processes (Kühn & 
Gallinat, 2013).  
These findings warrant a deeper understanding of the atypical neural representation 
of self- versus other-relevant information in the context of social functioning in 
depression. To date, limited research has addressed empathy for others’ social 
experiences of rejection and inclusion in healthy controls, with existing studies 
revealing conflicting results (Eisenberger, 2015; Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 
2011b; Nordgren et al., 2011). On the one hand, observing others’ social pain of 
exclusion was associated with increased activation in areas associated with self-
referential processing, including the dorsomedial, medial PFC and precuneus 
(Masten et al., 2011a). On the other hand, empathy for social pain was argued to 
activate sensory-discriminative areas, including posterior insula cortex and secondary 
somatosensory cortex (S2) (Lamm et al., 2011). Finally, the subgenual cingulate 
cortex was recruited during empathic processing of both physical and social pain 
(Novembre et al., 2013), contrasting with earlier evidence suggesting affective but 
not sensory activation in response to others’ experience of physical pain (Singer et 
al., 2004).  
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Moreover, neural networks appear to respond differentially as a function of social 
proximity and interdependence. Affective areas, including the dACC and insula were 
recruited during the observation of social exclusion of close others (Beeney et al., 
2011; Meyer et al., 2013, 2014). In contrast, observing less proximal social targets’, 
i.e. strangers’, social pain of exclusion, was associated with greater activity in the 
dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), precuneus, and temporal pole, mirroring 
previous findings (Masten et al., 2011b). In addition, a study investigating the 
relevance of social hierarchy modulated by incidental performance on a visuo-spatial 
task revealed that a superior social rank motivated empathy towards inferior social 
targets’ painful stimulation similarly activating the AI and anterior middle cingulate 
cortex (aMCC). In contrast, this pattern of activity was markedly attenuated when 
observing painful stimulations to superior ranked social targets (Feng et al., 2016). 
Thus, differential activation during empathic processing may be modulated by 
situational and individual factors.  
However, these findings are based almost exclusively on healthy control populations 
and the important question of how depressed individuals will engage in other-relevant 
social processing involving inclusion and exclusion remains to be examined. As 
described in Chapter 2, depressed individuals exhibit greater self-perceptions of 
inferiority, submissiveness and involuntary subordination (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; 
Sturman, 2011). This might suggest similar neural responses in depression in 
response to others’ social pain as those seen in healthy controls when viewing 
superior ranked social targets’ pain (Feng et al., 2016). As discussed in the 
introduction in Chapter 1, depression is associated with heightened levels of 
empathetic stress, but reduced empathic concern or perspective-taking ability (Cusi 
et al., 2011; Schreiter et al., 2013). Empathic concern encompasses externally-
oriented responses to the feelings of others, which may result in prosocial behaviour 
and social support (Jean Decety, 2010). This is illustrated in depressed mothers’ 
decreased emotional reactivity to their newborns’ distress, as well as overall reduced 
responsiveness compared to healthy mothers (Field et al., 2009; Young et al., 2015), 
despite other suggestions that depressed individuals display greater empathy in 
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response to social pain, as a result of prior personal experience (Nordgren et al., 
2011).  
From a theoretical perspective, the emotion context-insensitivity (ECI) hypothesis 
(Rottenberg et al., 2005) suggests that lowered emotional reactivity in depression may 
reflect an evolutionary adaptive overall disengagement with one’s environment 
aimed at reducing exposure to potential threat. This is similar to the social risk (SR) 
hypothesis of depressed mood (Allen & Badcock, 2003), which suggests that 
depressed mood is the result of adopting a risk-averse internally-oriented approach to 
social interactions. Therefore, one’s social investment potential, as described in the 
previous chapter, would only be sensitive to others’ currently relevant social 
experiences, which are personally meaningful or could impact on the likelihood of 
exclusion. If this is not the case, then the SR hypothesis argues that individuals with 
depressed mood tend to withdraw from exchange-oriented contexts, in line with 
behavioural findings. On a neural level, this might be reflected in a distinct neural 
circuitry involved in processing other’s relevant social signals compared to the social 
evaluative network identified in the previous chapter. 
However, as before, the literature to date has focused predominantly on (empathy for) 
negative (social) experiences, such as social pain, while neglecting the importance of 
positive experiences, such as social reward or inclusion. Empathic responses to both 
happy and sad facial expressions have previously revealed shared neural circuitry 
with activity in right inferior frontal gyrus, and inferior frontal operculum (Jabbi et 
al., 2007; Harada et al., 2016). However, the strongest support derives from a study 
suggesting that the anterior insula is actively implicated in the empathetic processing 
of both negative and positive social processing and social exchanges more generally, 
including perceived fairness and cooperation (Lamm & Singer, 2010). This suggests, 
as with the discussion in the previous chapter, that empathy for positive and negative 
social information may share a common underlying neural representation (Jackson, 
Rainville, & Decety, 2006; Lamm et al., 2011; Lamm & Singer, 2010; Novembre et 
al., 2015).  
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In sum, processing of social information is dependent on situational and individual 
features, such as the proximity of the social target, as well as differences in self-
referential processing. While previous research has found neural overlap when 
contrasting the personal and vicarious experiences of social pain in healthy controls, 
no study to date has explored empathy for social pain in depression, let alone empathy 
for social inclusion. The previous chapter revealed overlapping neural activity in 
response to self-relevant social signals of rejection and inclusion in depression. 
However, research suggests altered empathic processing at a behavioural level in 
response to other relevant signals. This may be due to increased self-focused attention 
and reduced empathic concern. Given the limited neural evidence to date, this raises 
the question of how individuals with and without depression process others’ negative 
and positive social experiences at the psychological and neural levels. Thus, this 
chapter aims to explore the importance of self- versus other-referential processing in 
response to others’ personal memories of social rejection and inclusion in depression, 
compared to healthy controls, using script driven imagery, as previously described. 
Our hypotheses were as follows; 
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HYPOTHESES 
Behavioural Hypotheses 
• Ratings of valence and arousal will reveal a dampened response in MDD 
compared to healthy controls in response to other’s social experiences of 
rejection and inclusion (Cusi et al., 2011). 
Neural Hypotheses 
• Results will reveal overlapping patterns of activity for rejection and inclusion 
memories (relative to neutral social experiences) in areas including the MCC, 
AI, precuneus, and supramarginal gyrus (Lamm et al., 2011; Novembre et al., 
2015; Singer et al., 2004), 
• Individuals with MDD will show reduced activity compared to healthy 
controls in the ‘empathy regions’ of the brain outlined above, including the 
MCC, AI and somatosensory cortices (Fujino et al., 2014), with greater 
activity in so-called mentalising areas, including the IFG and prefrontal 
cortices (Feng et al., 2016; Meyer et al., 2013, 2014). 
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5.2 METHODS AND MATERIALS 
PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-three participants experiencing a current Major Depressive Episode and 
meeting criteria for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD; 18 female; 
mean age = 34.11, SD = 10.9 years), and 27 healthy controls who had never met 
criteria for MDD (15 female; 33.21±16.1 years) were recruited from volunteer panels 
at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit and the University of Cambridge. All 
participants were recruited separately to the samples of healthy controls and MDD 
participants described in the neuroimaging study in Chapter 4. In this study, all 
participants completed a single neuroimaging session followed by behavioural post-
testing outside of the scanner. All participants were right-handed, with no history of 
brain injury, normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no hearing impairments. MDD 
participants previously underwent a structural clinical interview to confirm their 
diagnosis and presence of a current episode. Full demographics can be found in 
Table 5.2. 
CLINICAL INTERVIEW AND SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND PROCESS SELF-REPORT 
MEASURES 
A comprehensive diagnostic interview and battery of social, affective and process 
self-report measures was undertaken with respect to all participants. See Chapter 2 
for a full description. 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
Stimuli 
The stimuli for the current neuroimaging task consisted of 10x neutral, 10x inclusion 
and 10x rejection social memories derived from participants who had previously 
taken part in the neuroimaging study (Chapter 4) or the behavioural study (Chapter 
7), respectively. Hence, there was no initial memory generation session within this 
study, as participants were listening to another’s memories. The methodology of 
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memory generation implemented is described in Chapter 3. In brief, participants were 
asked to generate highly emotionally salient autobiographical memories involving 
social rejection, social inclusion and socially neutral experiences. Each memory had 
previously been edited into 30-second audio-scripts in the first person, present tense 
and audio-recorded by a range of research assistants gender-matched to the 
participant from the original study to be used as stimuli in the fMRI script-driven 
paradigm. For this study, a subset of these acquired memories was selected as stimuli 
for use in the modified memory presentation task (see below) in the following way. 
Firstly, from the 720 individual audio-scripts obtained (see Chapter 3 for details), we 
selected memories of social rejection, social inclusion and neutral social experiences 
that were narrated by the identical male or female speaker. This was done to avoid 
confounding effects of personality or voice, as the same research assistants involved 
in the study were not available for all recordings for the duration of the project or had 
since left the project. This reduced the number of available memories in the first 
instance to 346, of which 220 had been narrated by the same female speaker and 126 
by the same male speaker. Secondly, the reduced subset of memories was 
independently rated by research assistants on vividness and intensity, and with 
respect to the same four subjective mood states (distress, rejection, inclusion, 
positivity) on the same Likert scales as previously rated by the participants who had 
generated the memories in the first place. Finally, the ten most highly rated memories 
with respect to social rejection, inclusion and neutrality were selected for each 
category, with 5 memories within each memory category narrated either by a male or 
female speaker. See Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1 
Mean Ratings of Final Stimuli Selection for Others’ Memory fMRI Study (Chapter 5) 
    Distress/ 
Rejection* 
Positivity/ 
Inclusion* 
Imaginability Intensity 
Condition N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Inclusion 10 0.13 0.24 6.38 0.65 6.65 1.29 3.80 1.86 
Neutral 10 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.36 6.50 1.05 0.80 0.35 
Rejection 10 6.03 1.18 0.00 0.00 6.05 1.14 4.50 1.86 
*Distress/Rejection and Positivity/Inclusion were averaged into their respective composite 
scores (see Chapter 3). N= Number of memories. 
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Modifications to ‘Self’ Memory Presentation Task (see Chapter 4) 
At the outset of the current experiment, the aim was to apply a traditional general 
linear modelling (GLM) approach to the fMRI analysis, as well as a novel intersubject 
correlation (ISC) analysis method (Hasson et al., 2004a; Kauppi et al., 2014), as 
described in Chapter 6. To this end, we closely matched our paradigm to a recent 
study investigating inter-subject synchronicity in an unselected sample in response to 
watching a series of emotionally salient movies (Nummenmaa et al., 2014). This 
paradigm implemented both the standard GLM approach alongside an ISC analysis, 
which required some modifications to the ‘self’ memory presentation (SEMP) task 
implemented in the previous chapter.  
Firstly, apart from an increase in the number of trials in each block relative to the 
paradigm used in Chapter 4 (see below), the other-relevant memories were presented 
in a fixed order to allow for ISC analysis at each time point between individuals. 
Secondly, in the SEMP task, the auditory presentation or ‘listening’ period of the 
memories was previously immediately followed by a silent ‘imagery’ period. This 
‘imagery’ period represented the contrast of interest for subsequent whole-brain and 
region of interest analyses in line with previous script-driven imagery paradigms 
(Lanius et al., 2003). For the purpose of adapting our paradigm to the methodology 
implemented by Nummenmaa et al. (2014), the contrast of interest in the current 
experiment consisted of the ‘listening’ period only, with no additional imagery period 
between memories. This allowed for a more realistic investigation into on-line 
processing of socially salient information as the narrative unfolds that is appropriate 
when listening to and processing another’s memory that has not been encountered 
before. This time-sensitive activity was captured by ISC analysis in contrast to 
capturing the neural response to self-generated memories as described in Chapter 4 
using a traditional GLM approach. Finally, mood ratings previously obtained in a 
self-timed manner immediately following each memory in Chapter 4 would not allow 
for subsequent trials to be presented at the same time point. Thus, ratings were 
obtained following the scanning session with respect to mood and arousal, in line 
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with Nummenmaa et al. (2014). The resulting modified ‘other’ memory presentation 
(OMP) task is presented below. 
‘Other’ Memory Presentation (OMP) Task 
The neuroimaging session consisted of a single run block-design with three blocks 
(neutral, rejection, inclusion) presented in fixed order to facilitate overall mood repair 
as previously. The paradigm consisted of ten consecutively presented 30-second 
same-type closed-eye audio scripts within each of the three blocks during which 
participants were instructed to close their eyes and listen. All 30 memories were 
presented in the exact same order to allow for the subsequent ISC analysis, in which 
stimuli need to be presented in a fixed and identical order across participants (Hasson 
et al., 2004a; Kauppi et al., 2014). A tone cue following each memory prompted 
participants to press any button using a button box as quickly as possible in a fixed 5 
second time window, while keeping their eyes closed, to ensure participants’ 
continued attention to the task. See Figure 5.1 for overview of paradigm in scanner. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Script-driven imagery paradigm for Other’ Memory presentation (OMP) task. 
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Outside the scanner, following the neuroimaging session, participants rated each 
memory separately in terms of induced mood and level of arousal on 5-point self-
assessment manikin (SAM) scales ranging from “Negative” to “Positive” and “Calm” 
to “Excited”, respectively (see Figure 5.2). The SAM scales allow for a non-verbal 
pictorial assessment of emotion (Bradley & Lang, 1994) and were presented on a 
computer screen. Ratings were provided using arrow keys prior to each memory 
category to establish baseline levels and following each memory within categories. 
The memories were presented in the exact same order as during the neuroimaging 
session. Auditory and visual presentation of the stimuli inside and outside the scanner 
was identical to the stimulus presentation in Chapter 4. The total approximate 
duration was 20 minutes per scanning run, followed by 30 minutes of behavioural 
ratings.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 SAM scales provided non-verbal pictorial assessment of arousal (top row) and 
valence (bottom row). 
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PROCEDURE  
Immediately prior to the neuroimaging session, all participants provided informed 
consent and were then administered the BDI, BAI, and National Adult Reading Test 
(NART). In the scanner, participants were instructed to keep their eyes closed, to 
listen and concentrate on a series of brief audio clips describing personal memories 
of past events. It was emphasised that these were real events. In addition, participants 
were instructed to press any button as quickly as possible in response to hearing a 
brief tone cue to ensure participants were still attending to the task. Following the 
scanning session, participants were given a brief break (<5min) before providing 
behavioural ratings outside of the scanner. Participants were instructed to keep their 
eyes closed while listening to the same personal memories. At the end of the session, 
participants were provided with a battery of social, affective and process self-report 
measures to be completed and returned in their own time (see Chapter 2). Finally, 
participants were thanked for their time and debriefed. 
FMRI DATA ACQUISITION 
A 3T Siemens Tim Trio MRI scanner with a 32-channel head coil was used to acquire 
a structural T1-weighted MPRAGE image (1-mm isotropic voxels) and functional 
data of 555 whole-brain T2*-weighted EPI volumes with 32 oblique axial slices that 
were 3 mm thick and acquired in descending order, an in-plane 64×64 matrix with 
3×3 mm resolution, TR 2 s, and TE 30 ms (single run). fMRI data were pre-processed 
and analysed using AA (Automatic analysis, Cusack et al., 2015), which uses 
MATLAB R2013a and SPM12, described in Chapter 4. 
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Behavioural Ratings 
The affective pre- and post-ratings of arousal and mood were averaged within each 
memory category and analysed in a univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) with 
group (controls/MDD) as a between-group factor and memory type 
(rejection/inclusion/neutral) and time (pre/post) as within-group factors. The 
affective ratings, as well as self-report measures were analysed as described 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
fMRI Pre-processing and analysis 
Data was processed and analysed at the first level in the same manner as described 
in Chapter 4. At the second level, changes from Chapter 4 included separate sets of 
regressors generated for listening trials only as opposed to listening and imagining. 
Age and gender were also entered as covariates in all analyses, following significant 
differences in age and gender between groups (see Table 5.2). Contrasts of these 
parameters were generated for rejection and inclusion memories relative to neutral 
social memories, as well as contrasts of rejection relative to inclusion and for each 
memory individually (neutral, rejection, inclusion), as well as for tone cues for each 
participant during the closed-eye listening periods. These contrasts were taken to the 
second level for group level analysis. All whole-brain analyses are thresholded at 
k=20, p<0.001 uncorrected, unless otherwise specified.  
Regions of Interest Analysis 
Having investigated regionally sensitivity patterns of activation in response to social 
pain based on ROI analysis in Chapter 4, ideally, we would have run similar ROI 
analyses derived from studies investigating empathy for social pain. However, to 
date, few studies have explicitly investigated empathy for social pain with significant 
regional variability in findings. As a result, implementing regions derived from meta-
analyses is a more reliable approach (Poldrack, 2007). Therefore, in the absence of 
such meta-analyses for the present study, we focused our analysis on whole-brain 
fMRI results.  
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5.3 RESULTS  
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 5.2 shows the demographic characteristics for the healthy controls and MDD 
participants, while Appendix 5.1 presents the descriptives and group comparisons of 
social, affective and process measures for the current sample. All measures revealed 
significant group differences between MDD and healthy control participants, except 
for the Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (p=0.20). Despite efforts to match our 
groups on demographic characteristics, there was a significant difference in age 
(t(48)=2.66, p=0.01), and so age and gender was entered as a co-variate in the 
subsequent fMRI analysis. However, there was no significant difference in estimated 
IQ, derived from reading ability as measured by the NART (t(42)=.33, p=0.75) or in 
other demographic characteristics, except for marital status (p=0.03).  
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Table 5.2 
Demographic Characteristics for Others’ Memory fMRI Study for Chapter 5. 
Numbers are ns unless otherwise stated. 
  
Controls MDD Total X2 p 
n=27 n=23 N=50 
Sex   
  Male 12 5 17 3.80 0.07 
  Female 15 18 33   
Age, years         
  Mean 28.96 39.48 33.80  0.01 
  SD 12.67 15.25 14.75   
National Adult Reading Test   
  Mean 12.67 11.00 11.93  0.75 
  SD 5.39 6.94 6.10   
Ethnicity   
  Caucasian 22 23 45 4.74 0.05 
  Other 5 0 5   
Marital Status   
  Single / Unmarried 22 13 35 7.68* 0.03 
  Married 4 2 6   
  Separated / Divorced 0 2 2   
  Other 1 6 7   
Education   
  Completed Year 10 1 3 4 8.95* 0.08 
  Completed Year 12 8 8 16   
  Completed Bachelors  10 3 13   
  Completed Masters 3 0 3   
  Completed PhD 0 2 2   
  Other 5 7 12   
Employment Status   
  Employed 14 10 24 4.48* 0.22 
  Unemployed 4 7 11   
  Student 7 2 9   
  Other 2 4 6   
Employment   
  Full Time 9 8 17 4.50 0.34 
  Part Time 8 3 11   
  Other 10 12 22   
Note: * indicates Fisher’s exact test 
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BEHAVIOURAL RATINGS  
The behavioural analysis involved all participants providing affective ratings of mood 
and arousal levels in response to listening to the same memories of social rejection, 
inclusion and neutral social experiences generated by unknown other individuals. The 
mean affective ratings for each group and each memory type are presented in 
Table 5.3-Table 5.5, illustrating the mean mood (‘Negative-Positive’) and arousal 
(‘Calm-Excited’) ratings. Overall, mean ratings revealed that positive mood 
decreased while listening to rejection memories and improved across all participants 
following inclusion memories, relative to the baseline, while remaining relatively 
unchanged following neutral memories, see Figure 5.4 for changes (deltas) in mood 
and arousal by memory and group. Mean arousal in controls was lower overall 
compared to MDD participants, with an increase in arousal for rejection and inclusion 
memories and decrease in arousal for neutral memories. In contrast, MDD 
participants showed a decrease in arousal in response to neutral and inclusion 
memories and an increase only for rejection memories (Figure 5.5). An initial data 
exploration suggested an emotional overspill of the negative affect resulting in a 
reduced baseline rating at the beginning of the inclusion block. This could not be 
remedied due to the fixed order of presentation. However, the change in positive 
affect speaks to the salience of the (positive) memory type in manipulating mood. 
 
Table 5.3 
Mean mood and arousal ratings by group (Chapter 5) 
Measure Groups Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval  Lower  Upper  
Mood Controls 3.58 0.14 3.31 3.86 MDD 2.80 0.13 2.53 3.06 
Arousal Controls 1.96 0.19 1.58 2.33 MDD 2.57 0.18 2.21 2.92 
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Table 5.4 
Mean mood and arousal ratings by memory type (Chapter 5) 
Table 5.5 
Mean mood and arousal ratings by memory type and group (Chapter 5) 
  
Measure Memory Type Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower  Upper  
Mood 
Neutral 3.38 0.10 3.17 3.59 
Rejection 2.83 0.11 2.61 3.05 
Inclusion 3.36 0.10 3.15 3.57 
Arousal 
Neutral 2.26 0.13 2.00 2.52 
Rejection 2.28 0.14 2.00 2.57 
Inclusion 2.24 0.14 1.95 2.53 
Measure Groups Valence Time Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% CI 
Lower  Upper 
Mood 
Controls 
Neutral Pre 3.85 0.20 3.45 4.25 Post 3.54 0.14 3.25 3.82 
Rejection Pre 3.90 0.18 3.54 4.26 Post 2.58 0.19 2.20 2.96 
Inclusion Pre 3.40 0.21 2.98 3.82 Post 4.23 0.15 3.92 4.54 
MDD 
Neutral Pre 3.14 0.19 2.76 3.52 Post 2.99 0.13 2.72 3.26 
Rejection Pre 3.05 0.17 2.71 3.38 Post 1.80 0.18 1.43 2.16 
Inclusion Pre 2.23 0.20 1.83 2.63 Post 3.58 0.15 3.28 3.87 
Arousal 
Controls 
Neutral Pre 2.05 0.22 1.60 2.50 Post 1.89 0.18 1.51 2.26 
Rejection Pre 1.75 0.20 1.34 2.16 Post 2.22 0.24 1.73 2.70 
Inclusion Pre 1.75 0.26 1.23 2.27 Post 2.08 0.20 1.68 2.48 
MDD 
Neutral Pre 2.73 0.21 2.30 3.15 Post 2.37 0.18 2.01 2.72 
Rejection Pre 2.18 0.19 1.79 2.57 Post 2.99 0.23 2.53 3.45 
Inclusion Pre 2.73 0.24 2.24 3.22 Post 2.40 0.19 2.02 2.79 
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Mood Ratings 
For mood ratings (Figure 5.4), there was a significant main effect for group 
(F[1,40]=17.27, p<0.001, ηp²=0.30), for time (F[1,40]=4.69, p=0.04, ηp²=0.03) and 
for memory type (F[2,80]=26.27, p<0.001, ηp²=0.34). There was also a significant 
interaction between memory and time (F[2,80]=83.84, p<0.001, ηp²=0.67). There was 
no significant interaction between memory type and group (F[2,80]=1.42, p=0.25, 
ηp²=0.03), indicating that mood ratings for each memory type did not differ as a 
function of group; no significant interaction for time and group (F[1,40]=3.74, 
p=0.06, ηp²=0.09), indicating that changes in ratings over time did not differ as a 
function of group, and no significant interaction between memory, time and group 
(F[2,80]=0.83, p=0.44, ηp²=0.02), indicating that change in mood ratings over time 
with respect to each memory type showed no differential patterns as a function of 
group (see Figure 5.4).  
Planned comparisons revealed significant group differences with greater positive 
mood in controls compared to MDD (0.78±0.19, p=0.001) (see Table 5.4), suggesting 
a more positive baseline mood for controls compared to MDD irrespective of memory 
type manipulation or time, as would be expected. In addition, planned comparisons 
for memory type revealed significant differences between all memories (p<0.001) 
with inclusion memories rated significantly more positively relative to neutral and 
rejection memories (0.51±0.15), while rejection memories were significantly more 
negative relative to neutral (0.55±0.09), again as would be expected. Overall, this 
suggests that on a behavioural level, while overall baseline positive mood was 
increased in controls, the memory manipulation as a function of time effectively 
impaired and repaired positive mood across both groups. See Table 5.5.  
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Figure 5.3. Mean changes (deltas) in mood (left) and arousal (right) ± 1SE from baseline to 
post-memory. Higher scores represent more positive mood and greater arousal, respectively. 
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Arousal Ratings 
For arousal ratings, Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity was violated for memory type (x2=7.49, p=0.02) and the interaction of 
memory type and group (x2=3.36, p=0.19), and will be reported using the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There was a significant main effect for group 
(F[1,40]=5.70, p=0.02, ηp²=0.13), but not for time (F[1,40]=3.41, p=0.07, ηp²=0.08) 
nor for memory type (F[1.71,69.34]=0.13, p=0.85, ηp²=0.003). There was a 
significant interaction between memory type and time (F[2,80]=13.21, p<0.001, 
ηp²=0.25). There was no significant interaction between memory type and group 
(F[1.71,68.37]=0.09, p=0.89, ηp²=0.002) or time and group (F[1,40]=1.50, p=0.23, 
ηp²=0.04). Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between memory 
type, time and group (F[2,80]=3.85, p=0.03, ηp²=0.09), suggesting that MDD 
reported greater change in arousal levels over time with decrease in arousal following 
the inclusion memory compared to controls, who reported increased arousal 
following the inclusion memory. Both groups reported increase in arousal in response 
to the rejection memories and no significant change for neutral. 
Planned comparisons revealed significant group differences with diminished arousal 
in controls compared to MDD (0.62±0.26, p=0.02) overall, suggesting a lowered 
baseline of arousal in controls (see Table 5.3). There was no significant difference in 
arousal as a function of memory types. See Table 5.5 for mean pre- and post-mood 
and arousal ratings by memory type. Overall, this suggests that arousal levels were 
increased in MDD at baseline, with a differential pattern of response to inclusion 
memories as a function of group. Decreases in arousal following inclusion memories 
in MDD may suggest an overspill of arousal following the rejection memories, which 
saw a significant increase in arousal, not apparent in the control group. Given a 
similar adjustment to the inclusion baseline as was carried out for the mood ratings, 
results may suggest similar increases in arousal in MDD in response to inclusion, 
albeit to a lesser degree than to rejection memories (see Figure 5.5).  
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Figure 5.4. Mean mood ratings ± 1SE of the mean by group and memory type over time. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Mean arousal ratings ± 1SE of the mean by group and memory type over time. 
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FMRI RESULTS 
Four healthy controls, and one MDD participant were excluded from the final fMRI 
group analysis due to acquisition difficulties. As noted, all whole-brain analyses are 
thresholded at k=20, p<0.001 uncorrected. The first level of analysis consisted of 
carrying out one-sample t-tests to investigate the neural pattern of activation in 
response to listening to rejection and inclusion memories within each group.  
In control participants, one-sample t-tests of rejection > neutral memories are 
presented in Appendix 5.1. Results revealed activations in bilateral angular gyrus 
(AnG), left precuneus, left postcentral gyrus, right superior frontal gyrus medial 
segment (MSFG), left precentral gyrus, right caudate, right supramarginal gyrus 
(SMG) and right middle frontal gyrus (MFG). Inclusion > neutral revealed activations 
in bilateral SMG, right middle and anterior cingulate cortex (MCC/ACC), right AnG, 
right precuneus, left precentral gyrus, left parietal operculum (PO), right superior and 
middle frontal gyrus and right AI. For inclusion > rejection, results revealed a large 
cluster in bilateral superior occipital gyrus, bilateral precentral gyrus, bilateral 
posterior insula, bilateral superior parietal lobule (SPL), left superior frontal gyrus 
(SFG), left ACC, and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Finally, rejection > inclusion 
revealed bilateral AnG, bilateral MTG, and right MFG.  
In MDD participants, one-sample t-test results for rejection > neutral memories are 
presented in Appendix 5.3. Results revealed activations in right middle temporal 
gyrus (MTG), right MFG, right precuneus, left thalamus, left caudate and bilateral 
AnG. During inclusion > neutral memories, we found left supplementary motor 
cortex (SMC), left postcentral gyrus (PoG) and precentral gyrus (PrG). For inclusion 
> rejection, we found bilateral Anterior Insula (AI), left middle cingulate gyrus 
(MCgG), bilateral posterior orbital gyrus (POrG), right precuneus and the right 
triangular part of the inferior frontal gyrus (TrIFG). In reverse, rejection > inclusion 
revealed activations in bilateral MTG, bilateral AnG, and right precuneus. 
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Next, we sought to explore the differential pattern of activity as a function of group 
in two-sample t-tests (see Appendix 5.4). Two sample t-tests in controls compared to 
MDD revealed increased activation in controls in right AnG during rejection > 
neutral, right middle occipital gyrus (MOG) during inclusion > neutral, and left AI, 
right PrG, and left MCC for rejection > inclusion memories (see Figure 5.6). MDD 
compared to controls revealed activity in PoG during rejection > inclusion only.  
Finally, as in Chapter 4 we explored neural activity in response to listening to other’s 
memories more closely with a conjunction analysis of rejection versus neutral and 
inclusion versus neutral within and across both groups. Results revealed bilateral PoG 
activation in controls only, but not for MDD, thresholded at p<0.05, uncorrected, 
k=20. Conjunction analyses of controls compared to MDD, for rejection versus 
neutral and inclusion versus neutral, revealed no significant activations.   
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Figure 5.6. Two-sample whole-brain analysis results. (A) Listening to rejection>neutral 
memories, (B) inclusion>neutral memories and (C) rejection>inclusion memories for 
controls compared to MDD revealed significant activations in emotion regulation areas, such 
as the angular gyrus, and affective areas including precentral gyrus, anterior insula and MCC, 
uncorrected at p<0.001, k=20. 
  
A    Rejection > Neutral                 B    Inclusion > Neutral C Rejection > Inclusion
Angular Gyrus Middle Occipital Gyrus Middle Cingulate Cortex
Controls > MDD, p<0.001, uncorr, k=20
Anterior InsulaPrecentral Gyrus 
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5.4 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we aimed to assess the psychological and neural responses to listening 
to others’ personal experiences of social rejection and inclusion relative to neutral 
experiences in currently depressed and healthy control individuals. We measured the 
change in mood and arousal in response to the individual memories presented, as well 
as brain activity at the whole-brain level. On a behavioural level, we predicted that 
behavioural ratings of mood and arousal would reveal a dampened response in mood 
and arousal in MDD compared to healthy controls in response to others’ social 
experiences of rejection and inclusion. Our findings revealed that MDD individuals 
reported lower overall mood compared to healthy controls, irrespective of memory 
type, in line with our prediction. However, our findings of arousal went against our 
prediction; rather than overall lowered arousal, we found increased levels of arousals 
in response to rejection and decreased arousal in response to inclusion memories in 
MDD, relative to controls. 
Overall, reduced affective responses to others’ experiences of social rejection and 
inclusion are in line with meta-analytic findings suggesting reduced emotional 
reactivity in MDD in response to both positively and negatively valenced stimuli 
(Bylsma et al., 2008). The emotion context-insensitivity (ECI) hypothesis 
(Rottenberg et al., 2005) argues that this reduced affect in depression represents an 
active disengagement with the environment, while the SR hypothesis (Allen & 
Badcock, 2003, 2006) suggests withdrawal from exchange-oriented contexts. 
However, this argument remains contentious with previous studies highlighting a 
discrepancy between behavioural and neural responses to positive and negative 
sources of information. For instance, depressed individuals require greater intensity 
of stimuli to correctly identify positive emotions, such as  happy facial expressions 
compared to sad facial expressions (Joormann & Gotlib, 2006). This suggests a 
negative response bias, alongside reduced sensitivity to positive cues, correlated with 
depression severity (Gollan et al., 2010). This bias is further illustrated in our arousal 
findings, which suggest differential reactivity as a function of memory type. In 
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response to inclusion memories, arousal decreased in depressed compared to controls. 
This is in line with previous findings suggesting reduced emotional reactivity to 
anticipated reward (such as the social inclusion event) (McFarland & Klein, 2009) 
and reduced arousal in response to non-autobiographical positive stimuli (Sloan et 
al., 2001). In contrast, increased arousal in response to social rejection events may 
reflect heightened (empathic) stress in MDD, characterised by heightened inward 
directed attention (Derntl, Seidel, Schneider, & Habel, 2012; Schreiter et al., 2013). 
Thus, our findings of heightened arousal in depression in response to other’ negative 
social experiences may be driven by such heightened self-focused attention (Schreiter 
et al., 2013) directed towards prior personal rejection experiences and identification 
consistent with their negative mood state (Batson, 2009). 
On a neural level, we predicted that imagining others’ personal experiences of social 
rejection and social inclusion would reveal common activity for rejection and 
inclusion experiences (relative to neutral social experiences), in affective and 
empathetic processing areas (Lamm et al., 2011; Novembre et al., 2015; Singer et al., 
2004). We further predicted that individuals with MDD will show reduced activity 
compared to healthy controls in empathy and somatosensory regions (Fujino et al., 
2014), with greater activity in areas associated with self-referential processing (Feng 
et al., 2016; Meyer et al., 2013, 2014). These predictions were met. Comparing 
groups, the neural response to other’s rejection (relative to neutral) in healthy controls 
was associated with activation in the angular gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, and medial 
frontal gyrus, bordering on the MCC. This is consistent with previous findings on 
observing other’s social and physical pain (Lamm et al., 2011; Masten et al., 2011a; 
Novembre et al., 2015), revealing activity for social pain in MCC, insula, 
supramarginal gyrus, postcentral gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and inferior parietal 
gyrus (Novembre et al., 2015). This suggests a unique role for empathising with 
social experiences, drawing on higher-level cognitive processes, including 
mentalisation and Theory of Mind to facilitate social interaction (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Bird et al., 2010; Jean Decety, 2010). However, the literature 
has been largely limited to investigations of empathy for negative social emotional 
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experiences, as opposed to empathy for positive experiences, such as social inclusion. 
Our findings therefore suggest that the experience of other’s inclusion similarly 
activates areas involved in affective and empathic processing, in AI and MCC, in line 
with previous suggestions (Lamm and Singer, 2010). This contributes to the growing 
evidence-base regarding a shared neural circuitry underlying empathy for positive 
and negative social information (Jackson et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2011; Lamm & 
Singer, 2010; Novembre et al., 2015).  
In addition, as highlighted in Chapter 4, the personal relevance and social proximity 
derived from a social interaction may be key to understanding the functional 
correlates presented above. Self-relevance as a determinant in empathic processing is 
evident in the observation that the ‘dACC-insula’ network preferentially responds to 
the exclusion of close others but not to strangers (Beeney et al., 2011; Meyer et al., 
2013, 2014). In fact, observing less proximal social targets, i.e. stranger’s social pain, 
evoked greater activity in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), precuneus, 
and temporal pole (Meyer et al., 2013, 2014). Similarly, our study uses socially 
distant targets, i.e. stranger’s personal experiences, which may account for 
heightened activity in medial frontal, precuneus and midline cingulate cortices, 
involved in mentalising. Thus, in the context of social hierarchy, our findings 
complement a previous study on empathic responses to inferior and superior target’s 
physical pain (Feng et al., 2016). Differences in self-perceptions of social rank 
identified in Chapter 2 may thus impact the emphatic processing of social rejection, 
modulating empathy towards social targets viewed as more superior and reflected in 
attenuated responses within the AI and MCC in depressed relative to healthy controls. 
However, this remains to be fully explored, as in depression, only one study to date 
has explicitly compared healthy controls and depressed individuals empathic 
processing of others’ physical pain (Fujino et al., 2014). The visual presentation of 
human hands in painful situations activated the MCC, AI, somatosensory related 
cortices (SRC) and prefrontal cortices in healthy controls, consistent with previous 
meta-analytic findings of empathy for physical pain in healthy controls (Lamm et al., 
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2011). In contrast, MDD individuals exhibited reduced activation in the left MCC 
and right SRC, and greater activation in the left IFG. Interestingly, depressed 
individuals in our study similarly revealed reduced activation in MCC and AI in 
response to rejection over inclusion, and MCC and posterior insula activation in 
response to rejection over neutral memories. The attenuated response in MDD 
relative to controls thus aligns with previously identified deficits in evaluating 
physical pain (Jackson et al., 2006), reduced empathic concern (Schreiter et al., 
2013), reduced awareness of other’s emotions (Donges et al., 2005) and difficulty in 
interpreting externally derived social cues (Kupferberg et al., 2016).  
In sum, this chapter aimed to investigate the neural and psychological response in 
response to listening to others’ personal experiences of social rejection and inclusion 
in individuals with and without depression. This work builds on the previous chapter, 
which investigated self-relevant processing of autobiographical memories of social 
rejection and inclusion. Findings suggested that the subjective evaluation of others’ 
rejection and inclusion experiences results in reduced emotional reactivity in 
depression on a neural and behavioural level, while ratings of arousing differed as a 
function of memory type. In healthy controls, findings support the existing 
knowledge base regarding empathic processing of negative social experiences, but 
extend this to the processing of social inclusion. Here we provide a first investigation 
of empathy for others’ social negative and positive experiences comparing healthy 
and depressed individuals. Nonetheless, more research is needed, with a focus on the 
distinction between self- versus other- relevant social contexts. To this end, the next 
chapter will aim to present an extended narrative of social rejection and inclusion 
within an elicited dyadic social interaction, allowing us to further investigate self- 
versus other social processing. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The findings from the previous two neuroimaging chapters (‘self’ and ‘other’ relevant 
processing of social rejection and inclusion) strongly suggest that depressed 
individuals and healthy controls exhibit altered neural processing of socially salient 
experiences of rejection and inclusion, depending on the point of origin. Chapter 4 
involved imagining memories describing the emotional experience of personal social 
rejection and inclusion. Results revealed greater activity in somatosensory cortex in 
controls compared to MDD participants, and greater activity in the 'social pain' 
dACC-AI network in MDD participants, relative to controls. In contrast, Chapter 5 
involved listening to socially salient events narrated from another person's viewpoint. 
The vicarious experience of another’s social rejection and inclusion experiences was 
associated with an attenuated response in MDD relative to controls in regions 
commonly associated with affective and empathic processing (J. Decety, 2011; D. P. 
Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012), including the angular gyrus and AI during rejection and 
inclusion compared to neutral, and MCC for rejection compared to inclusion 
experiences. These findings provide important insight into the differential neural 
representation of socially salient events between depressed and non-depressed 
individuals.  
However, in line with the majority of neuroscience research, the previous two studies 
investigated the neural processes underlying social processing in depression using a 
traditional model-driven GLM approach. This model infers brain activity from an 
averaged signal in response to repeated trial presentations, thus omitting time-
sensitive components (Kauppi et al., 2014; Pajula, Kauppi, & Tohka, 2012). 
Therefore, the interpretation of these events should be treated with caution given the 
complexity and intricacy of social interactions and their neural representation. In fact, 
judgements and impressions about others and their personality occur within brief 
periods of time, and may affect subsequent social interactions (McAleer, Todorov, & 
Belin, 2014). Interestingly, lesions within the AI cortex are associated with increased 
reaction times during empathetic pain processing further emphasising a time-
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sensitive component in emotional social processing (Gu et al., 2012). A time-locked 
sensitivity to unfolding social interactions may thus impact upon the neural 
processing of socially salient emotions, and implicate key regions identified in 
previous studies. Time sensitive considerations may further be heightened in the 
presence of depression, given the behavioural impairments in visuospatial attention, 
delayed reaction times (Hammar & Ardal, 2009), and attentional biases towards 
negative interpersonal signals (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Neubauer Yue, & Joormann, 
2004). This suggests that the findings from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 may be 
complemented by a methodology capable of capturing time-sensitive variability in 
incoming sensory information, such as MEG or EEG.  
An alternative approach, which maintains high spatial and temporal sensitivity, is to 
investigate the degree to which brain activity measured by fMRI is correlated or 
‘synchronized’ among a group of listeners exposed to the same stimulus at any given 
time point. The Intersubject Correlation (ISC) approach represents a similarity 
measure across subjects who are presented with an identical stimulus, and is 
especially suited to the presentation within naturalistic contexts, which can entail 
complex and emotionally-engaging stimuli, such as cinematic displays and emotional 
scenes (Hasson et al., 2008; Hasson, Nir, Levy, Fuhrmann, & Malach, 2004b). 
Recently, a novel ISC toolbox was introduced to allow for the implementation of this 
data-driven approach to fMRI analysis during natural viewing or listening conditions 
(Hasson et al., 2004a; Kauppi et al., 2014; Pajula et al., 2012). The ISC methodology 
assumes a model-free approach, with no prior assumptions as to the functionality of 
the areas identified. ISC implements a series of voxel-wise Pearson’s correlations 
between all subject pairs collapsed over time and across different frequency bands 
(Hasson et al., 2004a; Kauppi et al., 2014; Pajula et al., 2012). Only a few studies to 
date have implemented this novel analysis in either a mixed group or mixed condition 
design (Cantlon & Li, 2013; Hasson, Malach, & Heeger, 2010; Herbec, Kauppi, Jola, 
Tohka, & Pollick, 2015; Kim et al., 2008; Petrini, McAleer, Neary, Gillard, & Pollick, 
2014; Salmi et al., 2013). Importantly, the ISC approach and stimulus-model based 
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traditional GLM analysis have revealed comparable sensitivity, thus further 
validating the approach (Kauppi et al., 2014; Pajula et al., 2012).  
Although still in its infancy, this approach has seen increasing implementation across 
a variety of areas, including memory (Hasson et al., 2008), emotions (Nummenmaa 
et al., 2012, 2014), perspective taking (Lahnakoski et al., 2014) and communication 
(Nummenmaa et al., 2014; Schmalzle, Hacker, Honey, & Hasson, 2015; Stephens, 
Silbert, & Hasson, 2010). However, only a few studies to date have explicitly 
investigated group differences in intersubject correlations. These include studies in 
autism (Hasson et al., 2010; Salmi et al., 2013), schizophrenia (Kim et al., 2008), in 
development (Cantlon & Li, 2013), and when investigating the effect of expertise on 
action perception (Petrini et al., 2014). Autism is of particular interest when 
considering social functioning in depression, given the well-established difficulties 
in communication and social domains (Hughes, 2008; M. D. Kaiser & Pelphrey, 
2012; Shah & Sowden, 2015). Using the ISC approach, individuals with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) were found to exhibit lower ISCs in social and affective 
brain regions compared to ‘neurotypical’ controls in response to viewing social 
interactions (Hasson et al., 2009; Salmi et al., 2013). These findings revealed 
decreased ISC in regions implicated in empathetic and social evaluation, including 
the insula, PCC and ACC, caudate, precuneus, lateral occipital cortex, and 
supramarginal gyrus (Salmi et al., 2013), as well as visual cortical areas and the 
superior temporal cortex (Hasson et al., 2009). These findings are intriguing when 
considered alongside the similar broad social impairments observed in the context of 
depression. 
However, the ISC studies described above have tended to use highly edited cinematic 
displays, such as Hollywood movies (Hasson et al., 2008) or other popular media 
(Nummenmaa et al., 2012) to explore the association between ISC and subjective 
emotional experience of movie-watching. More recently, studies have moved 
towards the implementation of more ecologically valid, albeit visually degraded 
stimuli, such as CCTV footage (Petrini et al., 2014) or unedited dance performances 
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(Herbec et al., 2015), which retain the natural fluctuations in emotionality and arousal 
experienced over time. These short-lived, albeit highly arousing salient stimuli more 
closely resemble the affective environment we live, and more importantly, interact 
in. However, ideally, the data driven approach requires long visual and/or auditory 
sequences of 90 seconds or more, thus reliably invoking large ISCs in ‘proof-of-
concept’ auditory and visual cortices involved in processing and imagining vivid 
visual and/or auditory stimuli (Hasson et al., 2004a). The degree of intersubject 
synchronization can thus provide a novel quantifiable measure of the level of cortical 
processing of external sensory stimuli. The presentation of long sequences is thought 
to reveal greater brain activity compared to viewing short epochs (Bartels & Zeki, 
2004), as brain mechanisms are thought to be optimised for natural viewing as 
opposed to traditional brief stimulus presentation paradigms (Bartels & Zeki, 2005). 
While promising in their approach, these studies nonetheless suffer from a third-
person perspective with limited personal agency within the emotional scenes 
depicted. More recently, a ‘speaker-listener’ fMRI paradigm investigated cortical 
synchrony between a speaker telling an unrehearsed non-emotive real-life story and 
a group of listeners (Stephens et al. 2010). This revealed temporal coupling and 
comparable neural response patterns between listeners and speakers in linguistic 
production areas in the brain, such as the superior temporal gyrus (STG), with greater 
coupling predicting better overall comprehension of the narrative presented. This 
study may present an avenue for future research to examine real-time dyadic 
interactions.  
In sum, this chapter aims to prompt depressed and non-depressed participants to listen 
to and vicariously experience another individual’s highly personal memories of social 
rejection and inclusion. The extended social narrative will afford greater personal 
agency in the social interaction, as opposed to the presentation of affective stimuli 
with limited personal relevance. This will serve to more accurately reflect the 
dynamic nature of social information processing and elucidate differences in social 
processing in depression. To date, there has been no single investigation into group 
differences underlying social communication in depressed compared to healthy 
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controls using the ISC approach. This is despite deficits in social functioning and 
altered neural processing in MDD participants presenting an obvious target for further 
investigation. While the ISC toolbox is still in development and suffers from 
methodological limitations discussed in more detail within the statistical analysis 
section, this chapter will implement this novel methodology to further investigate the 
time-sensitive neural patterns underlying intersubject synchrony in response to the 
real-time experience of social interactions in depressed and non-depressed 
individuals. 
The hypotheses were as follows; 
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HYPOTHESES 
Behavioural Hypothesis 
• Listening to another’s social positive and social negative narratives will result 
in overall increased positive mood and increased negative mood, respectively, 
across groups. 
• MDD individuals will exhibit dampened overall mood in response to the 
others’ memories presented, compared to healthy controls, in line with the 
results presented in Chapter 5. 
Neural Hypotheses 
• MDD participants will show greater synchronicity in ‘affective’ brain areas 
involved in self-relevant processing as identified in previous chapters, 
including the dACC and AI, relative to healthy controls. This study therefore 
aims to extend findings from the neuroimaging study described in Chapter 4. 
• MDD participants will show reduced synchronicity in response to other 
relevant emotionally salient information compared to healthy controls in so-
called empathic and regulatory brain areas (supramarginal gyrus, posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC) and middle cingulate cortex (MCC)), and so-called 
mentalising areas, including the (medial) PFC. This study therefore aims to 
extend findings from the neuroimaging study described in Chapter 5. 
• There will be overlap in terms of inter-subject synchronicity in response to 
listening to the social rejection and social inclusion narratives, within the 
affective and empathic brain regions described above, underscoring the 
common neural processing of social events irrespective of valence described 
within previous chapters. 
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6.2 METHODS AND MATERIALS 
PARTICIPANTS 
The participants were those recruited in Chapter 5 with 23 participants with Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD; 18 female; 34.11±10.9 years), and 27 healthy controls 
who had never met criteria for MDD (15 female; 35.30±16.1 years). See Chapter 5 
for further details and Table 5.2 for full demographics. Within the healthy control 
group, an additional female “speaker” (age 29) was recruited as part of the 
experimental task described below. 
CLINICAL INTERVIEW AND SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND PROCESS SELF-REPORT 
MEASURES 
A comprehensive diagnostic interview and battery of social, affective and process 
self-report measures was undertaken with respect to all participants. See Chapter 2 
for a full description. 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
Stimuli 
The stimuli for the neuroimaging task were derived from an initial recording or 
‘speaker’ session within the fMRI scanner, in which a female speaker from within 
the research unit was invited to take part in a single neuroimaging session consisting 
of a single run with two conditions (rejection, inclusion) in a fixed order. The female 
narrator was instructed to provide two approximately 300-second personal 
autobiographical memories involving social rejection and social inclusion, 
respectively (see Appendix 6.1 for the transcript). The audio-recordings of the 
memories were then used as stimuli for all other participants as described in the task 
below. In choosing suitable memories, the speaker was instructed to provide 
memories from her life that she very clearly remembers and that still feel important 
to her, that involve at least one other person, and which still evoke a strong emotional 
response. The two memories were recalled in the stated order to facilitate mood repair 
Chapter 6 | Intersubject Synchronization during Rejection and Inclusion 
 
177 
 
in both speaker and listeners. A tone cue preceded each memory indicating to the 
speaker to commence the narration while keeping her eyes closed, followed by a 
second tone cue, once the 300-second time period had expired indicating to the 
speaker that she may open her eyes and stop narrating the memory. 
Modified OMP Task 
In the present study, the sample population and experimental set up is identical to that 
described in the previous chapter; however, participants were presented with the 
second part of the experiment following a brief break outside of the scanner. This part 
of the session consisted of a single run with two consecutively presented 300-second 
closed-eye audio scripts (rejection, inclusion) acquired in the initial neuroimaging 
‘speaker’ session with the female speaker. The two memories were presented in the 
stated fixed order (rejection, inclusion) to facilitate overall mood repair and to allow 
for the ISC analysis. A tone cue preceded each memory indicating to participants that 
the memory was about to commence and to listen and keep their eyes closed, followed 
by a second tone cue, once the memory had finished.  
Outside the scanner, following the neuroimaging session, participants listened to the 
two memories a second time and provided continuous affect ratings throughout the 
duration of the 300-second memories on a horizontal visual analogue sliding scale 
ranging from 0 (“Strongly Negative”) to 100 (“Strongly Positive”) using a mouse to 
slide the pointer across. The simplified rating dimension was selected to keep the task 
manageable and to allow participants to focus on the emotional salience of the stimuli 
while listening. This affective dimension has also been shown to account for the 
largest variance in emotional judgments (Gottman & Levenson, 1985; Levenson & 
Gottman, 1985). The memories were presented in the same order as during the 
neuroimaging session, to allow for the ISC analysis, as described in Chapter 5. 
Participant’s continuous affective responses were recorded in 2s intervals, resulting 
in a time series with 150 samples per memory. The approximate durations of the 
neuroimaging and behavioural sessions was 12 minutes each. See Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Script-driven imagery paradigm for modified ‘Other’ memory presentation 
(mOMP) task. 
 
PROCEDURE 
Immediately prior to the mOMP task in the neuroimaging session, all participants 
provided informed consent and were then administered the BDI, BAI, and NART, 
before performing the fMRI task within the scanner. In the scanner, participants were 
instructed to keep their eyes closed throughout the scan, and to listen to two personal 
memories of past events just as they would if they were to have a conversation with 
someone face-to-face in the present. Participants were further instructed to 
concentrate on their emotional response while listening. Immediately after the fMRI 
session, participants were given a brief break (<5min) before providing behavioural 
ratings by indicating how negative or positive they felt at any given moment in the 
story using a sliding scale presented on a screen. At the end of the session, participants 
were provided with a battery of self-report measures to be completed and returned in 
their own time. Finally, participants were thanked for their time and debriefed. 
STIMULUS PRESENTATION  
The speaker’s two memories were audio-recorded in the scanner via a dual channel 
MRI Microphone System (© 2007 FOMRI™ II OptoAcoustics - 
www.optoacoustics.com, version 1.1) with effective noise reduction to reproduce 
high-quality speech from recordings within an MRI environment. The system uses 
two pressure gradient optical microphones with low self-noise, high bandwidth, a 
large dynamic range and a high directivity index of 4.8dB arranged in an orthogonal 
configuration, matched in phase and amplitude to capture the same input sound field. 
Instructions “Start”	Tone	Cue
Rejection
Narrative
”End”	
Tone	Cue +
“Start”	
Tone	Cue
Inclusion
Narrative
”End”	
Tone	Cue
3s 0.5s 300s 0.5 30 0.5s 300s 0.5
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The two microphones consist of a reference microphone capturing background noise, 
and a source microphone capturing both background noise and speech signals. The 
dual-channel OptiMRI implements a dual channel adaptive filter, followed by a 
single channel speech enhancement algorithm. The dual-adaptive filter subtracts the 
reference input from the noisy signal channel assuming the signal in the reference 
input is roughly similar to the interference in the noisy signal. To achieve optimal 
subtraction, the reference signal is modified by an adaptive filter, whose gains are 
learned continuously from the residual signal and the reference input. To prevent 
divergence of the filter when speech is present a speech detector is integrated into the 
algorithm. The single channel speech enhancement performs its filtering in the 
spectral domain, by re-shaping the noisy signal spectrum. The noise estimator is aided 
by an accurate voice activity detector, which evaluates the speech likelihood in each 
signal block before applying a single channel speech signal restoration with minimal 
residual artefacts.  
Auditory and visual presentation of the stimuli inside and outside of the scanner were 
identical to those described in detail in Chapter 5. While listening to the memories 
outside of the scanner, participants were asked to simultaneously provide continuous 
affect ratings on a visual analogue sliding scale. The horizontal slider interface 
occupied the main part of the interface window and was developed using the 
psychophysics toolbox. The slider presented the audio-clips in two blocks, while 
recording participants’ continuous responses at 2s intervals.   
DATA ACQUISITION 
Data acquisition was identical to that described in Chapter 5 with functional data 
limited to 335 whole-brain T2*-weighted EPI volumes. The data acquisition for the 
speaker and listener imaging session was identical. The speaker’s data was acquired 
to allow for further neuroimaging analysis at a later point of the neural coupling 
between the speaker and the average listeners in line previous studies (Schmalzle et 
al., 2015; Stephens et al., 2010).  
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Behavioural Ratings 
Self-report measures of affective, process and social processing were analysed using 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation analyses and independent samples t-tests. 
Continuous affect ratings were averaged over the 300 second duration into simple 
affective means for each social memory. These simple means, collapsed over time 
were then analysed in a mixed model ANOVA with group as the between-subject 
factor (controls/MDD) and social valence (rejection/inclusion) as the within-subject 
factor. In addition, to more closely investigate the temporal characteristics of the 
affective ratings, the time series were averaged and collapsed into 30-s time windows 
and entered into a mixed ANOVA with group as the between-subject factor 
(controls/MDD) and social valence (rejection/inclusion) and time (segments 1-10) as 
the within-subject factors. 
fMRI Pre-processing and analysis 
MRI data were pre-processed as described in Chapter 5, and further analysed in the 
ISC toolbox (Kauppi et al., 2014). See next section for description. 
Intersubject Correlation Analysis (ISC) 
Intersubject correlation (ISC) is akin to a similarity measure across subjects in 
response to an identical stimulus and is particularly useful in contexts involving 
naturalistic presentations of complex dynamic information, such as social interactions 
(Hasson et al., 2004a). ISC analysis implements voxel-wise Pearson’s correlations 
between all subject pairs over time and across multiple frequency bands (Hasson et 
al., 2004a; Kauppi et al., 2014; Pajula et al., 2012). In an initial step, Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients are calculated for each subject pair (1), where the sample 
correlation coefficient between time series is represented by rij, N denotes the total 
number of samples in the time series, and Si and Sj are the timeseries from the ith and 
jth subject. Finally, all subject pairs rij values are averaged (2) into a single combined 
ISC statistic, where m denotes the overall sample size. 
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(1) (2)  
This novel analysis technique can be performed using an ISC toolbox, developed for 
Matlab (Kauppi et al., 2014) (https://www.nitrc.org/projects/isc-toolbox/) over 
specific frequency bands, within specific time-windows and between both -session 
and -group comparisons. The analysis within this chapter followed the same 
principles as presented in previous research (Kauppi et al., 2010; Kauppi, Pajula & 
Tohka 2014; Pajula, Kauppi & Tohka, 2012). ISC maps will be presented showing 
the ISC across the subjects during the rejection and inclusion conditions respectively, 
and maps showing the difference in ISC between the two groups for each condition. 
To date, the toolbox does not allow for a multivariate analysis of variance and is 
limited to either paired or unpaired comparisons. The ISC analysis in this chapter was 
implemented via the ISC toolbox (Kauppi et al., 2014) and performed at the full 
frequency band both within- and between-groups, separated by condition. All results 
were thresholded via non-parametric voxel-wise resampling with an approximated 
resampling distribution of 1,000,000 realisations and corrected p-values using an 
FDR-based multiple comparison correction with independence or positive 
dependence assumptions. 
ISC Between Group Comparison 
To explore group differences between the ISC maps in MDD and healthy controls we 
used permutation testing based on the Pearson–Filon sum statistics on Fisher's Z-
transformed correlation coefficients (ZPF statistics) (Kauppi, 2010; Kauppi et al., 
2014; Pajula et al., 2012). This was achieved by applying a Fisher's Z-transform to 
the r-values, followed by calculating the transformed difference between the two 
groups for each subject pair and estimating the group-level statistics as the sum of the 
ZPF statistics over subject pairs (Kauppi, 2010). These statistics reflect the sum of 
the pairwise differences of ISC strength across groups. The statistical significance of 
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mean ISC differences across groups was estimated via the ISC toolbox by sampling 
the maximum and minimum sum statistics with 25,000 random permutations of the 
group labels of each pair. The toolbox samples the maximum (minimum) statistics to 
estimate the largest differences that would be observed by chance over the entire brain 
between randomly shuffled groups, controlling for the family-wise error (FWE) rate. 
Time Series Analysis 
In the next step, we explored the relationship between the elicited emotion derived 
from continuous affective ratings in response to the two social narratives collected 
outside of the scanner and the regional neural synchronicity across the same group. 
Average ISCs of whole-brain activity were computed at each time frame across the 
300-second memories using a TR of 2 seconds and converted to 4-D NIFTI files for 
further use in SPM. These ISC maps, reflecting the moment-to-moment degree of 
inter-subject synchronisation across participants, were entered into a traditional GLM 
with continuous affect ratings as the regressor of interest. Resulting beta values were 
stored in separate maps, in which voxel intensity reflects the degree of ISC in 
response to positive or negative mood.  
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6.3 RESULTS 
All participants were administered a battery of social, affective and process measures, 
as described in Chapter 2. The results of the univariate analyses of between-group 
differences on these measures, as well as full demographic characteristics are 
presented in Chapter 5. Exploratory data analysis was conducted to verify that the 
data met the criteria for parametric statistical analysis. As we planned to conduct both 
between-groups and repeated-measures analyses, we checked for normality and 
homogeneity of the data as well as sphericity, the conditions of which were met. 
BEHAVIOURAL RATINGS 
The behavioural analysis involved all participants providing continuous affective 
ratings of valence in response to listening to the personal memories of social rejection 
outside of the scanner. In the first instance, these continuous ratings were averaged 
over time to generate mean affective ratings for each group and each memory type. 
These mean affective ratings are presented in Table 6.1, illustrating the mean valence 
ranging from 0 (‘very negative’) to 100 (‘very positive’). Mean ratings confirmed 
that the social interaction memories elicited strong emotions with average valence 
ratings during the social inclusion memory ranging from 71.08 to 85.00 in controls, 
and 51.39 to 66.36 in MDD. During social rejection, mean valence ratings ranged 
from 24.05 to 37.97 in controls, and 11.43 to 26.41 in MDD. Mean affective ratings 
collapsed over time showed a significant main effect for both social valence 
(F[1,39]=143.94, p<0.001, ηp²=0.71) and group (F[1,39]=0.95, p<0.001, ηp²=0.33) 
but no interaction (p=0.34). Thus, the inclusion memory revealed significantly 
elevated mood compared to the rejection memory, with overall significantly 
heightened mood in controls compared to MDD participants, across memories. 
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Table 6.1.  
Mean affective ratings in response to social rejection and inclusion narratives  
Narrative Group Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
Inclusion 
Controls 78.04 3.52 71.08 85.00 
MDD 58.88 3.78 51.39 66.36 
Rejection 
Controls 31.01 3.52 24.05 37.97 
MDD 18.92 3.78 11.43 26.41 
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Next, we investigated whether the fluctuations in emotionality over time in response 
to the naturalistic narratives would be reflected in between-group differences in 
continuous affective ratings. These continuous affective ratings were analysed in a 
mixed model ANOVA with group as the between-subject factor (controls/MDD) and 
social valence (rejection/inclusion) and time (segments 1-10) as the within-subject 
factors. See Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 below for an illustration of the full timeseries 
of social inclusion and rejection narratives, respectively.  
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for social valence (F[1,39]=143.94, 
p<0.001, ηp²=0.79), time (F[9,31]=5.31, p<0.001, ηp²=0.61), and group 
(F[1,39]=18.9, p<0.001, ηp²=0.33), in line with the previous mean affective ratings. 
There was also a significant interaction between time and valence (F[9,31]=18.10, 
p<0.001, ηp²=0.84), suggesting that, as time progressed, social inclusion memories 
led to greater increases in positive mood, while social rejection memories led to 
decreases in mood. There was no significant interaction between time and group 
(F[9,31]=2.04, p=0.07, ηp²=0.37), with similar effects of change in mood over time 
observed across both groups, despite greater positive mood overall for controls 
relative to depressed participants. There was no three-way interaction (F[9,31]=1.66, 
p=0.14, ηp²=0.33).   
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Figure 6.2. Mean continuous affective ratings ± 1SE (in grey) during the social inclusion 
narrative. MDD (in red) revealed overall dampened affect during social inclusion relative to 
controls (in blue). 
 
Figure 6.3. Mean continuous affective ratings ± 1SE (in grey) during the social rejection 
narrative. MDD (in red) revealed greater negative affect during social rejection relative to 
controls (in blue).  
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BASIC INTERSUBJECT CORRELATION (ISC) ANALYSIS 
At the neural level, we employed ISC analysis to investigate similarity in brain 
activity across participants, while listening to the social memories. Results revealed 
that both groups revealed highly time-locked brain activity in key brain regions 
involved in visual imagery, auditory processing, as well as in affective regions (see 
Figure 6.4). All statistically significant group-level ISC results are reported at 
p<0.001, FDR corrected (independent/dependent) (Benjamini & Yekutieli, 2001). 
See Appendix 6.2, Appendix 6.3, and Appendix 6.4 for within- and between-group 
comparisons. 
In MDD participants, during both social rejection (Appendix 6.3) and inclusion 
(Appendix 6.2), the largest ISCs were observed in the occipital cortex, bilateral 
auditory cortex and precuneus. Further statistically significant ISC clusters during 
social inclusion were observed in affective regions, including left ACC (6, 30, -8), 
left NAcc, (-12, 12, -12) and right amygdala/hippocampus (46, 16, 32) (see 
Figure 6.5). During social rejection only, additional ISCs were observed in left 
precentral gyrus, right AI and in the right temporal pole (Figure 6.6).  
In healthy controls, the largest ISCs during social inclusion (Figure 6.7 and Appendix 
6.2) were observed in bilateral auditory cortex, and visual cortex, with additional 
significant ISCs in the left precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), left AI, left 
Supra Marginal Gyrus (SMG), and subgenual PFC. During social rejection 
(Figure 6.8 and Appendix 6.3), large ISCs were observed in auditory cortex and 
visual cortex, especially the posterior Superior Temporal Gyrus (pSTS) as well as the 
bilateral precuneus, right precentral and postcentral gyrus, right PCC, bilateral ACC, 
and bilateral Insula. 
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Figure 6.4. Brain regions with significant ISCs during (A) social rejection and (B) social 
inclusion across all participants (p<0.001, FDR corrected)  
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Figure 6.5. Brain regions with significant ISCs during social inclusion in MDD (p<0.001, 
FDR corrected). From top left to bottom right, axial slices with 4mm inter-slice interval are 
shown from z = −66 to 62 mm (in MNI-coordinates). Red-yellow colour scales depict lower-
higher levels of ISC. See Appendix 6.2 for table of activations. 
 
Figure 6.6. Brain regions with significant ISCs during social rejection in MDD (p<0.001, 
FDR corrected). See Appendix 6.3. 
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Figure 6.7. Brain regions with significant ISCs during social inclusion in healthy controls 
(p<0.001, FDR corrected). See Appendix 6.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Brain regions with significant ISCs during social rejection in healthy controls 
(p<0.001, FDR corrected). See Appendix 6.3. 
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ISC BETWEEN GROUP COMPARISON  
We next explored the between-group differences in ISC averaged over time between 
MDD and healthy controls and calculated summary statistics for each narrative 
separately (see Appendix 6.4). The summary statistic reflects the sum of the pairwise 
differences of ISC strength across groups, and is illustrated in Figure 6.9. During 
social inclusion, healthy controls, relative to MDD participants, exhibited greater ISC 
in large areas within the frontal cortex, anterior and posterior cingulate cortices, and 
bilateral posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG). In MDD participants, relative to 
controls, larger ISCs were observed in occipital visual cortex, with additional larger 
ISCs in inferior frontal gyrus and subgenual PFC. During social rejection, results also 
revealed greater ISC in MDD participants in the visual cortex, while controls 
exhibited greater ISC in the frontal-parietal cortex, bilateral STG and temporal poles.  
  
 
Figure 6.9. Brain regions with greater ISC in MDD compared to healthy controls (on red 
scale) and healthy controls compared to MDD participants (on blue scale) during social 
rejection and social inclusion. Summary ZPF maps have been rescaled from -1 to 1, p<0.001, 
FDR corrected. See Appendix 6.4 for table of brain activation. 
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TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
Next, we assessed the relationship between mean continuous affect ratings and the 
degree of inter-subject synchronization over time. Continuous affect ratings were 
used as regressors to predict voxel-wise ISC time courses in a GLM with voxel 
intensity reflecting the level of emotional synchronicity. This served to validate that 
the emotional narratives triggered reliable activity in emotion-related brain regions, 
in line with previous research on emotional synchronicity using the ISC approach 
(Nummenmaa et al., 2012). See Appendix 6.5 and Appendix 6.6 for data from healthy 
controls and MDD participants respectively. See Figure 6.10 for overview of ISC in 
brain regions correlated with increased negative valence and positive valence during 
social rejection and inclusion, respectively. 
In healthy controls during social rejection, increases in negative valence were 
associated with greater ISC in in the dACC and bilateral insula. In contrast, increases 
in positive valence while listening to social rejection were associated with greater 
ISC in mOFC, ventral striatum, right hippocampus, and bilateral frontal and parietal 
control regions, including right Angular Gyrus. During social inclusion, positive 
valence was associated with increased ISC in ventromedial PFC (VMPFC), posterior 
ACC, ventral striatum and bilateral anterior hippocampus/amygdala, while lower 
positive mood for social inclusion memories revealed widely distributed heightened 
synchronicity with large ISCs in bilateral auditory cortex, vmPFC and bilateral 
inferior frontal gyrus.  
In MDD participants, during social rejection, greater negative mood was associated 
with increased ISCs in bilateral inferior temporal gyrus, bilateral postcentral gyrus, 
right superior frontal medial gyrus, right fusiform gyrus, bilateral precuneus, and 
PCC. Greater positive valence during social rejection was associated with increased 
ISC in bilateral superior temporal gyrus, bilateral insula, bilateral amygdala, left 
hippocampus, left parahippocampal gyrus, dACC, superior and medial OFC. During 
social inclusion, as valence increased to positive, ISCs increased in MCC and dACC, 
right anterior insula, superior frontal (medial) gyrus, supplementary motor area, right 
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precuneus, bilateral supramarginal gyrus, and bilateral postcentral gyrus. Negative 
valence was associated with increased ISCs in bilateral caudate, bilateral thalamus, 
left inferior orbital frontal gyrus, left precentral gyrus, bilateral hippocampus, and 
large activations across the ventral visual cortex.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Brain regions with ISC correlated with greater negative valence in response to 
social rejection and greater positive valence in response to social inclusion for MDD (in blue) 
and healthy control participants (in red). All whole-brain results thresholded at p<0.001, 
k=20, uncorrected. 
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6.4 DISCUSSION 
This chapter represents the first attempt that we are aware of to investigate the degree 
of inter-subject synchronization in depressed and non-depressed individuals while 
listening to another’s narratives of positive and negative social interactions. On a 
behavioural level, we firstly predicted that across groups affect would become more 
negative in response to the social rejection narrative and improve in response to the 
social inclusion narrative. This prediction was unsurprisingly met. Secondly, we 
predicted that the MDD group would exhibit greater decreases in mood in response 
to the rejection and social inclusion narrative overall, compared to healthy controls. 
This prediction was also met.  
On a behavioural level, while Chapter 5 had presented brief, yet highly salient 
negative and positive social narratives, the present study involved extended five-
minute auditory presentations with natural fluctuations in valence. This raised the 
question of whether the natural emotional dynamics contained within the narrative 
would reliably translate into salient overarching negative or positive mood over time. 
However, our findings suggest that, despite group differences, varying emotional 
saliency can be reliably elicited, incorporating natural fluctuations in mood as the 
social dynamic unfolds, with significant differences as a function of valence. This 
finding adds to the ecological validity of the work presented, in line with the previous 
chapters. On a neural level, we predicted that MDD participants would show less 
synchronicity in response to other-relevant emotionally salient information than 
healthy controls in brain regions associated with processing another’s affective 
memories. This included empathic and regulatory areas, such as the supramarginal 
gyrus, posterior and middle cingulate cortex and mentalising areas, including the 
medial (pre)frontal cortex. We further predicted greater synchronicity in MDD in 
affective areas involved in self-relevant processing. This included areas such as the 
dACC and AI, relative to healthy controls. These findings would extend the findings 
reported in the neuroimaging studies in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. These predictions 
were partially met. In line with previous ISC studies (Hasson et al., 2004a), our 
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findings revealed strong ISCs within ‘proof-of-concept’ regions involved in visual 
imagery, auditory processing, and also in regions underpinning self and other- 
relevant affective processing. Greater synchronization in visual and auditory sensory 
areas across both groups and conditions thus lends weight to the time-locked brain 
activity identified in key extra-sensory brain regions revealed by our ISC analysis 
and discussed below.  
Healthy controls exhibited affective synchrony in the ACC, bilateral insula and 
postcentral gyrus when listening and engaging with another’s negative social 
rejection experiences. This mirrors our findings using the traditional GLM approach 
in Chapter 4, despite being a data-driven approach without stimulus-based modelling. 
In addition, while listening to the social inclusion narrative, controls revealed 
increased synchrony in precuneus, PCC and ACC, supramarginal gyrus and 
subgenual PFC. Similarly, these findings of increased activity in empathic and 
affective regions mirror those outlined in Chapter 5 in healthy controls relative to 
MDD. In addition, the finding of increased ISCs in the subgenual PFC provides cross-
modal support for the notion that this region is crucial in the integration of social 
signals and limbic feedback (Drevets et al., 1997; Drevets, Savitz, & Trimble, 2008). 
Additional ISCs in midline and frontal regions may also indicate greater levels of 
mentalisation in healthy controls (Feng et al., 2016; Meyer et al., 2013, 2014) and 
affect sharing, crucial to the empathic response (Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, 
& D’Esposito, 2010; D. P. Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012; Vrtička et al., 2013).  
In depression, listening to the social rejection narrative evoked ISCs in 
somatosensory cortices, right anterior insula and temporal poles (TP), but not in 
regions associated with empathic processing, as predicted for healthy controls. 
However, these findings do fall in line with observing a stranger’s social rejection in 
the Cyberball task (Meyer et al., 2013, 2014), albeit in a healthy control population. 
While the functionality of the temporal poles (TP) in the context of socio-emotional 
processing remains to be fully examined (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000), emerging 
evidence suggests that this area may integrate dorsal (auditory), medial (olfactory) 
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and ventral (visual) perceptual streams underlying social and emotional processing 
(Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007). In addition, during evocative negative emotional 
processing, the TP may be reactivated even when emotions are merely imagined – in 
line with our paradigm (Olson et al., 2007). In contrast, the social inclusion narrative 
evoked ISCs in affective and reward regions - the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and 
ACC. Previous functional imaging studies found that activation in reward regions, 
including the NAcc, was associated with the perception of pleasant emotional stimuli 
(Sabatinelli et al., 2007). The NAcc activation was found to also extend into the 
subgenual PFC, thought to be impaired in depression, with early neuroimaging 
evidence suggesting glial reduction (Ongür, Drevets, & Price, 1998) and 
abnormalities in gray matter volume (Drevets et al., 1997, 2008). Finally, activity in 
the ACC mirrors previous findings of positive social processing of autobiographical 
memories of inclusion (and rejection), described in Chapter 4. Thus, the heightened 
sensitivity to both self and other relevant social signals in depression highlights a 
potential role for the ACC in evaluating the socio-emotional state independent of 
valence.  
To further elucidate the time-locked sensitivity to unfolding social interaction, we 
examined the relationship between the elicited emotion derived from the continuous 
affective ratings in response to the two social narratives and the regional neural 
synchronicity within each group. This revealed strong ACC and insula activity across 
both conditions and both groups in response to changes in mood. This suggests that 
continuous processing of incoming social signals modulated cingulate cortical 
activity with strong agreement across groups. Previously, Etkin, Egner, and Kalisch, 
(2011) suggested that evaluative cognitive control in response to emotional exposure 
includes the appraisal of positive signals and its evaluation against a negative 
emotional appraisal within this network. Similarly, a study investigating the 
relationship between ISC and valence in response to emotional movies revealed that 
as valence decreased from positive to negative, ISC increased in regions involved in 
emotional processing, including the medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex, 
and in the default-mode network, including the precuneus, and ventromedial 
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prefrontal cortex (Nummenmaa et al., 2012, 2014). This contributes to the growing 
evidence base that activity in the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices may be 
associated with a range of higher-order cognitive processes, including mentalising, 
and self-monitoring, in addition to emotional processing per se (Amodio & Frith, 
2006; Mar, 2011). This interpretation is underscored by previous animal models and 
neuroimaging studies suggesting a social evaluative function in the ACC and medial 
PFC (Apps et al., 2012, 2016; Apps & Ramnani, 2014). Using the ISC approach, our 
findings therefore provide further encouraging support for the notion of a neural 
network sensitive to social evaluation taking into account positive and negative social 
cues. As described within the discussion of previous chapters, this falls well within 
the theoretical accounts of social processing, such as the social risk hypothesis of 
depressed mood, or the social rank hypothesis and sociometer theory.  
In addition, the social risk hypothesis of depressed mood suggests a heightened neural 
sensitivity to social cues in depression, which may be reflected in increased activity 
within the social evaluative network described above. This assumption was supported 
by empirical findings in Chapter 4; however, it remains to be explored using the ISC 
approach. In fact, very few studies to date have investigated differences in the degree 
of inter-subject synchrony between groups, let alone clinical disorders. Studies 
investigating differences in social cognition using ISC analyses (Hasson et al., 2004) 
have focused on socio-emotional deficits in schizophrenia (Kim et al., 2008) and 
autism (Hasson et al., 2010; Salmi et al., 2013), with the latter revealing less 
synchronised brain activity across ASD listeners than controls in regions implicated 
in empathetic and social evaluation processing. These regions included the insula, 
PCC and ACC, caudate nucleus, precuneus, and supra-marginal gyrus (Salmi et al., 
2013). The greater variability in perceptual and sensory processing was attributed to 
the known deficits in social perception and action recognition in autism, with 
decreased synchronisation reflecting a more heterogeneous neural response. 
Similarly, our results suggest greater ISC activity in healthy controls in areas involved 
in social and affective cognition across both social narratives when comparing 
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intersubject correlations between depressed and never-depressed individuals. This 
includes the superior temporal gyrus (STG), temporal poles, and to some extent 
ventromedial prefrontal cortices. In contrast, MDD participants exhibited greater 
activity in primary visual cortices across narratives, and greater activity in the 
precentral gyrus, associated with physical pain processing during social rejection. 
Previous studies have proposed a role for mental imagery in cognitive processing, 
including suppression or distorted appraisals, which may exacerbate and/or maintain 
depression (Weßlau & Steil, 2014). This is illustrated in a greater proportion of 
negative (relative to positive) images being generated, characterized further by 
greater vividness and distress, correlated with depressive symptom severity (Weßlau, 
Cloos, Höfling, & Steil, 2015). Our findings of elevated visual cortex activity in 
depressed relative to healthy controls thus begs the question whether mental imagery 
of dynamic social interactions may elicit a different neural response in MDD, perhaps 
due to greater perceived ‘realness’ (Mathews, Ridgeway, & Holmes, 2013). 
However, large ISCs in visual cortices across groups and narratives overall lend 
weight to the notion of ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ when engaging in mental 
imagery, in line with previous findings (Costa, Lang, Sabatinelli, Versace, & Bradley, 
2010; Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015; Sabatinelli et al., 2007).  
The results presented in this chapter may be further explained when examining the 
nature of the task more closely. The STG, activated more strongly in controls relative 
to MDD, is implicated in language comprehension, and while attending to auditory 
signals in the presence of background noise within dynamic social contexts (Vander 
Ghinst et al., 2016). Our task involved attending to an extended auditory social 
narrative within an inherently noisy environment, as the speaker was being recorded 
while simultaneously being scanned. While there is limited evidence on how 
emotional signals in the voice are processed in the human brain as opposed to visual 
stimuli, it is crucial to detect small fluctuations in prosody, gesture, as well as facial 
expressions to fully gauge another’s intentions, thoughts and actions (Adolphs et al., 
2002; D. P. Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). Greater ISC in the STG may therefore 
emphasise the ability of healthy controls to extract emotionally salient features within 
Chapter 6 | Intersubject Synchronization during Rejection and Inclusion 
 
199 
 
a social narrative, a process that may be disrupted in MDD under the present task 
conditions.  
Curiously, a study investigating ISC in response to rhetorically powerful compared 
to weaker speeches similarly identified strong and regionally localized ISCs in the 
STG and medial PFC (Schmalzle et al., 2015). This level of ‘resonance’ may be 
mirrored in our findings. Prioritising the most salient features or intent to achieve 
engagement within a narrative requires a dedicated attentional mechanism, which 
may be impaired in MDD relative to controls. Instead, attentional resources in MDD 
appeared to be shifted towards the visual imagery of the scenes presented. 
Alternatively, decreased regional ISCs in key socio-affective areas may also reflect a 
more heterogeneous or idiosyncratic response in MDD relative to controls, despite 
all participants being exposed to the same narratives. This may be due to more inward 
directed self-referential and ruminative processing, in line with previous notions of 
heightened self-focused attention in MDD (Gotlib et al., 2004).  
In sum, we used a novel approach to study brain mechanisms while listening to 
another’s personal experience of social rejection and inclusion in a naturalistic social 
context. This has highlighted several important themes. Firstly, the ISC approach can 
be used to identify primary sensory cortices as well as extra-sensory activation in 
social, affective and empathic cortical areas. This suggests that social affective 
stimuli can lead brains to synchronise or ‘tick together’ in a coherent manner even in 
the absence of constrained presentations, as revealed by the data-driven approach. 
Secondly, co-activation of ACC and insula in response to social rejection and 
inclusion narratives across groups further highlights the social evaluative function 
posited in previous chapter. However, contrary to the findings described in Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5, group comparisons revealed greater synchrony in healthy controls 
in key social cognitive areas, such as the STG compared to depressed individuals who 
exhibited greater regional ISCs in the visual cortices. Thus, deficits in social 
functioning in depression may be in part reflected by more individualistic, 
heterogeneous neural responses in line with reduced cortical synchrony when 
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processing other relevant social affective information. Considering these results, 
implementing the ISC approach to examine the neural basis of social interactions 
points to exciting lines of future research. However, given its early state of 
development, results should be interpreted with caution.   
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we extend our investigation from emotion elicitation to emotion 
regulation to address individual differences and cognitive mechanisms in detecting 
and responding to interpersonal emotional signals. In the previous chapters, our 
findings revealed that autobiographical memories of social rejection, inclusion and 
neutral social experiences can reliably elicit salient emotions in the present using the 
ecologically valid approach of script-driven imagery. The behavioural study 
presented in this chapter therefore aims to utilise social autobiographical memories 
to examine emotion activation and regulation in a sample of healthy individuals. It 
presents an exploratory attempt at implementing this approach to further address 
pertinent questions within the social affective research context, and with regards to 
socio-emotional processing. 
In responding to salient emotional cues in the environment individuals tend to adopt 
regulatory goal-directed strategies, characterised by two main processes; (1) the 
ability to translate a regulatory goal into a behavioural response, and (2) the ability to 
disengage with a maladaptive regulation strategy once initiated (Gross, 1998). These 
encompass voluntary and automatic processes that influence the occurrence, 
magnitude, duration, and expression of a goal-directed emotional response (Gross, 
1998; Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015), conceptualised within a dual-process 
framework (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). Explicit voluntary regulation strategies 
include the cognitive reappraisal of meaning associated with an emotional context, or 
the active attentional disengagement from negative stimuli, while implicit regulation 
strategies include affect labelling or ‘putting your feelings into words’ with the aim 
of reducing subjective distress (Gross, 1998; Moyal, Henik, & Anholt, 2014).  
Cognitive reappraisal is one of the most widely implemented explicit emotion 
regulation strategies, which can reduce depressive symptom severity and reduce 
negative affect by actively reframing a meaning associated with an emotional context 
(Gross, 1998; Moyal et al., 2014). An alternative to cognitive reappraisal is the active 
disengagement from a negative stimulus and attentional reallocation (Moyal et al., 
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2014). While adaptive in reducing negative affect in response to highly intense 
stimuli in healthy individuals, in depression, the use of rumination or maladaptive 
distraction, is intrinsically linked to greater symptom severity (Sheppes et al., 2015). 
However, the use of adaptive strategies to regulate social emotions has revealed 
inconsistent results (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010), although findings 
from Chapter 2 suggest that difficulty in emotion regulation is significantly associated 
with a range of social behaviours, such as increased submissive behavior, 
interpersonal sensitivity, and involuntary subordination in depressed individuals, 
relative to healthy controls. This suggests that difficulty in emotion regulation may 
be inherently linked to depressed individuals failing to fulfil regulatory, socially-
oriented, goals, as described within the social rank theory (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; 
Gilbert et al., 2007) and social risk hypothesis of depression (Allen & Badcock, 
2003), thus perpetuating the presentation of depressive symptoms. 
In addition to the explicit regulation strategies mentioned above, affect labelling, or 
putting your feelings into words (e.g. ‘I am feeling… happy’) emerged as an adaptive 
implicit regulation strategy from within the practice of mindfulness (Moyal et al., 
2014). Mindfulness more generally is thought to reduce distress by increasing 
emotional awareness, thereby reducing the immediate impact of negative self-
referential processing, and focusing instead on goal-directed behaviours (Burklund, 
David Creswell, Irwin, & Lieberman, 2014; Creswell & Lindsay, 2014). Previous 
studies have found that putting your feelings into words, integral to mindfulness 
practice, can incidentally downregulate affect in response to emotional faces 
(Lieberman et al., 2007) and highly distressing negative images on a neural level, 
when contrasted with passive watching (Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 
2011), even in the context of exposure therapy for spider phobia (Kircanski, 
Lieberman, & Craske, 2012).  
Importantly, while affect labelling is not considered a more adaptive emotion 
regulation strategy compared to cognitive reappraisal or distraction, perhaps due to 
its incidental nature, (Black, 2013; Lieberman et al., 2011), it may have potential 
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positive carry over effects in other domains, including executive control and working 
memory (Teper et al., 2013; J. M. G. Williams, 2010; L. E. Williams, Bargh, Nocera, 
& Gray, 2009). As such, affect labelling may represent a more advantageous emotion 
regulation strategy, as opposed to explicit regulation strategies constrained in their 
effect to the regulatory goal at hand. However, self-reported belief in the efficacy of 
the implicit affect labelling strategy is significantly lower relative to for instance, 
cognitive reappraisal (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011a), with self-report biases 
potentially limiting the interpretation of behavioural comparisons in the absence of 
physiological markers (Kircanski et al., 2012). However, investigating the 
effectiveness of affect labelling nonetheless warrants further investigation, given both 
the advantages and potential carry-over effects outlined above, and the discrepant 
findings regarding the adaptive nature of existing emotion regulation strategies to 
date (Burklund et al., 2014; Gyurak et al., 2011a; Lieberman et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 
2014; Opialla et al., 2014). 
The latter point is especially pertinent, as a major constraint within the existing 
emotion regulation literature is the tendency to examine explicit regulation tasks in 
response to experimentally constrained emotional stimuli, and frequently in the 
absence of external stressors known to impact the implementation of cognitive 
control (Raio, Orederu, Palazzolo, Shurick, & Phelps, 2013). Existing ‘effortful’ 
emotion regulation strategies may be reduced in their efficacy within realistic 
affective contexts (Burklund et al., 2014; Gyurak et al., 2011a; Lieberman et al., 
2011; Lutz et al., 2014; Opialla et al., 2014), perhaps due to limited attention to the 
importance of sociality within emotion, despite being an inherent part of the 
regulatory process (Shuman, 2013). Goal-directed regulatory behaviours are 
frequently aimed at modifying the current social contexts (Leary, 2004; Vrtička et al., 
2013), encompassing others’ appraisals. This is demonstrated in amplified positive 
emotions in the workplace (Wong, Tschan, Messerli, & Semmer, 2013) and social 
decision-making as a function of anticipated regret about fair and unfair behaviour 
(Van der Schalk, Bruder, & Manstead, 2012). In these contexts, implicitly labelling 
affect may offer an ‘easier’ approach to implement within naturalistic socio-affective 
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contexts, compared to the more ‘effortful’ approach required in cognitive appraisal. 
In addition, our approach addresses the problem of low ecological validity in emotion 
regulation paradigms by modelling the real-world as closely as possible using 
autobiographical memories (see Chapter 3 for more detail). This encompasses 
dynamic affective environments and highly salient negative and positive emotions 
derived from social interactions. As sociocultural contexts are known to modulate the 
use of emotion regulation strategies (De Leersnyder, Boiger, & Mesquita, 2013; 
McRae, Heller, John, & Gross, 2011), script-driven imagery may thus provide a 
useful paradigm to further explore emotion regulation strategies within distinctly 
social contexts. Chapter 3 provided the initial validation of this paradigm in the 
context of memory generation and saliency over time. 
This chapter will extend this validation to the memory presentation session, as well 
as investigating affect labelling as an effective emotion regulation strategy. There are 
two main aims: i) to further validate the activation of salient emotions in response to 
autobiographical script-driven memories of social rejection and inclusion and ii) to 
examine the effectiveness of affect labelling as an implicit emotion regulation 
strategy in healthy controls in response to autobiographical memories of social 
rejection and inclusion within a realistic affective context. 
Our hypotheses were as follows; 
HYPOTHESES 
• Memories involving social rejection, social inclusion, and neutral social 
experiences will reliably modify mood across participants in a script-driven 
memory presentation session, with the recall of rejection memories resulting 
in increased negative mood, the recall of inclusion memories resulting in 
increased positive mood, and neutral memories resulting in relatively 
unchanged mood.  
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• Affect labelling will result in greater modification in mood in response to 
listening to memories of rejection and inclusion relative to a control condition 
involving describing and attending to memories, only.  
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7.2 METHODS AND MATERIALS 
PARTICIPANTS 
Thirty-four healthy participants (22 female; 39.32±16.73 years) with no history of 
Major Depressive Disorder or other mental health problems, normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and no hearing impairment, were recruited from volunteer panels at the 
MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit and the University of Cambridge. All 
participants completed two behavioural research sessions, a memory generation 
session (described in Chapter 3) and a memory presentation session. Full 
demographics can be found in the results section in Table 7.2.  
CLINICAL INTERVIEW AND SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND PROCESS SELF-REPORT 
MEASURES 
A battery of social, affective and process self-report measures was undertaken with 
respect to all participants. See Chapter 2 for a full description. 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK  
Memory Generation (Session I) 
In the initial behavioural memory-generation session, participants provided 9 
autobiographical memories consisting of 3 social rejection memories, 3 social 
inclusion, memories and 3 neutral social memories (e.g. shopping in the presence of 
other people) and affective ratings with respect to current mood state at the time of 
memory recall and mood state at the time of the original experience. See Chapter 3 
for detailed information on the memory generation methodology. The generated 
autobiographical memory scripts represented the stimuli for the following memory 
presentation session. Audio stimuli of autobiographical memories were recorded and 
edited using Adobe® Audition® (2009 Adobe Systems, version 3.0). 
Emotion Regulation Task (Session II) 
In the following behavioural session, the emotion regulation task consisted of three 
consecutively presented 30-second same-type autobiographical memory scripts 
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within each of the three blocks (neutral, rejection, inclusion), generated in the 
previous session. Participants were instructed to listen while imagining experiencing 
the event in the present and to pay attention to their emotional response during the 
event and in the brief silence that followed, under three experimental conditions: (1) 
‘attend’, (2) ‘describe’ and (3) ‘label’. In these conditions, participants were 
instructed, respectively, to (1) only listen and imagine, (2) describe the imagined 
scene by selecting one of 16 possible neutral descriptive words or (3) label emotions 
elicited by the scene by selecting one of 16 possible social emotion words. In the (1) 
‘describe’ and (2) ‘label’ condition, participants were prompted with a wheel 
displaying either (1) neutral descriptive words or (2) social emotion labels. The 
wheels were presented at three time segments: mid-script, immediately post-script 
and after a brief period of silence. For an overview of the paradigm, see Figure 7.1.  
After each audio script, there was a 20-second period of silence during which 
participants were asked to mentally elaborate on the emotionally salient aspects of 
the previous memory (Lanius et al., 2002). Participants rated their current mood prior 
to each block following a brief 30-second closed-eye baseline period and following 
each audio script. Participants rated levels of current subjective distress, rejection, 
inclusion and positivity on the same 11-point Likert scale as in the initial behavioural 
session. The positive and negative scores were combined for the analyses into 
composite mood scores (See Chapter 3). In addition, participants provided ratings of 
how well they were able to imagine themselves experiencing the event in the present 
(‘imaginability’), as well as of vividness and intensity. An additional 30-second 
washout clip depicting an ocean sunset was presented between the rejection and 
inclusion blocks to encourage mood repair. The order of each condition was 
randomised within a block and indicated by a 3-sec instruction cue immediately 
preceding each script. The order of individual scripts within each block was 
randomised. The total approximate task duration was 25 minutes. See Figure 7.1 
below. 
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Figure 7.1 Script-driven imagery paradigm for emotion regulation task. 
 
Auditory presentation of the stimuli was delivered via headphones connected to a 
desktop PC running Matlab (Mathworks) and presented using the psychophysics 
toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The effective viewing distance was 50 cm with 
a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels and a visual angle of 16.7 degrees. Participants were 
asked to provide affective ratings on the 11-point mood scale using arrow keys. The 
neutral descriptive and social emotion labels were presented on screen in a circular 
wheel, from which participants were instructed to select one label as quickly as 
possible (see Figure 7.2). The 14 social emotion labels were derived from a series of 
emotions which had been explicitly identified as representing social emotions by a 
range of authors (see Hareli & Parkinson, 2008, for review). A list of neutral 
descriptive words for the ‘describe’ condition was independently generated with the 
aim of describing scenes. Both lists contained optional labels of ‘none’ and ‘other’, 
in addition to the social emotions or neutral descriptive words. To ensure low 
emotional valence for descriptive and high emotionality for the social emotion labels, 
both word lists were cross-referenced with the Affective Norms for English Words 
(ANEW) database, which provides a set of normative emotional ratings for a large 
number of words in the English language (M. M. Bradley & Lang, 1999).    
Chapter 7 | Emotion Regulation Strategies in Response to Social Memories 
 
210 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Screenshot from the emotion regulation task, depicting a range of emotion labels 
within the 'label' condition, from which participants are prompted to select one as quickly as 
possible. 
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Table 7.1  
Social emotion labels (‘label’) and neutral descriptive words (‘describe’) used in the 
emotion regulation task 
Number Social Emotion Labels  Neutral Descriptive Words  
1 Hate/Dislike Large 
2 Sadness Small 
3 Disgust Active 
4 Anger Busy 
5 Guilt Noisy 
6 Contempt Warm 
7 Shame Tall 
8 Admiration Bright 
9 Love Cold 
10 Pride Dark 
11 Joy Cool 
12 Fear Short 
13 Hope Quiet 
14 Compassion Hot 
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
The procedure for the memory generation session is described in Chapter 3. One 
week later, in this 1.5-hour memory presentation session, participants provided 
informed consent once more and were then familiarised with the wheels depicting (1) 
neutral descriptive words or (2) social emotion labels prior to the task, using 
laminated cue cards. A practice run preceded the experimental block to familiarise 
participants with the task, in which participants were instructed to listen to brief 30-
second audio-scripts consisting of news segments describing neutral events (e.g., a 
gardening show) under the three experimental conditions described above. 
Participants then performed the behavioural emotion regulation task described above. 
Immediately after the main task, participants were administered a battery of social, 
affective and process measures (see Chapter 2). At the end of the session participants 
were thanked for their time and debriefed. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Behavioural Appraisal 
Affective ratings, vividness and emotional intensity scores acquired in session I were 
averaged for each memory type and then compared between time of experience and 
time of recall as described in Chapter 3. Session II change scores in composite mood 
were calculated from affective ratings acquired in the second session memory 
presentation task before and following each memory, and analysed using a repeated 
measures 3x3 ANOVA with condition (affect label/describe/attend) and memory 
type (rejection/inclusion/neutral) as within-subject factors. Vividness, intensity and 
imaginability ratings acquired in session II were analysed using a repeated measures 
ANOVA with memory type (neutral/rejection/inclusion), and condition (affect label, 
attend, describe) as within-subject factors. 
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7.3 RESULTS 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 7.2 
Demographic characteristics of the participants. 
 N=34 
Sex 
  Male 12 
  Female 22 
Age, years   
  Mean (SD) 36.24 (16.65) 
National Adult Reading Test 
  Mean (SD) 7.68 (6.03) 
Ethnicity 
  Caucasian 33 
  Other 1 
Marital Status 
  Single / Unmarried 17 
  Married 6 
  Separated / Divorced 5 
  Other 6 
Education 
  Completed Year 10 1 
  Completed Year 12 10 
  Completed Bachelors degree 16 
  Completed Masters degree 3 
  Completed PhD 0 
  Other 4 
Employment Status 
  Employed 19 
  Unemployed 12 
  Student 0 
  Other 3 
Employment 
  Full Time 6 
  Part Time 10 
  Other 18 
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BEHAVIOURAL APPRAISAL 
Memory Generation (Session I) 
In the first step, we investigated whether the memories recalled in the memory-
generation session had maintained their saliency over time since the original event. 
The results are presented in Chapter 3. Results suggested the memories maintained 
sufficient emotional saliency over time and were thus deemed appropriate for use in 
the memory presentation session.  
Emotion Regulation Task (Session II) 
Six participants’ responses to the experimental conditions were excluded from the 
final analysis where no descriptive or affective label was provided when prompted 
suggesting lack of engagement with the experimental manipulation. Mean affect 
change as a function of memory type are presented in Table 7.3, while mean affect 
change as a function of regulation strategy (condition) is presented in Table 7.4. 
Results suggest that the affect labelling condition resulted in a marginally greater 
change in mood numerically, while mean change in mood was lowest for the describe 
condition. Overall, results suggest that mood was most elevated following inclusion 
memories, followed by neutral and lastly rejection memories, irrespective of 
condition (see also Figure 7.3). Mean vividness, intensity and imaginability scores 
are presented in Table 7.5. 
To investigate the response to the emotional memories in the memory presentation 
session, we compared the change in composite mood scores obtained during the 
session immediately before and after each memory was presented, as well as 
vividness, intensity and imaginability ratings. Affective change ratings were analysed 
using a within-group 3x3 ANOVA with condition (affect label/describe/attend) and 
memory type (rejection/inclusion/neutral) as the within-group factors. Mauchly’s test 
of sphericity was violated for memory type (x2=10.96, p=0.004) and the interaction 
of condition and memory type (x2=20.04, p=0.02) and results aree reported using a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction. For vividness, intensity and imaginability ratings, 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not violated, hence sphericity is assumed. 
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Table 7.3 
Mean change in mood by memory type for the emotion regulation task 
Memory Type Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Rejection -6.65 0.64 -7.97 -5.33 
Neutral 0.40 0.47 -0.57 1.38 
Inclusion 4.43 0.62 3.15 5.71 
NB: Lower scores represent more negative mood with a range of -10 to +10 (most positive) 
 
Table 7.4  
Mean change in mood by regulation strategy (condition) for the emotion regulation 
task 
Condition Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Affect Label -.81 .41 -1.66 .04 
Attend -.70 .36 -1.45 .04 
Describe -.31 .29 -.90 .28 
NB: Lower scores represent more negative mood with a range of -10 to +10 (most positive) 
Table 7.5  
Mean vividness, intensity and imaginability ratings for emotion regulation task 
Measure Memory Type Mean  Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Vividness 
Rejection 7.2 0.38 6.41 7.99 
Neutral 6.77 0.39 5.96 7.57 
Inclusion 7.55 0.35 6.83 8.27 
Intensity 
Rejection 7.33 0.4 6.51 8.16 
Neutral 6.22 0.45 5.29 7.15 
Inclusion 7.16 0.45 6.22 8.1 
Imaginability 
Rejection 7.33 0.35 6.61 8.06 
Neutral 7.20 0.36 6.45 7.96 
Inclusion 7.74 0.36 7.00 8.48 
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Affective change ratings results revealed a main effect for memory type 
(F[1.49,40.18]=84.36, p<0.001, η²=0.76), but no significant main effect of condition 
(F[2,54]=1.28, p=0.28, η²=0.04) nor an interaction (F[3,81.28]=1.43, p=0.24, 
η²=0.05). Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed mood change was 
significantly different between all three memory types (all p<0.001) with greatest 
increases in negative mood in response to rejection memories, followed by a 
significant improvement in mood following inclusion memories and no significant 
change in mood following neutral memories. The greatest mean difference in mood 
was observed for rejection memories compared to inclusion memories (-11.08±1.08), 
relative to rejection compared to neutral (-7.06±0.79) and inclusion compared to 
neutral (-4.02±0.67). 
Vividness ratings revealed a significant main effect for memory type (F[2,44]=5.35, 
p=0.01, η²=0.20), but no main effect for condition (F[2,44]=1.51, p=0.23, η²=0.06) 
and no significant interaction (F[4,88]=0.86, p=0.49, η²=0.04). Planned comparisons 
of memory type revealed a significant difference in vividness between neutral and 
inclusion memories (-0.78±0.24, p=0.01), while other comparisons of neutral relative 
to rejection (-0.43±0.26, p=0.31) and inclusion relative to rejection memories 
(0.35±0.22, p=0.40) were not significantly different. However, while not statistically 
significant, numerically, rejection memories were rated as most vivid, followed by 
inclusion and then neutral memories (see Table 7.5).  
Intensity ratings revealed a significant main effect for memory type (F[2,44]=8.03, 
p=0.001, η²=0.27), but no main effect for condition (F[2,44]=0.93, p=0.40, η²=0.04) 
and no significant interaction (F[4,88]=1.40, p=0.45, η²=0.04). Planned comparisons 
of memory type revealed a significant difference in intensity ratings between neutral 
and inclusion (-0.94±0.29, p=0.01) and rejection memories (-1.12±0.34, p=0.01), 
while rejection memories were not significantly different from inclusion memories 
(0.17±0.27, p=1.00). Overall, inclusion memories were rated as most intense, 
followed by rejection and then neutral memories (see Table 7.5).  
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Imaginability ratings revealed no significant main effect for memory type 
(F[2,44]=2.57, p=0.09, η²=0.11), condition (F[2,44]=0.34, p=0.72, η²=0.02) or 
interaction (F[4,88]=1.72, p=0.153, η²=0.07) indicating that all memories were 
comparably imaginable across all memory types and conditions, suggesting the 
script-driven paradigm was successfully implemented. See Table 7.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Mean change in mood ± 1SE by regulation strategy (condition) and memory type 
in the emotion regulation task. Results reveal significant change in mood as a function of 
memory type but not as a function of regulation strategy. 
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7.4 DISCUSSION 
This chapter investigated three emotion regulation strategies for modulating salient 
emotions of rejection and inclusion elicited using script-driven imagery in a novel 
implementation. The first aim was to replicate the validation of script-driven imagery 
as an effective mood induction in eliciting positive and negative social emotions 
within the memory presentation session, as already demonstrated in Chapter 4. The 
second aim was to compare the emotional regulatory impact of affective labelling, 
and descriptive labelling relative to passive listening in response to autobiographical 
memories of social rejection and inclusion within a naturalistic affective context. The 
study revealed two main findings. Firstly, we replicated the finding that script-driven 
imagery used in the emotion regulation task could successfully activate salient social 
emotions and changes in mood, in line with our predictions. This is further supported 
by comparable vividness and intensity across inclusion and rejection memories, as 
well as comparably imaginability across all memories. Secondly, the comparison of 
emotion regulation strategies revealed no significant differences between affect 
labelling, describing and passive listening with respect to negative and positive 
change in mood, in contrast to our predictions.  
Successful mood induction in the main experimental task within the memory 
presentation session underscores the utility of script-driven imagery in eliciting 
salient emotions from social autobiographical memories. These findings are novel as 
previous research implemented this paradigm primarily in PTSD populations by 
eliciting highly arousing memories from a single or limited number of events 
(Beckham et al., 2007; Frewen et al., 2008, 2010, 2011; Kleim et al., 2010; Lanius et 
al., 2002, 2003; Lindauer et al., 2004). Thus, this chapter extends the findings from 
Chapter 3 by further validating the script-driven imagery paradigm in a population of 
healthy participants, providing support for the implementation of this approach in 
social affective research contexts and clinical populations, as described in Chapter 4-
6. 
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However, comparing emotion regulation strategies revealed more complicated 
findings. The contrast of affect labelling compared to describing and attending 
allowed for an investigation of affect labelling as an adaptive implicit emotion 
regulation strategy, as opposed to comparing it to more explicit regulation strategies, 
such as cognitive appraisal. However, studies investigating affect labelling have 
revealed inconsistent findings (Burklund et al., 2014; Gyurak et al., 2011a; 
Lieberman et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2014; Opialla et al., 2014). While previous 
findings emphasised the importance and utility of ‘putting your feelings into words’ 
(Kircanski et al., 2012; Lieberman et al., 2007), our study suggests that labelling with 
words fails to significantly modulate positive or negative mood beyond passively 
attending. 
An important consideration at the outset of this study involved the examination of 
intensity, vividness and imaginability at both the time of experience (as 
retrospectively rated) and the time of recall to achieve consistency across sessions for 
the retrieved memories used in the experimental session. This was validated in 
Chapter 3. It could, however, be the case that although memories recalled within the 
session were emotionally salient, as demonstrated by the impact on mood, the 
emotion elicited was insufficiently arousing to the extent that it required regulation. 
This is reflected in the attenuation in vividness and intensity over time and over 
sessions. In addition, as previously suggested, affect labelling may reveal implicit 
changes in physiological states, such as skin conductance rate, in response to intense 
affective stimuli, but not in subjective self-reported distress (Kircanski et al., 2012). 
This is aided by findings indicating that subjectively, labelling is considered a less 
efficient emotion regulation strategy compared to explicitly cognitively reappraising 
emotional meaning (Lieberman et al., 2011). Our findings may therefore reflect a 
subjective response bias, in which all three strategies are considered equally effective 
or ineffective, a limitation that requires attention in subsequent implementations. 
Further, previous studies have shown that emotion regulation strategies consider the 
sociality dimension an important part of the regulatory process (Shuman, 2013), with 
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distinct sociocultural contexts known to modulate the use of emotion regulation 
strategies (De Leersnyder, Boiger, & Mesquita, 2013; McRae, Heller, John, & Gross, 
2011). While the implementation of the script-driven imagery was aimed at 
increasing the ecological validity of the emotion regulation task, autobiographical 
memories involving emotional experiences of social interactions may have already 
undergone a process of previous regulation, thus attenuating the need for further 
regulation within the goal-directed regulatory framework. However, incorporating 
ecologically valid approaches to investigating emotion regulation within realistic 
socio-affective contexts provides a starting point for further research. 
In sum, this chapter aimed at investigating affect labelling as an effective emotion 
regulation strategy in a novel implementation and further validation of the script-
driven imagery. Results revealed that script-driven imagery presents a viable mood 
induction with the aim of eliciting salient social emotions in response to 
autobiographical memories of social rejection and inclusion. This is of particular 
importance in the study of dysfunctional emotion regulation in clinical populations, 
such as depression, as individual differences in the ability to regulate emotion 
contribute to the vulnerability and maintenance of affective disorders (Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2010). However, it is debatable whether the saliency of the elicited emotions 
was sufficient to warrant regulation, or whether biased self-report ratings may have 
interfered with the behavioural investigation. Thus, in future investigations, it will be 
important to implement different methods to investigate the efficacy of affect 
labelling in realistic socio-affective contexts, either by increasing saliency or 
incorporating physiological indicators. 
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8.1 THESIS OVERVIEW 
The work described in this thesis aimed at investigating the psychological and neural 
bases of social processing in Major Depressive Disorder, building on the existing 
literature. The experimental investigations described in the previous chapters 
represent an attempt to resolve current conflicts and gaps in the social affective 
neuroscience literature regarding social functioning in depression. This may inform 
current theoretical accounts of depression, as well as providing a scientific basis for 
incorporating functional treatment outcomes from within social domains into existing 
intervention approaches. 
Firstly, this thesis aimed to challenge the long-held view that a dedicated neural 
network is selective for processing negative social emotions, such as social pain, in 
healthy individuals in response to being rejected or excluded. Secondly, this thesis 
was motivated by the importance of this ‘social pain’ debate to the understanding of 
social functioning in depression. This included an extension to the above debate to 
incorporate an experimental investigation of processing positive social emotions both 
in individuals with and without depression.  
This chapter will review the experimental findings from the previous chapters and 
discuss these with respect to current theoretical frameworks of social processing in 
depression discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. Personal memories as vehicles for 
eliciting social emotions were used to investigate the complex psychological and 
neural mechanisms underlying dynamic social interactions across Chapter 4, Chapter 
5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7. This chapter will therefore further aim to highlight some 
of the challenges in the social affective neuroscience literature more generally, and 
discuss the validity and implications of using personal social memories in this 
context, more specifically. Finally, this chapter will outline the limitations of the 
experimental investigations, the wider implications for clinical practice and future 
directions. 
In sum, that was the outline; let’s review the journey. 
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8.2 REVIEW OF MAIN FINDINGS BY CHAPTER 
Chapter 1 provided a general introduction to the work presented in this thesis, 
outlining the existing evidence-base on social information processing in depression, 
highlighting the research questions that arose from the literature and embedding these 
within the context of current theoretical frameworks. 
Chapter 2 aimed at investigating systemic biases using a battery of social, affective 
and process measures. Replicating previous findings, depressed individuals were 
more anxious and depressed, and exhibited greater difficulty in emotion regulation 
and social processing. This included greater negative social comparison, submissive 
behaviour and involuntary subordination relative to controls. This provides strong 
support for the notion of social processing as a hallmark symptom of depression. A 
further important finding relates to persistence of social processing deficits in 
remission. These findings provide a comprehensive behavioural characterisation of 
the altered socio-cognitive profile in depression, which can be measured even in the 
absence of an acute episode. This investigation thus validated and replicated well-
established measures, and provided new insights using measures of social processing. 
Chapter 3 described the general methodology and initial implementation of 
autobiographical memories and script-driven imagery as the main approach within 
this thesis. The use of autobiographical memories and script-driven imagery aimed at 
implementing an ecologically valid experimental paradigm in the study of naturalistic 
social interactions. Thus, memories obtained from the initial memory generation 
sessions that took place prior to the studies described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7 were 
examined for comparable emotional saliency, vividness and intensity in healthy 
controls and depressed. Findings revealed that depressed and healthy controls 
successfully retrieved and elicited salient emotions in the present, despite time 
modulation effects. Importantly, mood, affective intensity, and vividness differed as 
a function of the respective social autobiographical memory, and not as a function of 
group. This demonstrated its usefulness for the subsequent chapters and validated the 
script-driven imagery approach.  
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The next three chapters used functional neuroimaging (fMRI) to investigate the 
neural basis for social processing with suggestions that depressed and healthy 
controls exhibit altered neural processing of socially salient experiences of rejection 
and inclusion depending on the point of origin.  
In Chapter 4, imagining personal experiences of social rejection as well as inclusion, 
revealed a common neural substrate for both social inclusion and social rejection 
(relative to neutral) in affective regions previously associated with social rejection in 
healthy controls only. In addition, between group comparisons revealed greater brain 
activity in somatosensory cortex in controls compared to those with MDD, and 
greater activity in the affective 'social pain' network in the dACC and AI in those with 
MDD relative to controls. However, on a behavioural level, both groups’ mood was 
comparably modulated by the valence of the experience. This study, using robust 
conjunction analyses and focusing on brain regions of interests identified in the 
literature, thus highlighted two important findings: the notion of a valence-
independent ‘social pain and social gain’ or social evaluation network, and a 
heightened sensitivity in depression compared to healthy controls to socially salient 
signals, irrespective of valence.  
In contrast, Chapter 5 revealed that the vicarious experience of socially salient 
experiences, narrated from another person's viewpoint, was associated with reduced 
emotional reactivity in arousal and valence on a behavioural level in depressed 
participants compared to controls. It also revealed decreased neural activity in so-
called affective and empathy brain regions in depression compared to controls, in line 
with previous findings in the empathy literature. These regions included the affective 
components of the 'social pain' network in the dACC and AI and empathy regions 
within the supramarginal gyrus. In comparison, healthy controls engaged in increased 
empathic processing of another’s experiences of social rejection and inclusion, thus 
pointing towards a potential dissociation between self- and other-relevant neural 
processing of socially salient emotional experiences.  
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Then, Chapter 6 used a novel neuroimaging analysis method to investigate 
intersubject synchronicity in response to naturalistic social experiences. These 
dynamically unfolding social emotional narratives provided an opportunity to explore 
the extent of attentional synchronicity within regions across- and between-listeners 
over time in a naturalistic and thus ecologically valid paradigm. Results revealed 
heightened intersubject correlations (ISC) in key sensory and extra-sensory regions 
in social, affective and empathic cortical areas, including the medial frontal cortex 
ACC and PCC. In depressed individuals, listening to the socially inclusive narrative 
revealed a more heterogeneous neural response reflected in overall decreased ISC, 
while the rejection narrative elicited a strong homogenous ISC in key regions 
identified previously. Thus, suggests greater synchronicity across depressed listeners 
in response to rejection compared to inclusion narratives. In contrast, healthy controls 
revealed consistent levels of ISC across valences, while the between-group 
comparison revealed greater synchrony in key social affective and cognitive areas, 
such as the superior temporal gyrus. Reduced cortical synchrony in depression in 
these areas may thus reflect individualistic heterogeneous neural responses in line 
with the heterogeneous symptom presentation of depression itself (Chapter 1). While 
this presents an exciting avenue for further research, these chapter findings should 
nonetheless be interpreted with some caution, given the methodology’s early stages.  
Finally, Chapter 7 explored emotion regulation strategies in response to 
autobiographical memories of rejection, inclusion and neutral memories using the 
script-driven imagery approach in a sample of healthy controls. Script-driven 
imagery was validated as a viable mood induction technique aimed at eliciting salient 
social emotions in the present. However, no significant changes in mood were 
observed as a function of the respective emotion regulation strategy employed. The 
efficacy of affect labelling and emotion regulation strategies more generally may thus 
be limited within naturalistic affective contexts and subject to diverging findings. 
However, this study also highlighted the usefulness of script-driven imagery as a 
novel approach for investigating emotion regulation strategies and similar research 
questions within naturalistic affective contexts. These findings are encouraging, 
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especially as previous chapters additionally validated this approach within a 
depressed sample, and as part of a neuroimaging investigation, opening up avenues 
for future investigations. 
Thus, following the summary of the work presented in this thesis thus far, this chapter 
aims to bring together the behavioural and neural findings to provide a clearer 
understanding of social processing in MDD, guided by the current theoretical 
frameworks introduced in Chapter 1. The thesis will conclude with an outline of 
future directions for this fascinating area of research 
8.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The ability to detect and respond to diverse signals of social inclusion and social 
exclusion is critical to the establishment and maintenance of relationships, groups and 
social hierarchies (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Formation of these social attachments 
affects important aspects of our narrative self, shaping our motivations, goals, 
behaviours and self-identity (Walton, Cohen, Cwir, & Spencer, 2012). Moreover, 
increased social connectedness is associated with a range of positive emotions, such 
as the experiences of joy, love, and friendship, and social support plays a vital role in 
the maintenance or rehabilitation of positive psychological well-being following 
adverse life events (Correa-Velez, Gifford, & Barnett, 2010). In contrast, the 
psychological sequelae of early social deprivation or the severing of existing social 
bonds detrimentally affects cognition, memory and development and is associated 
with an increase in psychopathology and functional impairment (Carlson & Earls, 
1997; van Ast et al., 2014). 
In depression, major life events involving social rejection, loss or failure are found to 
be the most proximal risk factors and are associated with lowered feelings of self-
worth and early-onset depression (DeWall et al., 2009; Slavich & Irwin, 2014b; 
Slavich et al., 2010). As outlined in Chapter 1, depression has a debilitating effect on 
day-to-day functioning and severely impairs appetite, sleep, concentration, and 
energy and is associated with suicidal ideation, feelings of worthlessness, sadness and 
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loss of interest in previously enjoyed activities (APA, 1994). Deficits across affective, 
cognitive and social domains are further outlined in Chapter 2. Here, the socio-
cognitive profile of healthy controls and individuals with a current depressive episode 
or a history of depression highlight the systematic biases in emotional processing of 
social signals. Findings of heightened interpersonal rejection sensitivity, increased 
submissiveness, feelings of low social rank and striving to avoid inferiority further 
emphasise the notion of severe impairments in social functioning in depression and 
underscore the persistent nature of these deficits beyond recovery, with implications 
for treatment goals and risk of recurrence.  
IMPLICATIONS FROM BEHAVIOURAL FINDINGS 
On a behavioural level, we have argued that the findings described in Chapter 2 
represent a dysfunctional entrenchment of behavioural coping strategies to avoid 
social exclusion from a group. This assumes that depression, dampened affect and 
decreased motivation may have presented an evolutionary adaptive condition to 
conserve energy and resources while engaging in social competition.  
The social risk hypothesis (Allen & Badcock, 2003) advocates a risk-averse stance, 
with downstream behavioural adaptions and cognitive biases in response to critically 
low social investment potential (SIP). The depressed mood state is thus induced as a 
function of fluctuations in the ratio of one’s respective social value and social burden 
to the group. For instance, when faced with perceptions of low social rank, and 
negative social comparison, as described in Chapter 2, the greater perceived social 
burden relative to an individuals’ social value would reduce the ratio and subsequent 
estimate of SIP (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert & Allan, 1998). This theory integrates 
the previous view on social attention holding power (SAHP) within the hierometer 
and social rank theories (Gilbert, 2000; Mahadevan et al., 2016), which describe the 
ability to attract positive attention and social rewards (see Chapter 1 for details). 
Across theories, adopting a social-risk-averse stance is thus argued to reduce the 
likelihood for social defeat and expulsion by reducing socially risky behaviours. 
However, the continued inhibition of socially appetitive behaviour as an ‘adaptive’ 
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depressed mood state, once entrenched, prevents the depressed individual from 
redirecting resources to more beneficial endeavours both in social and non-social 
contexts in the long-term. This is illustrated in the learned helplessness model, in 
which the individual ‘learns’ that outcomes are uncontrollable, thereby continuing to 
inhibit the appetitive behaviour (Abramson et al., 1978) and potentially resulting in 
chronic depression.  
Underlying these social-risk-averse behavioural adaptions is a proposed capacity to 
sensitively monitor incoming social information, an evolved ‘sociometer’, which 
allows an individual to gauge his or her social value and burden to a group 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, 2004). Heightened sensitivity in depression to 
socially salient signals, evidenced in Chapter 2, may thus be designed to optimally 
respond to social threat or changes in relational value. This interpretation is supported 
by findings of increased sensitivity to cues of interpersonal rejection in depression 
and remitted depression (Ayduk et al., 2001; J. C. Butler, Doherty, & Potter, 2007; 
Liu et al., 2014; Luterek et al., 2004), and the ‘depressive realism’ effect (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1988), in which depressed individuals’ judgments about self-relevant 
information can be more accurate than those of non-depressed individuals. These 
findings are also in line with the generally heightened awareness and attentional 
orientation towards internally generated or self-relevant information observed in 
depression (Ingram, 1990), associated with greater negative affect and negative 
appraisal (Beck & Clark, 1997; David M. Clark, 2001; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Spurr 
& Stopa, 2002). Thus, previous behavioural investigations have extensively 
examined the heightened sensitivity to self-relevant social information implied within 
the previous interpersonal theories. In contrast, the underlying neural mechanisms 
dedicated to detecting social signals and estimating relational value as proposed by 
the above theories had yet to be fully investigated.   
IMPLICATIONS FROM NEUROIMAGING FINDINGS 
So how do our behavioural findings relate to our neuroimaging findings in the context 
of the above theories? As described in the introduction, one of our main aims was to 
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challenge the long-held view that a dedicated neural network is selective for 
processing negative social emotions, such as social pain, in the human brain in 
response to being rejected or excluded. This was based on previous work by 
Eisenberger, Inagaki, Muscatell, Byrne Haltom, & Leary (2011), who had 
conceptualised the ‘sociometer’ as a ‘neural alarm system’ geared towards the 
detection of social cues signalling exclusion in healthy controls. Heightened 
sensitivity to social threat was thus argued to be reflected in neural activity in the 
dACC-AI or ‘social pain’ network, correlated with subjective distress.  
However, experimental investigations were limited to the discussion of rejection 
experiences relative to a fundamentally socially-neutral condition as opposed to 
incorporating bona fide socially inclusive signals (Eisenberger, 2012b; Eisenberger 
& Lieberman, 2003). In addition, the Cyberball paradigm suffers from 
methodological limitations with constrained ecological validity (De Gelder & 
Bertelson, 2003) and difficulty in establishing a ‘true’ neutral condition (Somerville 
et al., 2006). See Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 for a further discussion. The previous 
assumption of a ‘social pain’ network therefore deserved further consideration and 
was examined in Chapter 4. Interestingly, and in line with the theoretical predictions, 
our neuroimaging study on social rejection and inclusion experiences provided robust 
evidence for heightened sensitivity to social signals independent of valence across 
both groups and within brain areas formerly attributed exclusively to the processing 
of social pain (Eisenberger, 2012b; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003). Therefore, our 
findings from Chapter 4 point towards a ‘neural sociometer’ monitoring incoming 
signals of both social inclusion and rejection. This interpretation is complemented by 
other recent findings revealing comparable neural activity in the dACC and AI in 
response to both positive and negative social evaluation (Dalgleish et al., 2017). In 
sum, this dedicated neural mechanism may be drawn upon to establish the current 
relational value, whether that be conceptualised as SAHP, as outlined in the social 
rank theory (Gilbert, 2000; Mahadevan et al., 2016), or SIP, as described in the SR 
hypothesis (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert & Allan, 1998). Adding to the terminology 
provided within the theoretical accounts, the ‘social pain’ network may, however, be 
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better understood as a ‘social pain and social gain’ or social evaluative network 
(SEN).  
In addition, this thesis aimed to examine the notion of ‘social pain’ in the context of 
social functioning in depression. From the above findings, it follows that a heightened 
sensitivity to any incoming social signals may be associated with altered 
psychological or neural processing in depression, given the propensity to interpret 
social signals as more threatening relative to healthy controls (Ayduk et al., 2001; J. 
C. Butler et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2014; Luterek et al., 2004). As discussed with respect 
to our behavioural findings, the SR hypothesis further argues that monitoring one’s 
SIP serves to protect one from, for instance, ‘overinvesting’ in social interactions with 
uncertain or negative outcomes. This adaptive valence-independent socio-cognitive 
bias is illustrated in a study investigating the neural basis of judging threat from 
dynamic social interactions in expert CCTV operators (Petrini et al., 2014). Tasked 
with predicting violent outcomes from confrontational, neutral and playful social 
interactions, experts, relative to novice controls were more likely to predict a violent 
outcome following the presentation of both confrontational and playful social 
interactions. This was attributed to operators judging playful interactions as more 
likely to unexpectedly result in confrontation, reflected in greater attentional demands 
on a neural and behavioural level. Thus, CCTV operators exhibited heightened 
sensitivity to negative and positive social cues when evaluating potentially 
threatening social interactions. Similarly, in depression, heightened sensitivity to 
social signals may thus be designed to optimally respond to potential social threat, as 
a result of prior exposure to negative life events involving social rejection, loss or 
failure (Heim & Binder, 2012; Luterek et al., 2004; van Harmelen et al., 2010, 2014). 
RETHINKING THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL PROXIMITY AND RELEVANCE 
Nonetheless, heightened sensitivity and emotional reactivity to social emotional 
signals independent of valence is seemingly at odds with the mainstream depression 
literature. It has been well-established that individuals with depression demonstrate 
negative response biases and reduced reactivity to positive emotional cues, as 
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described in the introduction (Roiser & Sahakian, 2013). However, the literature on 
positive emotional processing has revealed divergent findings, with some suggestions 
that greater levels of depression are associated with both reduced and increased 
sensitivity to positive cues (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; DeWall et al., 2009; Steger 
& Kashdan, 2009). It is, therefore, important to highlight the sociality dimension, 
which may aid in the understanding of the existing literature.  
Previously, it has been suggested that emotions should be better understood as 
interpersonal phenomena, contingent on the social and cultural context within which 
the occur (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000). In line with this thinking, 
evidence suggests that emotional reactivity independent of valence may be enhanced 
for self-relevant, more proximal elicitors of social emotions (Rottenberg, Joorman, 
Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005). As discussed previously, ‘depressive realism’ suggests 
potentially greater accuracy in self-relevant judgements in those who are depressed 
relative to controls (Alloy & Abramson, 1988). However, the majority of (social) 
affective neuroscience has relied on the use of standardised non-social external 
emotional cues, and tasks to elicit emotions (Amodio, 2010; Poldrack, 2008). This 
approach may have fallen short of capturing the essence of realistic socio-affective 
contexts, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. The presentation of brief, 
normative and other-relevant cues, such as standardised affective images, to 
individuals with depression may therefore fail to achieve the same level of 
engagement as that in healthy controls carrying out the same task, either as a function 
of impairments in attention or motivation, or lack of perceived self-relevance 
(Hammar & Ardal, 2009; Snyder et al., 2015). 
Emotional reactivity to interpersonal and self-relevant elicitors of emotions, such as 
idiographic emotional memories, may therefore provide a better approach to 
understanding social emotion functioning in depression. A Chatroom task designed 
to prompt social evaluation for instance revealed comparable affective responses to 
positive and negative social interactions when the social context was more personally 
meaningful and self-relevant (Caouette & Guyer, 2015; Steger & Kashdan, 2009), in 
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line with our results. Furthermore, individuals with social phobia are also found to 
shift their attention to detailed monitoring and observation of themselves when 
expecting negative evaluation by others (D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, 
D’Acremont, & Mayers, 2006), with greater self-referential information contained 
within descriptions of past social events in individuals with social phobia relative to 
controls (D M Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
On a neural level, metacognitive evaluations about the self suggest further differential 
processing compared to other-relevant information. This is reflected in increased 
activity in right dorsolateral medial prefrontal cortex (Schmitz, Kawahara-Baccus, & 
Johnson, 2004), even when contrasted to ‘familiar’ or close others as opposed to 
judgments about strangers (Heatherton et al., 2006). Interestingly, damage to the 
medial PFC is found to eliminate the self-reference effect, with impaired memory 
recall in response to self-relevant cues (Philippi et al., 2012). In line with the SR 
hypothesis, evaluating one’s social investment potential may therefore recruit the 
dACC-AI network, as highlighted in Chapter 4, as a function of the self-relevance of 
the social cues signalling social value (‘social gain’) and social burden (‘social pain’), 
respectively. 
In contrast, processing others’ relevant social signals, which do not contribute as 
strongly to one’s SIP, may recruit a different neural pattern of activity. See Figure 1.3 
and Figure 1.4 in the general introduction for hypothesised inputs and outputs. This 
was examined in Chapter 5, where individuals with and without depression were 
exposed to another’s experiences of social rejection and inclusion. In this context, the 
SR hypothesis would predict that the personal SIP would not be contingent on 
another’s past social experiences, as these are not personally meaningful or likely to 
impact on the probability of personal exclusion. Extending this rationale, the dACC-
AI network would not be expected to be activated in response to another’s 
experiences. This was indeed the case, with heightened sensitivity to another’s 
experiences instead reducing neural activity in the affective components of dACC 
and AI network and the brain’s so-called empathy regions within the supramarginal 
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gyrus and angular gyrus, in those with depression compared to controls. This was 
mirrored by reduced mood at the behavioural level, with the dichotomy perhaps 
reflecting the notion of personal significance or proximity as a driving force in 
activating the social evaluation network. 
Intriguingly, perceived superiority within a social hierarchy previously motivated 
empathy towards inferior social targets’ painful stimulation within the AI and aMCC, 
but was attenuated when observing painful stimulations to superior ranked social 
targets (Feng et al., 2016). Similarly, our study suggested heightened activity in the 
MCC and AI for healthy controls relative to depressed, who in this context may 
arguably perceive themselves as having relatively more stable or higher social status, 
as evidenced by their self-reported more favourable social comparisons (see Chapter 
2). Reduced emotional reactivity on behavioural and neural levels in depression thus 
endorses the SR hypothesis’ notion of motivational disengagement and adoption of a 
risk-averse state, which is focused on internally oriented processes. This 
interpretation is supported by previous findings of reduced empathic concern and 
decreased emotional reactivity in response to another’s distress in depression (Field, 
Diego, & Hernandez-reif, 2009; Young, Parsons, Stein, & Kringelbach, 2015). In 
fact, the SR hypothesis further predicted that individuals with depression would 
exhibit greater withdrawal in exchange-oriental contexts, while favouring  
reciprocity-oriented contexts (Allen & Badcock, 2003, 2006). This may be reflected 
by the differential pattern of neural activation in self- versus other-relevant social 
contexts, although the two studies examined in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are 
unfortunately not directly comparable, due to the modifications to the task presented. 
An interactionist approach to social functioning 
In Chapter 6, this notion was more explicitly investigated by considering reciprocity 
within the social exchange as a function of the task instructions. Using intersubject 
correlation, listening to long spontaneous social rejection and inclusion narratives 
aimed at prompting an engaged social experience within depressed, non-depressed, 
which would potentially activate self-relevant processes within the dACC-AI 
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network (or SIP network). It further explored the extent of intersubject synchronicity 
across listeners. Reciprocity, or self-other social interactions, are closely associated 
with higher social cognitive processes, including mentalisation and theory of mind 
(Ladegaard et al., 2014; Schilbach, 2015) and commonly associated with heightened 
activity in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 
(Benoit, Gilbert, Volle, & Burgess, 2010; Garrison et al., 2013; Schmitz et al., 2004). 
Both depressed individuals and healthy controls revealed activity in these areas. 
However, greater recruitment of superior temporal gyri in healthy controls may point 
towards differential socio-affective engagement across narratives, compared to 
depressed individuals who exhibited greater activity in brain areas associated with 
visual imagery of the social interaction presented. Previously, Schilbach et al. (2013) 
argued that interpersonal functioning, or social emotional processing could only be 
understood within the context of self-relevant cues, the social proximity of the agents 
involved, and the emotional engagement within the social interaction. As a result, the 
ability to take another’s perspective can be viewed as independent from being 
emotionally engaged or socially invested. The intended reciprocal interaction may 
therefore have rather been viewed as non-relevant social interaction, which would not 
impact on the individual’s personal value or burden within a group. In the context of 
the social risk hypothesis and other theoretical frameworks, investigating the neural 
basis of real-time social interactions may thus require further resolution. However, 
the novel analysis method applied in Chapter 7 provides a starting point for further 
investigations, especially as the ISC methodology continues to be developed. 
IS BAD STRONGER THAN GOOD? 
In sum, in an early sweeping review of the depression and emotion literature it was 
proclaimed that “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister et al., 2001). This claim is 
well supported in many domains of research, with negative emotional stimuli often 
eliciting powerful reactions that trump the relatively attenuated response to positive 
emotional stimuli. However, autobiographical memories may represent an exception 
to this rule. From an evolutionary perspective, it appears intuitive for threatening 
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highly arousing negative stimuli to trigger such a highly emotive response, at both 
behavioural and neural levels, to protect the self from perceived danger and threat. 
However, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that memories containing self- 
and other-relevant social cues signalling inclusion and rejection prompt at least some 
reconsiderations of this claim. One way to address the relative strength of positive 
and negative events is to consider the personal meaning and self-relevance of the 
stimuli presented. In this case, autobiographical memories of rejection and inclusion, 
as opposed to listening to another’s experiences of social interactions, and to look at 
the elicited responses at both behavioural and neural levels. In these investigations, 
negative social interactions appear on a par with positive inclusive interactions, with 
heightened sensitivity in depression.  
In sum, the findings discussed in this section suggest a revision of the previously held 
view that the social pain network within the dACC-AI matrix responds exclusively 
to social rejection or exclusion, extending this to the experience of social inclusion. 
In addition, our findings identified a heightened sensitivity to social signals in 
depression, as well as exploring the importance of social interactions at the inter-
subject level. These findings were then discussed with respect to the current 
theoretical models of interpersonal processing. The sociometer and social rank 
theories argue that the altered behavioural and neural patterns of activation function 
as a neural alarm system designed to monitor current levels of social risk prior to 
prompting downstream modifications in social behaviour and cognitive biases in 
social attention. Similarly, the SR hypothesis (Allen & Badcock, 2003) argues that 
depressed mood represents a risk-averse motivational state which is activated by the 
threat of social exclusion by others. However, the SR hypothesis assigns greater 
importance to the notion of reciprocity, as the altered behaviour serves both to 
minimise the perceived social burden, while simultaneously increasing the potential 
social value.  
In depression, this may be accomplished by sending signals of submission and 
inferiority (identified in Chapter 2), social withdrawal or reduced affiliation in 
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exchange-oriented contexts (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). Modulating this decision-
making process may be the extent of social proximity and heightened attention to 
self-relevant social cues (Chapter 4). However, unanswered questions, and challenges 
within the field of social affective neuroscience remain to be explored. These will be 
outlined in the next section. 
8.4 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SOCIAL AFFECTIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE  
The term “social neuroscience” was first used by Cacioppo and Berntson (1992) to 
describe an emerging field aimed at examining the interplay of social and 
physiological levels of analysis. Central to describing these levels of analysis is the 
ability to make predictions pertaining to the relationship between variables. One of 
the key assumptions is that activity observed in specific brain regions reflects an 
underlying psychological process, which can be measured using modern brain 
imaging tools, including fMRI (Amodio, 2010). Testing hypotheses in this context is 
strengthened by the presence of prior regions of interest identified within the 
literature in response to the repeated presentation of experimental stimuli or 
paradigms similar in nature aiming to elicit a specific psychological process. This can 
be achieved more readily when an area is selectively activated by a particular process 
(Poldrack, 2008). A classic illustration of this process is the reliable, selective and 
localized activation of the fusiform face area (FFA) in response to the visual 
presentation of faces (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Kanwisher & Yovel, 
2006). These results have made important contributions to the challenge of 
functionally mapping the brain, and further developing the necessary methodology to 
achieve this goal. 
REVERSE INFERENCE PROBLEM 
However, the current constraints in developing the scientific evidence-base of social 
neuroscience has been the limited generation and application of novel social 
psychological hypotheses (Amodio, 2010). One of the challenges in generating 
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hypotheses within the social neuroscience framework has been the targeted 
investigation of specific psychological processes underlying complex social 
interactions. These are either subject to ambiguous or inadequate operationalisation 
of the mental process in question or are limited by the problem of reverse inference. 
The reverse inference problem is the process of drawing inferences from observed 
brain activity, without fully taking into account the selectivity of a particular brain 
area in response to the psychological process in question  (Poldrack, 2008); for 
instance in cases where psychological processes rely on input from multiple or 
grossly overlapping brain areas or networks, as is frequently the case in social 
cognition (D. P. Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012) or where a given brain region may be 
implicated in a wide range of psychological processes, with little or limited 
specificity. To illustrate, the social neuroscience literature has thus far identified 
multiple networks involved in complex social processes, such as inferring others’ 
mental states (Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2011), empathetic processing (J. Decety, 
2011; Lamm et al., 2011; Pfeifer, Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2008) or indeed 
social pain processing (S. Cacioppo et al., 2013; Eisenberger et al., 2006; Eisenberger 
& Lieberman, 2003), with arguably grossly overlapping anatomical brain regions (D. 
P. Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012; Kross et al., 2011; Woo et al., 2014). 
Similarly, as part of the 'social pain debate’, the dACC was described as selective for 
pain (Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2015), drawing on results from the automatic meta-
analytic software tool 'Neurosynth' (Yarkoni et al., 2011). This led to a strongly-
worded exchange (see also http://www.talyarkoni.org/blog/2015/12/05/no-the-
dorsal-anterior-cingulate-is-not-selective-for-pain-comment-on-lieberman-and-
eisenberger-2015/; (Lieberman, Burns, Torre, & Eisenberger, 2016; Wager et al., 
2016) with arguments reiterating previous accounts of the dACC being involved in 
saliency and conflict monitoring (Somerville et al., 2006) as well as perhaps more 
nuanced aspects of social pain processing, such as experiencing envy or 
schadenfreude (Takahashi et al., 2009). Overall, the conflicting interpretations of 
regional brain activity in the field of neuroscience have led to the increasing 
implementation of large-scale multivariate approaches (Haxby, Connolly, & 
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Guntupalli, 2014). These posit that in order to accurately decode relevant 
psychological processes, it is important to take into account (multiple) distributions 
of activation across many regions across the brain as well as in response to a range 
of different tasks and stimuli (Poldrack, 2008). This is argued to result in a greater 
likelihood of generalising across individuals compared to eliciting idiosyncratic 
features of individual brains.  
The work presented in this thesis has therefore sought to address the challenges 
described above as much as possible by carefully validating the tasks and stimuli, as 
well as using mixed method designs to investigate underlying social processing. 
However, it remains important to consider the notion of reverse inference when 
interpreting these neuroimaging findings. While currently the ISC toolbox does not 
allow for mixed-methods analysis; this data-driven approach invites further 
validation and implementation, alongside the continued need to further develop 
principled methods to explore information transfer across individuals using 
alternative analytical approaches. However, script-driven imagery provides one such 
viable approach to eliciting social emotions, and, in conjunction with intersubject 
correlation analysis may open up a promising new avenue for understanding the 
neural signature of socio-emotional processing (Pajula et al., 2012).  
ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY 
A further challenge and opportunity in social neuroscience is the implementation of 
a variety of tasks and stimuli, in order to capture relevant psychological processes 
occurring naturally within our environment (Amodio, 2010; Poldrack, 2008). To date, 
the literature has relied heavily on the presentation of experimentally constrained 
emotional stimuli to investigate underlying psychological processes. For instance, in 
the emotion regulation literature, the presentations of angry or fearful facial 
expressions are frequently used as a target for regulation strategies (Gross, 1998). 
These stimuli allow for the presentation of characteristics deemed crucial to the 
regulatory process, above and beyond other contextual features contained within our 
affective environment. However, there is limited evidence as to the reliability and 
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ecological validity of emotion regulation paradigms within our rich, multifaceted 
affective environment. Emerging evidence integrating contextual features as part of 
paradigms investigating specific psychological processes include for instance the 
impact of affective contexts on working memory (Schweizer, Grahn, Hampshire, 
Mobbs, & Dalgleish, 2013) or cognitive control under duress (Raio, Orederu, 
Palazzolo, Shurick, & Phelps, 2013), which provide more ecologically valid 
paradigms for generalising results to the general population in the real-word.  
In addition, conceptualising tasks and stimuli as explicitly social compared to 
affective non-social tasks, has seen considerably less attention. This is despite social 
contexts largely informing regulatory goals, and sociocultural contexts modulating 
the use of emotion regulation strategies (De Leersnyder, Boiger, & Mesquita, 2013; 
McRae, Heller, John, & Gross, 2011). The use of autobiographical memories in this 
thesis therefore presents a unique opportunity to investigate neural responses to 
socially salient emotional events. The evidence-base on the neural correlates of 
autobiographical memory has grown considerably over recent decades (Cabeza & St. 
Jacques, 2007). A range of methods for eliciting salient autobiographical memories 
has emerged within the fMRI context, ranging from generic cues (Martin A. Conway 
et al., 1999; Graham, Lee, Brett, & Patterson, 2003) and pre-scan interviews (Fink et 
al., 1996; D. L. Greenberg et al., 2005), to prospective memory tasks (Cabeza et al., 
2004; Levine et al., 2004; Steinvorth, Corkin, & Halgren, 2006). However, a concern 
has been the extent of control over the age and content of retrieved memories (Cabeza 
& St. Jacques, 2007), especially given the fading affect bias, as discussed in Chapter 
3. Nonetheless, the value of using an autobiographical memory approach lies in the 
rich emotional complexity of the memories, with distinct qualities of vividness and 
intensity. However, while this thesis aimed to address aspects of the challenges in 
social affective neuroscience outlined above, methodological limitations remain. 
These are described in the next section.  
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LIMITATIONS TO THE PRESENT WORK 
Invoking highly social contexts through the means of mental imagery confers 
advantages in terms of ecological validity, but also presents several limitations. As 
described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the script-driven imagery approach requires 
the generation of memories with sufficient affective saliency, as opposed to, for 
instance, the presentation of standardised arousing emotional pictures or film. In 
addition, with a memory generation and memory presentation session one week apart, 
this approach entails logistical issues with respect to time and resources. Furthermore, 
when recruiting clinical participants, it is important to consider the attentional 
demands of prolonged sessions. Unlike emotional pictures or films, the validity of 
idiosyncratic stimuli was also dependent on the extent of social disclosure 
participants were willing to extend to the researcher.   
A further consideration concerns the sociality of the memories. As described in 
Chapter 3, participants were explicitly instructed to recall social as opposed to non-
social memories with cue cards and prompts within the memory generation session. 
Memories were further required to involve at least one other person, thereby ensuring 
social encounters as the source of the emotional impact. However, in the absence of 
an explicit non-social comparison, our behavioural and neuroimaging findings are 
limited in their interpretation within the context of non-social salience processing 
(Eisenberger, 2015; Wiech et al., 2010). That said, the strength of the work in this 
thesis perhaps lies in the juxtaposing of the behavioural and neural responses to 
imagining highly salient personal memories of social inclusion and social rejection, 
relative to neutral experiences, with the fixed order accounting for expectancy 
violation (Kawamoto et al., 2012). With modifiable emotional impact as a function 
of memory type, our paradigm arguably contrasts favourably against previous 
paradigms such as Cyberball, in which the inclusion condition may be better 
understood as a default or neutral state (Somerville et al., 2006). This highlights the 
difficulty in defining standalone neutral conditions, despite our behavioural findings 
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underscoring the differential impact of neutral compared to negative and positive 
memories. 
Ultimately, the overarching benefit of our approach lies in the highly self-relevant 
nature of personal memories, which uniquely ‘recreates’ the phenomenological 
experience of being socially rejected or included. While the Cyberball paradigm has 
shown that being excluded by virtual characters increases levels of self-reported 
distress (Eisenberger, 2012b; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2003), it fails to capture 
changes in distress as a function of socially positive information. Originally, the 
Cyberball paradigm was aimed at extracting the essence of the drama of ostracism 
(K. D. Williams et al., 2012). However, the question remains as to whether this 
paradigm has satisfied this aim. With strong dissociable behavioural findings as a 
function of memory type, our script-driven imagery paradigm appears to more 
effectively address this question. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the use of 
ideographical memory stimuli does sacrifice the experimental control conferred as 
opposed to standardized stimuli to an extent. 
8.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In sum, social functioning is contingent on the ability to accurately recognise and 
respond to emotions, with evidence suggesting that depressed individuals struggle 
with detecting and responding to salient affective information in their immediate 
social environment; this is illustrated by a greater difficulty with identification of 
happy facial expressions (Joormann & Gotlib, 2006), and of affective gestures and 
body movements (Kaletsch et al., 2014), and a reduced awareness of others’ emotions 
and of the ability to empathise (Donges et al., 2005). These biases in emotion 
recognition and awareness tend to correlate with depression severity (Gollan et al., 
2010), and persist even beyond recovery (Lemoult & Sherdell, 2010). However, the 
understanding of one’s personal emotional experience appears relatively unimpaired 
in depression (Donges et al., 2005), reflected in comparable behavioural changes in 
mood between depressed and healthy controls in response to listening to personal 
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memories of rejection and inclusion described in Chapter 3. On a neural level, the 
potential dissociation between self-relevant (Chapter 4) and other-relevant (Chapter 
5 and Chapter 6) understanding and awareness of (social) emotional experiences were 
further illustrated in differential neural patterns of activity in healthy controls relative 
to depressed. 
In the future, addressing the challenges in social affective neuroscience, while 
incorporating the approaches outlined in this thesis, may allow for a richer 
understanding of the individual differences in social processing in depression. This 
may be achieved by implementing script-driven imagery and other more naturalistic 
paradigms capturing the essence of social interactions. Furthermore, identifying a 
neural socio-affective profile will allow for more focused therapeutic interventions, 
as poor social functioning may be indicative of future relapse into depressive 
episodes. This could be incorporated into existing social interventions with a focus 
on social functioning, such as interpersonal therapy (IPT), and compassion focused 
CBT, which address current or recent life events and interpersonal difficulties (Feijo 
De Mello et al., 2005). However, CBT may equally benefit from a more targeted 
evidence-based approach on challenging and restructuring cognitive distortions in 
core beliefs and assumptions explicitly from within the social domain (Beck, 1967; 
Beck et al., 1979; A. Butler et al., 2006).  
To conclude, the work presented in this thesis was aimed at investigating individual 
differences in detecting and responding to interpersonal emotional signals on a 
behavioural and neural level, as well as differences in cognitive mechanisms involved 
in emotion recognition and emotion regulation. Results were interpreted within 
explanatory theoretical frameworks, with an emphasis on the social risk hypothesis 
of depression, but also encompassing previous theories, including the sociometer, 
social rank and hierometer theories. Finally, challenges and opportunities in the 
existing social affective neuroscience literature were outlined, with implications for 
future directions in both clinical research and clinical practice.  
Chapter 1 |  
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Therefore, I would like to end with a quote - “knowing is not enough; we must apply. 
Willing is not enough; we must do.” 
“Es ist nicht genug, zu wissen, man muß auch anwenden; es ist nicht genug, zu 
wollen, man muß auch tun.“ (Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters 
Wanderjahre). 
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APPENDICES 
 (Chapter 1) 
 DSM-5 Criteria for Major Depressive Disorder and Persistent 
Depressive Disorder 
Major Depressive Disorder  
In children and adolescents, mood can be irritable. 
5 or more of 9 symptoms (including at least 1 of depressed mood and loss of interest 
or pleasure) in the same 2-week period; each of these symptoms represents a 
change from previous functioning 
• Depressed mood (subjective or observed) 
• Loss or interest or pleasure 
• Change in weight or appetite 
• Insomnia or Hypersomnia 
• Psychomotor retardation or agitation (observed) 
• Loss of energy or fatigue 
• Worthlessness or guilt 
• Impaired concentration or indecisiveness 
• Thoughts of death or suicidal ideation or suicide attempt 
Persistent Depressive Disorder  
In children and adolescents, mood can be irritable and duration must be 1 year or 
longer. 
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Depressed mood for most of the day, for more days than not, for 2 years or longer. 
Presence of 2 or more of the following during the same period and never without 
symptoms for more than 2 months. 
• Poor appetite or overeating 
• Insomnia or Hypersomnia 
• Low energy or fatigue 
• Low self-esteem 
• Impaired concentration or indecisiveness 
• Hopelessness 
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 (Chapter 2) 
 Ethics approval letter and application 
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 Demographics questionnaire used across all studies 
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 Blank consent form used across all studies 
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 Information sheet for fMRI study on autobiographical memories of 
rejection and inclusion (Chapter 4) 
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 Information sheet for fMRI study on other’s memories of rejection 
and inclusion (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) 
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Information sheet for behavioural study on Emotion Regulation Strategies in 
Response to Social Memories (Chapter 7) 
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 Testing guidelines and adverse events protocol 
This is the guidelines followed for general testing procedures at the MRC Cognition 
and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge.  
A formal risk assessment should be made prior to testing.  A checklist on the next 
page is provided to assist in the assessment.  
Lower risk studies will include those in which: 
• healthy volunteers are recruited or volunteers who are deemed fit by the research 
team to take part in the study without undue distress being caused to participant 
or tester.  
• neutral stimuli are used (e.g. normal range of cue words not all pleasant or 
unpleasant and none that under normal circumstances would be expected to 
produce an adverse reaction).  
Higher risk studies will include those in which: 
• participants are selected because they belong to a potentially vulnerable group 
(i.e. depressed/ anxious)  
• inductions are used with the intention of inducing a potentially vulnerable state 
(e.g. negative mood induction) 
• emotional stimuli are used (e.g. unpleasant IAPS pictures) 
• researchers have consistently found that on previous occasions volunteers have 
become distressed with the tasks. 
Special consideration: Inexperienced testers, new graduate students and new 
placement students should not be asked to run higher risk studies (or studies which 
could potentially fall into the high-risk category) without adequate training and 
support. 
Training and support: It is the responsibility of supervisors or line managers to ensure 
that all research staff are fully competent in carrying out the tests and that strategies 
for dealing with potential problems have been outlined prior to testing. 
‘Buddy’ system: New testers will be assigned a junior member of the cognition and 
emotion research team to act as a ‘buddy’.  The aim of the buddy system is to provide 
extra advice and support. 
 
Contingency plan: If a proposed study falls into the high risk category, and panel 
members will be involved in the research, a brief contingency plan should be 
submitted to the panel office at the time the request is made for volunteers.  The plan 
should provide details of what action will be taken to reduce the risk of distress to 
volunteers and to testers. The contingency plan must be agreed by the researcher and 
line manager or supervisor and signed by both parties. 
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Please note:  
• All new members of the research group must find out from their supervisor/line 
manager if the research that they will be conducting is already covered by an 
existing ethics application.    
• If their research is covered by an existing ethics application, then they must read 
the application and send a letter to the ethics committee stating that they agree to 
comply with all aspects of the application. 
• If the study is not covered by an existing ethics application, then an application 
must be made under the guidance of the supervisor/line manager. 
Risk management checklist 
q Will the experiment use stimuli that could elicit a strong emotional reaction? (e.g. 
unpleasant IAPS pictures) 
q Will the experiment use a negative mood induction?  
q Will the experiment use any invasive techniques? (e.g. electrophysiology)  
q Will potentially vulnerable (e.g. anxious or depressed) volunteers be asked to take 
part in tasks that might increase their vulnerable state? 
If the answer to any of the items above is yes, you are required to send a letter to all 
potential volunteers explaining the nature of the experiment.  The letter must be sent 
prior to recruiting volunteers over the telephone.  
Pre-test: 
q If you believe that your study might cause undue distress, and your volunteers 
intend to drive to the unit to take part, you should ask if they would prefer to be 
collected prior to the study and taken home afterwards in the unit car. 
q In the event of participants becoming distressed as a result of taking part in the 
research, what plan of action do you intend to take? 
q If a clinical psychologist might be needed to provide back-up support (e.g. 
following an adverse reaction to a negative autobiographical mood induction), 
which clinician has agreed to act on your behalf?  
q Have research-relevant assessments been made to check participants’ suitability 
to take part? (e.g. mood check, claustrophobia check) 
q If the study involves repeated use of keyboard or mouse, have any checks been 
made concerning repetitive strain injury or arthritis?  
q If there is a possibility that participants may become upset during the test, have 
you got a box of tissues with you in the testing room? 
Post-test:  
q Has the nature of the experiment been fully explained and was the participant 
given the opportunity to have any questions answered. 
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q What was the participant’s reaction to the experiment? Was there anything about 
the experiment that they did not like? Will participants be given a feedback sheet 
to allow them to comment on their experience of taking part in the study? 
q Is the participant’s mood at its normal pre-testing level?  
q Are you giving participants an information sheet with a contact telephone number 
of the researcher on it to take away with? For previous studies using mood 
induction procedures, contact sheets have included the following wording: “We 
always try to ensure that when people leave the experiment, their mood has 
returned to normal.  On rare occasions, people can find that their mood drops 
again after they have returned home.  We do not expect this to happen but it is 
possible.  If your low mood returns and you feel that your distress is due to the 
mood induction then call us on the telephone number below and we can discuss 
how best to help you.”   
What to do if participants become distressed as a result of taking part in the research: 
• Sit and listen, and offer the participant a drink of tea or coffee.  
• If necessary offer a confidential talk with a clinical psychologist. 
• If the participant is unable to drive home, the unit policy is to drive the person 
home yourself in the unit car (you must see Anthea to complete the necessary 
forms).  If this is not possible ask Jackie Harper or Pete Williams if they are 
willing to drive you and your volunteer to the participant’s home.  If all else fails, 
take the participant home in a taxi. 
• Ask if the participant would mind if you called them later that day/the next day 
to check that they are OK. 
Research using mood inductions, unpleasant IAPS pictures, invasive techniques and 
training in cognitive bias  
The following guidelines have been adapted from the CBU policy on the use of mood 
inductions: 
• Any researcher proposing to carry out research involving mood inductions, 
unpleasant IAPS pictures, invasive techniques or training in cognitive bias 
should send an email/letter to the Director prior to testing to obtain consent.  
• A covering letter must be sent to prospective volunteers indicating the nature of 
the research they are being invited to take part in  
• A contingency plan must be submitted to the panel office describing what 
measures will be taken to reduce the risk of distress to volunteers and to testers, 
and what action will be taken if an individual does suffer as a result of the testing 
(see description in ethics application question 10). 
• Volunteers must sign a written consent form before beginning the experiment. 
• If on the day of testing, the participant has changed their mind since agreeing to 
take part in the study and no longer wants to engage in the mood induction/view 
the IAPS pictures/be wired to the equipment, an alternative task must be made 
available for them to complete. 
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• Volunteers must be reminded that they are free to terminate the experiment at 
any point.  
• Experimenters must ensure that volunteers’ mood has returned to ‘normal’ (pre-
testing level) before concluding the experimental session.  
• Volunteers should not be asked to take part in other tests immediately following 
the experiment. 
• A clinical psychologist should be approached and asked whether they would be 
prepared to talk to any participants who suffer an adverse reaction as a result of 
the experiment.  This is not expected to happen but provision should be made in 
case it does occur.  The discussion would take place at a time mutually 
convenient to the clinician and the volunteer. 
 
Additional recommendations 
• Scientists who are not clinically trained, but who wish to do mood induction 
research, must obtain guidance from someone experienced in the use of this 
technique. Guidance should cover screening of volunteers, implementation of the 
procedure and (most important of all) how to assess whether volunteers have 
returned to normal mood at the end of the experiment.  
• The mood-state of volunteers must be screened before experiments using 
depression induction procedures, unpleasant IAPS pictures, invasive techniques 
or training in cognitive bias.  Great care must be taken when testing volunteers 
scoring 14 or more on the Beck Depression Inventory, scoring above 8 on the 
HADS, and scoring 45 or more on the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Questionnaire. 
Only testers with suitable training should test volunteers with high depression or 
anxiety scores. 
• As autobiographical mood inductions are more likely to lead to longer-term 
distress once the participant has returned home (compared with musical or film 
inductions) a negative autobiographical induction should not be used unless it 
forms an essential aspect of the study. 
• Group mood induction should not take place unless a special case is made for it 
to the Ethical Committee. 
Potential problems and advice on what to do 
Participant care 
Example 1: If a participant becomes distressed during the study…. 
If during an experiment (e.g. a study using an autobiographical memory task) a 
participant becomes distressed and begins to cry, testing should be curtailed. Sit tight, 
listen and make sympathetic noises if appropriate.  Try to give the impression that 
their emotion is absolutely justified, they are normal, and you care that they are 
currently distressed.  Give them time to recover.  If it feels ‘unfinished’, ring the 
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participant the next day to check they are OK. Provide feedback to the panel about 
the incident. 
Example 2: If the participant’s mood has not returned to normal after testing…. 
If after an experiment (e.g. a study using a negative mood induction) a participant’s 
mood has not returned to pre-testing levels, explain that it is not unit policy to send 
participant’s away from an experiment feeling unhappy.  Take them to a quiet room, 
if possible, play them relaxing music/ a tape of mood enhancing sounds, offer them 
a drink, and allow them to sit and relax for a while.  Give the participant an 
information sheet with a daytime contact number (see page 2).  Should the 
participant’s low mood return and they attribute it directly to the study, they can then 
telephone and discuss their feelings with the researcher.  Provide feedback to the 
panel about the incident. 
Example 3: If a participant reports feeling adverse effects a week or more after 
testing…. 
If, after taking part in a high-risk study (e.g. research using unpleasant IAPS pictures), 
a participant reports having intrusive thoughts about the stimuli they were presented 
with, listen to the individual’s concerns, and talk to them about their experience.  If 
they remain unhappy, invite them to discuss their concerns with the nominated 
clinician. Provide feedback to the panel about the incident.  Follow-up the complaint 
2-3 weeks later with a telephone call to see how the participant is feeling. 
  Example 4: If a participant faints or becomes ill during testing…. 
Before you begin testing, check which members of staff are first aid qualified, which 
are situated nearest to your testing space and whether they are willing to be called 
upon should the need arise.  If a volunteer does become ill during testing let the panel 
managers know about the incident.  Follow-up with a telephone call the next day to 
see how the participant is feeling. 
Researcher support 
Example 1: Dealing with distressed participants…  
If the researcher suspects that a participant is becoming unduly distressed by the 
experiment, then testing should be curtailed. After measures have been taken to deal 
with the participant’s distress (see above), the tester should discuss the incident with 
their line manager or supervisor. This debriefing for the tester should aim to provide 
reassurance and advice about the way the incident was handled, as well as advice on 
what further action should be taken. 
Example 2: If repetitive testing leads to tester-distress…. 
If repeated testing using emotional stimuli  (e.g. unpleasant IAPS) causes distress for 
the tester, or an incident with a participant has created ‘emotional wear-and-tear’, the 
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tester should seek out their ‘buddy’ or their line manager/supervisor to discuss the 
problem. This debriefing for the tester should aim to provide reassurance and advice.  
If it is the material that is causing particular problems, the issue should be raised with 
the line manager.  They should discuss ways in which to alleviate distress to the tester 
(e.g. by waiting outside the room during critical parts of the experiment) and if 
necessary, revise the experiment. The tester should be given as much time and 
emotional support as they require. Testing should only continue when the tester feels 
confident to do so. 
Example 3: Working outside normal hours or working alone outside the unit…. 
Junior staff/ students should avoid working alone outside the unit, if possible.  All 
staff testing outside the unit should register their whereabouts, contact details and 
expected return time with their line manager, their ‘buddy’ or with reception staff 
before they leave. They should take a unit mobile phone and inform their line 
manager/‘buddy’/reception when they return.  Junior staff/ students should also avoid 
testing participants in the unit outside normal working hours.  If testing outside office 
hours proves essential, arrangements should be made to make sure that an 
experienced member of the group is present in the building, who can provide 
assistance should it be needed. All staff working out of hours should sign in to register 
their presence. 
 
 MRI adverse events protocol 
Abnormal (Incidental) Findings  
The Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit is a cognitive neuroscience research unit and 
does not provide any diagnostic services. This policy will be clearly stated on the 
volunteer information sheet.  
However, in order to ensure that only participants with appropriately healthy brains 
are included in our studies, and also to pick up any major abnormalities that do occur, 
structural T2-weighted scans will be run on all participants if not already run within 
2 years. Even though we do not provide a diagnostic service, a Radiologist reviews 
all structural T2-weighted scans (taking into account their demographic details, e.g., 
age). In the event that a significant abnormality is noticed by the Qualified MRI 
Operator, this will be brought to the attention of the CBSU Medical Monitor, who is 
responsible for acting on this information. It may be necessary to exclude such 
participants from the study in which case the reasons for the exclusion will not be fed 
back to the researcher. The Medical Monitor will take responsibility for referring the 
individual concerned for further clinical evaluation where this is appropriate. Note 
that, if a volunteer later contacts a researcher to ask about possible abnormal findings, 
the researcher should only take their contact details, and then tell the Medical Monitor 
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and Radiographers, one of whom will contact the volunteer. A researcher should not 
try to give any other feedback to the volunteer. 
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 Sample debriefing protocol 
For All Participants 
q Ensure the nature of the experiment is explained 
Explain the purpose of the study and what the participant’s contribution is.  
q Ascertain the participant’s reaction to the experiment  
Questions to be asked: 
“What did you think of the experiment?” 
“Was there anything about the experiment that you didn’t like?” 
“Did you experience any adverse effects, for example concerning how you feel?” 
q Check current mood status 
Ask the participant about their feelings at this moment, whether or not they feel their 
mood is at / has returned to normal levels. End the session if all is well, otherwise 
continue with the steps below. 
 
Additional measures, in case of distress  
q Provide a safe space  
Participant’s should be offered a drink and in a peaceful environment in which to 
relax, to allow any adverse effects to dissipate. A member of the research team should 
remain with them or in the vicinity for as long as needed.  
q Offer a confidential consultation with a clinical psychologist  
If the participant remains upset or wishes to talk at length then offer the chance to 
speak with a nominated clinical psychologist, at a time that is mutually convenient.  
q Ensure Safe transport home and further follow up if necessary 
Consider participant’s suitability to drive and arrange alternative transport (e.g. staff 
member- see page 2) if necessary.  Offer follow-up telephone calls, as appropriate.  
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 Sample questions from Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Axis-I 
Disorder (SCID-V)  
Mood Module  
‘Now I’m going to ask you some questions about your mood… 
Has there even been a time where you lost interest or pleasure in things you usually 
enjoyed? (If yes: was it nearly every day? How long did it last?) 
Has there ever been a period of time when you were feeling so good, “high” excited 
or hyper that other people thought you were not your normal self or you were so hyper 
that you got into trouble? (Did anyone say that you were manic?) Was that more than 
just feeling good?) 
Anxiety Module 
Have you ever had a panic attack, when you suddenly felt frightened or suddenly 
developed a lot of physical symptoms (eg. heart racing, sweating, breathing 
changes)?   
Is there anything that you have been afraid to do or felt uncomfortable doing in front 
of other people, like speaking, eating or writing?  
Alcohol and Other Substance Use Module 
What are your drinking habits like? How much do you drink? How often? What do 
you drink? 
Was there ever a time in your life when you were drinking a lot more? 
Have you ever used street drugs? 
Psychosis Module 
Have you ever heard things that other people couldn’t hear, such as noises, or the 
voices of people whispering or talking? What did you hear? How often did you hear 
it? Have you ever had visions or see things that other people couldn’t see? 
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 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I)  
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 Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (BAI) 
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 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
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 Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) 
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 Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaires (FFMQ) 
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 Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS) 
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 National Adult Reading Test (NART) 
 
  
Appendices 
 
325 
 
 Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure (IPSM) 
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 Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire (ISQ) 
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 Striving To Avoid Inferiority Scale (SAIS-I and II) 
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 Submissive Behaviour Scale (SBS) 
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 Social Comparison Scale (SCS) 
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 Descriptive and sensitivity analysis results for all measures across 
all studies 
Measure Group N  Mean Std. Error 
95% CI  
df F Sig. Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
BAI 
Controls 69 5.74 0.56 4.63 6.85 [2,133] 29.66 0.00 
MDD 41 16.94 1.74 13.43 20.46       
Remitted 24 8.02 1.26 5.42 10.62       
Total 134 9.58 0.77 8.05 11.10       
BDI-II 
Controls 69 7.87 0.60 6.67 9.07 [2,133] 63.72 0.00 
MDD 41 23.69 1.50 20.65 26.73       
Remitted 24 10.97 1.57 7.73 14.21       
Total 134 13.26 0.87 11.55 14.98       
DERS 
Controls 69 75.31 2.42 70.49 80.13 [2,133] 38.78 0.00 
MDD 41 111.69 3.48 104.66 118.71       
Remitted 24 102.05 5.39 90.90 113.20       
Total 134 91.23 2.38 86.53 95.93       
IPSM 
Controls 69 100.60 1.74 97.12 104.08 [2,133] 26.72 0.00 
MDD 41 120.23 2.04 116.10 124.36       
Remitted 24 110.55 2.53 105.32 115.78       
Total 134 108.39 1.40 105.63 111.15       
ISQ 
Controls 69 72.57 2.01 68.56 76.58 [2,133] 48.12 0.00 
MDD 41 102.66 2.50 97.61 107.72       
Remitted 24 94.02 3.10 87.61 100.43       
Total 134 85.62 1.83 81.99 89.24       
PANAS 
Controls 69 49.19 1.06 47.08 51.30 [2,133] 3.38 0.04 
MDD 41 50.93 1.73 47.44 54.42       
Remitted 24 44.73 1.54 41.54 47.92       
Total 134 48.92 0.82 47.30 50.55       
SAIS-I 
Controls 69 58.16 1.94 54.28 62.04 [2,133] 2.57 0.08 
MDD 41 65.39 3.42 58.47 72.31       
Remitted 24 65.00 3.26 58.26 71.74       
Total 134 61.60 1.58 58.47 64.72       
SAIS-II 
Controls 69 43.51 2.10 39.31 47.71 [2,133] 12.97 0.00 
MDD 41 60.38 2.86 54.60 66.17       
Remitted 24 58.25 4.23 49.51 66.99       
Total 134 51.31 1.72 47.91 54.72       
SBS 
Controls 69 23.05 1.04 20.97 25.14 [2,133] 20.65 0.00 
MDD 41 34.41 1.68 31.02 37.80       
Remitted 24 29.63 1.44 26.65 32.62       
Total 134 27.71 0.90 25.94 29.48       
SCS 
Controls 69 57.68 2.32 53.05 62.32 [2,133] 13.89 0.00 
MDD 41 40.03 2.17 35.66 44.41       
Remitted 24 48.40 3.16 41.87 54.93       
Total 134 50.62 1.62 47.42 53.82       
SUIS 
Controls 69 38.88 0.99 36.90 40.87 [2,133] 1.70 0.19 
MDD 41 38.87 1.34 36.15 41.58       
Remitted 24 35.40 1.68 31.93 38.87       
Total 134 38.25 0.73 36.82 39.69       
FFMQ 
Controls 69 128.10 2.18 123.75 132.45 [2,133] 9.59 0.00 
MDD 41 114.90 2.06 110.73 119.07       
Remitted 24 122.46 1.60 119.16 125.76       
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Total 134 123.05 1.41 120.27 125.83       
Note: *. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, 
Beck Depression Inventory; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; FFMQ, Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire; IPSM, Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure; ISQ, Involuntary Subordination 
Questionnaire; PA, NA, Positive and Negative Affect Scale; SAIS-I/II, Strive to Avoid Inferiority 
Scale Part I and II; SBS, Submissive Behaviour Scale; SCS, Social Comparison Scale; SUIS, 
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. All tests, variances of groups assumed equal.  
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 Planned comparisons in sensitivity analysis for all measures across 
all studies 
Measure  Group Mean Difference 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% CI 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
BAI 
Controls MDD -11.21* 1.47 0 -14.77 -7.64 
Controls Remitted -2.28 1.77 0.6 -6.57 2 
MDD Remitted 8.92* 1.92 0 4.27 13.57 
BDI-II 
Controls MDD -15.81* 1.42 0 -19.25 -12.38 
Controls Remitted -3.1 1.7 0.21 -7.23 1.04 
MDD Remitted 12.72* 1.85 0 8.24 17.2 
DERS 
Controls MDD -36.37* 4.33 0 -46.88 -25.87 
Controls Remitted -26.74* 5.21 0 -39.37 -14.11 
MDD Remitted 9.64 5.65 0.27 -4.06 23.33 
IPSM 
Controls MDD -19.63* 2.7 0 -26.19 -13.07 
Controls Remitted -9.95* 3.25 0.01 -17.83 -2.07 
MDD Remitted 9.68* 3.52 0.02 1.13 18.23 
ISQ 
Controls MDD -30.09* 3.2 0 -37.85 -22.33 
Controls Remitted -21.45* 3.85 0 -30.78 -12.12 
MDD Remitted 8.64 4.17 0.12 -1.48 18.76 
PANAS 
Controls MDD -1.74 1.84 1 -6.21 2.74 
Controls Remitted 4.46 2.22 0.14 -0.91 9.84 
MDD Remitted 6.20* 2.4 0.03 0.37 12.03 
SAIS-I 
Controls MDD -7.23 3.57 0.13 -15.88 1.41 
Controls Remitted -6.84 4.28 0.34 -17.23 3.55 
MDD Remitted 0.39 4.65 1 -10.88 11.66 
SAIS-II 
Controls MDD -16.87* 3.62 0 -25.65 -8.1 
Controls Remitted -14.74* 4.35 0 -25.28 -4.2 
MDD Remitted 2.13 4.71 1 -9.3 13.57 
SBS 
Controls MDD -11.36* 1.8 0 -15.71 -7 
Controls Remitted -6.58* 2.16 0.01 -11.81 -1.35 
MDD Remitted 4.78 2.34 0.13 -0.9 10.45 
SCS 
Controls MDD 17.65* 3.38 0 9.46 25.85 
Controls Remitted 9.29 4.06 0.07 -0.56 19.14 
MDD Remitted -8.36 4.4 0.18 -19.05 2.32 
SUIS 
Controls MDD 0.02 1.65 1 -3.98 4.01 
Controls Remitted 3.48 1.98 0.24 -1.32 8.29 
MDD Remitted 3.47 2.15 0.33 -1.74 8.68 
FFMQ 
Controls MDD 13.20* 3.02 0 5.88 20.52 
Controls Remitted 5.64 3.63 0.37 -3.15 14.44 
MDD Remitted -7.56 3.93 0.17 -17.09 1.98 
Note: * The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck 
Depression Inventory; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; FFMQ, Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire; IPSM, Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure; ISQ, Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire; 
PA, NA, Positive and Negative Affect Scale; SAIS-I/II, Strive to Avoid Inferiority Scale Part I and II; 
SBS, Submissive Behaviour Scale; SCS, Social Comparison Scale; SUIS, Spontaneous Use of Imagery 
Scale. All tests, variances of groups assumed equal.  
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 Principal component analysis: total variance explained (Chapter 2) 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.55 59.14 59.14 3.55 59.14 59.14 
2 0.89 14.89 74.03    
3 0.58 9.60 83.63    
4 0.44 7.38 91.01    
5 0.36 5.98 96.99    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 
Component Matrixa 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
IPSM .81 
ISQ .88 
SAIS-I .63 
SAIS-II .75 
SBS .84 
Extraction Method: PCA 
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 Correlation results of social, affective and process measures  
In remitted depressed individuals (Appendix 2.26), depressive symptoms were 
positively correlated with anxiety symptoms, avoiding inferiority, submissive 
behaviour and negative affect. Depression was negatively correlated with rejection 
sensitivity and social comparison. Difficulty in emotion regulation was positively 
correlated with avoiding inferiority and negatively with social comparison. 
Involuntary subordination was positively associated with avoiding inferiority and 
submissiveness.  
In MDD participants (Appendix 2.27), anxiety scores were positively correlated with 
depression. Difficulty in emotion regulation was significantly correlated with 
depression severity, involuntary subordination, submissiveness, comparison and 
negative affect. Depression scores were also correlated with difficulty in emotion 
regulation, involuntary subordination, social submission and comparison. Difficulty 
in emotion regulation was positively associated with rejection sensitivity, 
subordination, avoiding inferiority, submissive behaviour, social comparison and 
positive and negative affect.  
Correlations in healthy controls (Appendix 2.28) revealed significant correlations 
predominantly between affective measures assessing depression and anxiety and 
process measures, including emotion dysregulation and interpersonal rejection 
sensitivity with greater variability on social measures. Involuntary subordination was 
positively correlated with interpersonal rejection sensitivity, striving to avoid 
inferiority, social submissiveness (SBS), and negative, but not positive affect. 
Avoiding inferiority was correlated with submissive behaviour and negative affect, 
while increased submissive behaviour was negatively correlated with social 
comparison and positive affect. Finally, Pearson’s correlations for all groups 
combined revealed significant correlations between all measures, except for the SUIS 
(Appendix 2.29).  
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 Correlation matrix of social, affective and process measures for remitted depressed participants described in Chapter 2 
  BAI BDI-II DERS IPSM ISQ SAIS-I SAIS-II SBS SCS SUIS PA 
BAI                       
BDI-II .553*                     
DERS -.194 .381                   
IPSM -.292 -.476* .215                 
ISQ .387 .466 .411 .185               
SAIS-I -.057 .573* .696** .208 .328             
SAIS-II .207 .594** .388 -.292 .537* .412           
SBS .379 .553* .342 -.054 .575* .473* .605**         
SCS -.287 -.626** -.578** -.337 -.413 -.798** -.412 -.604**       
SUIS -.079 -.061 -.086 -.199 -.302 -.114 .007 .054 .206     
PA -.296 -.310 -.335 -.489* -.302 -.648** -.134 -.184 .742** .320   
NA .367 .600** .307 -.343 .182 .429 .366 .671** -.411 .201 .363 
Note: BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; FFMQ, Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire; IPSM, Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure; ISQ, Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire; PA, NA, Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale; SAIS-I/II, Strive to Avoid Inferiority Scale Part I and II; SBS, Submissive Behaviour Scale; SCS, Social Comparison 
Scale; SUIS, Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. All tests, variances of groups assumed equal. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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 Correlation matrix of social, affective and process measures for MDD participants described in Chapter 2 
Note: BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; FFMQ, Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire; IPSM, Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure; ISQ, Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire; PA, NA, Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale; SAIS-I/II, Strive to Avoid Inferiority Scale Part I and II; SBS, Submissive Behaviour Scale; SCS, Social Comparison 
Scale; SUIS, Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. All tests, variances of groups assumed equal. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
  BAI BDI-II DERS IPSM ISQ SAIS-I SAIS-II SBS SCS SUIS FFMQ PA 
BDI-II .679**                       
DERS .291 .421**                     
IPSM .157 .134 .357*                   
ISQ .517** .442** .746** .537**                 
SAIS-I -.007 .089 .488** .469** .386*               
SAIS-II .163 .185 .372* .533** .458** .694**             
SBS .452** .327* .690** .521** .735** .448** .453**           
SCS -.518** -.589** -.580** -.307 -.608** -.294 -.465** -.629**         
SUIS -.060 .087 .171 .009 .013 .103 -.058 -.090 .086       
FFMQ -.040 -.248 -.363 .089 -.547* -.201 .024 -.412 .254 -.390     
PA .157 -.148 -.488** -.200 -.342* -.200 -.366* -.190 .265 .093 .060   
NA .425** .288 .357* .293 .367* .166 .386* .274 -.400* -.001 .217 -.144 
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 Correlation matrix of social, affective and process measures for healthy control participants described in Chapter 2 
  BAI BDI-II DERS IPSM ISQ SAIS-I SAIS-II SBS SCS SUIS FFMQ PA 
BDI-II .641**                       
DERS .472** .645**                     
IPSM .492** .486** .597**                   
ISQ .432** .535** .661** .676**                 
SAIS-I .336** .456** .273* .329** .322**               
SAIS-II .187 .190 .125 .163 .319** .462**             
SBS .149 .273* .534** .565** .641** .295** .155           
SCS -.194 -.061 -.230* -.346** -.211 -.096 -.064 -.328**         
SUIS .084 .101 .098 .204 .025 .128 .112 -.018 .114       
FFMQ -.364** -.198 -.095 -.132 -.181 -.012 -.240 .151 .254 .035     
PA .111 -.254* -.449** -.299** -.493** -.096 -.099 -.500** .116 .045 -.165   
NA .599** .476** .400** .415** .368** .239* .248* .134 -.354** .192 -.205 -.099 
Note: BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; FFMQ, Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire; IPSM, Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure; ISQ, Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire; PA, NA, Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale; SAIS-I/II, Strive to Avoid Inferiority Scale Part I and II; SBS, Submissive Behaviour Scale; SCS, Social Comparison Scale; SUIS, 
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. All tests, variances of groups assumed equal. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation 
is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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 Correlation matrix of social, affective and process measures for all subjects described in Chapter 2 
  BAI BDI-II DERS IPSM ISQ SAIS-I SAIS-II SBS SCS SUIS FFMQ PA 
BDI-II .771**                       
DERS .501** .682**                     
IPSM .500** .530** .672**                   
ISQ .628** .680** .801** .739**                 
SAIS-I .213* .350** .462** .430** .420**               
SAIS-II .344** .404** .425** .372** .532** .565**             
SBS .512** .547** .686** .644** .772** .432** .445**           
SCS -.459** -.504** -.534** -.511** -.512** -.314** -.345** -.562**         
SUIS .002 .069 .047 .101 -.024 .070 .026 -.032 .106       
FFMQ -.321** -.326** -.263* -.216 -.344** -.015 -.255* -.121 .322** -.025     
PA -.200* -.423** -.611** -.460** -.583** -.297** -.343** -.512** .403** .107 -.022   
NA .643** .633** .580** .498** .562** .307** .444** .473** -.515** .100 -.166 -.229** 
Note: BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; FFMQ, Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire; IPSM, Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure; ISQ, Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire; PA, NA, Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale; SAIS-I/II, Strive to Avoid Inferiority Scale Part I and II; SBS, Submissive Behaviour Scale; SCS, Social Comparison 
Scale; SUIS, Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. All tests, variances of groups assumed equal. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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 (Chapter 3) 
 Script development protocol for memory generation session across all 
studies 
[Participants complete Informed Consent & Demographics, followed by memory 
interview and Memory Evaluation Questionnaire.] 
Experimenter:  
“This study aims at investigating how we are able to regulate our emotional response 
to memories involving social rejection and affiliation. As we all have had different 
experiences in social situations – both positive and negative - it is important for us to 
ask each participant for their personal experience. We would like to ensure that your 
emotional response is as genuine as possible as regulating your emotion will be 
different for your own personal memories compared to memories of other people. 
We would like you to remember 3/6 negative social memories, involving rejection or 
exclusion, 3/6 positive social memories, in which you felt particularly included and 
a greater sense of belonging, and finally, 3/6 neutral social memories, for instance 
being part of a larger group, without any particular importance to you. To try and 
help you recall experiences you might have had in the three social situations 
described above, we will offer examples and cues to retrieve the most sensory and 
contextual detail as possible. After this session, we will create a personal script that 
is tailored to your memories and will become relevant in Session II of this study. 
Before we start, do you mind if I audio-record this session so that I have as complete 
a description of the event as possible? Also, as with any research involving emotional 
material, there is a chance that you will experience some upset during this session. If 
you feel yourself becoming upset, we can take a break at any time and/or stop the 
recording and interview. Please just let me know. Ok. Do you have any questions so 
far? Are you ready to start? Let’s start with the [neutral] memories.” 
[Neutral] Memories 
I’d like you to recall a time when you had a [neutral] social experience [see example 
list below]. It should be a memory you have thought about many times and is still 
important to you, even as you are recalling it now. Please describe the memory in 
brief: 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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[If consent given, audio-record session. Ascertain brief description of event.]. Once 
you’ve got it in mind, close your eyes and get as clear an image as you can.  
 “I would now like you to spend some time thinking about the memory you just 
described briefly and to focus on as much detail as you can. Play the scene over in 
your head like you are replaying a movie of how the event unfolded. I am going to 
guide you through a series of questions and prompts to help you do this. Get an image 
of the event in your mind. Please describe the memory in as much detail as possible.” 
[Listen and record participant describing memory, make notes as to whether the 
questions below have been covered. If not, ask the questions and if necessary, provide 
the prompts below the question.] 
• Describe the situation in your own words 
• Visualise what you were wearing.  
• What kind of day was it? Sunny? Overcast? Bright? 
• Imagine what your surroundings looked like. Were you inside or outside? 
[Prompts: Outside / Inside, familiar / unfamiliar place; Public Transport] 
• What could you smell? Was the air fresh and crisp [outside]? Had someone been 
cooking [inside]? 
• How long ago was it? 
[Prompts: Up to a week ago; Up to a month ago; Several months ago; Several 
years ago] 
• Were other people there? What where they saying? How were they acting? 
[Prompts: How many? Body language; Voice; Facial Expression]  
• What did you say? How did you act? 
[Prompts: Verbal behaviour (silence, expletives, “inner” talk”, complete 
sentences/discussion; Pitch); Facial expression; Gaze; Body/head movement; 
posture] 
• What were the thoughts running through your head at the time? 
• What were the sensations going through your body during the event?  
[Prompts: General sensations (un/pleasant, refreshed, tired, tense, harmony, 
rested); Body temperature (pleasant, blushing, warm, cold, perspiration, goose 
pimples); Breathing; Heart (Heart pounding chest pain, sense of weight, 
slower/fast hear beat, “blood boiling”); Muscles (trembling, tense, rested); 
Stomach (un/pleasant, “butterflies”, pressure/churning, feeling sick, hunger)] 
• What sounds could you hear? 
[Prompts: Traffic, birds, kids playing, people chatting, absolute silence]  
• Did you have any other sensations? [Prompts: taste; touch] 
• How long did it last? [Prompt: Under 5 min; Up to 1 hr; Up to a day; Several 
days and longer] 
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Thank you very much, that was really helpful! Are you ready to do the same for the 
next memory or would you like a short break? Ok. Let’s continue. [continue for 
remaining memories. Take breaks where necessary].   
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 Example stimuli derived from memory generation session described 
in Chapter 5. 
Female MDD Rejection Memory 
Its early afternoon in the summer. I am in my front room, it has pale green walls and 
a cast iron fireplace. I get an unexpected phone call from my boyfriend. He tells me 
the relationship is over. I say “can I come round and talk to you?”, but he says his 
son’s at his house so I can’t come round. It devastates me. I think you coward for 
hiding behind your disabled son. I am crying. I feel physically sick and run to the 
toilet. All my insides feel like jelly. He says “we could have gone on like this for a 
couple of years” and it makes it worse. I think “what I am supposed to make of that”? 
Like there is no point in dragging it out. I am shocked, crying and shaking. 
Male MDD Neutral Memory 
About a month ago I move to Cambridge from London with a man with a van. Its 
Sunday, the 14th of September. We leave early morning at 8.30. The van is a dark 
blue people carrier, and we have folded down all the seats in the back and opened up 
the boot. The driver is about 40, a little bit shorter, chubby, balding, and is wearing 
glasses. He seems to enjoy his job. I met him when I moved here a week before. I am 
wearing shorts and just a random loose T-shirt while we are packing. Just before we 
leave, I change into jeans and a proper shirt, white with lots of small black crosses 
on it. I sit down in the front passenger seat and we drive off. 
Female MDD Inclusion  
I'm at my leaving party at the Cambridge Blue with my team at the end of August. 
Mike gets up on to the table and does a speech. No one is listening at first. It’s funny 
and we are laughing at him. He talks about us being part of their community and how 
much we've enjoyed it. Our team cheers "waaay". Mike is tall with short brown hair 
and a large nose. We move on to another pub but there are still a lot of people. My 
boss Richard is buying everybody shots. Richard is French in his late forties with 
light brown hair. When we say our goodbyes, everyone gets upset that we are leaving, 
even Richard. My best friend Jude gets really upset and we hug for quite a while.  
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 Mean descriptives for non-composite affective ratings across memory 
generation sessions 
Measure Memory Type Time Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Positivity 
Neutral Experience 5.10 .26 4.58 5.62 Recall 5.17 .27 4.62 5.71 
Rejection Experience 1.19 .16 .86 1.52 Recall 2.50 .28 1.94 3.07 
Inclusion Experience 8.86 .13 8.61 9.11 Recall 8.48 .18 8.12 8.83 
Inclusion 
Neutral Experience 3.79 .31 3.16 4.41 Recall 3.48 .31 2.87 4.10 
Rejection Experience 1.44 .17 1.10 1.79 Recall 1.90 .25 1.39 2.40 
Inclusion Experience 8.82 .14 8.54 9.10 Recall 8.19 .20 7.80 8.58 
Distress 
Neutral Experience 1.50 .21 1.08 1.93 Recall .79 .13 .54 1.04 
Rejection Experience 8.52 .18 8.16 8.88 Recall 5.91 .25 5.41 6.41 
Inclusion Experience 1.24 .20 .83 1.65 Recall .81 .15 .52 1.10 
Rejection 
Neutral Experience .89 .18 .53 1.25 Recall .50 .11 .27 .72 
Rejection Experience 8.56 .15 8.26 8.86 Recall 6.20 .30 5.60 6.81 
Inclusion Experience .47 .11 .26 .69 Recall .50 .10 .29 .71 
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 (Chapter 4) 
 Descriptives and group comparison of social, affective and process 
measures in Chapter 4. 
            95% CI   
  Group  N  Mean  SD  SE  Lower Upper df p 
BAI  MDD  15 17.53 11.95 3.08 3.53 17.54 18.98 0.01* 
   Control  21 7.00 5.95 1.30  
BDI-II MDD  18 22.33 9.89 2.33 6.37 17.15 25.63 <.001** 
   Control  21 10.57 5.48 1.20  
DERS  MDD  18 105.72 20.42 4.81 15.22 42.89 36.80 <.001** 
   Control  21 76.67 22.20 4.84  
FFMQ  MDD  18 114.11 18.41 4.34 -25.58 -1.72 35.96 0.03* 
   Control  21 127.76 18.20 3.97  
IPSM  MDD  18 119.06 11.59 2.73 8.32 25.79 36.51 <.001** 
   Control  21 102.00 15.28 3.33  
ISQ  MDD  18 100.83 11.85 2.79 15.76 36.96 33.07 <.001** 
   Control  21 74.48 20.15 4.40  
PANAS  MDD  18 51.72 13.23 3.12 -4.62 10.73 30.60 0.42 
   Control  21 48.67 9.64 2.10  
SAIS-I  MDD  18 60.33 10.75 2.53 -12.74 2.93 36.87 0.21 
   Control  21 65.24 13.37 2.92  
SAIS-II  MDD  18 58.00 15.70 3.70 -2.65 17.98 36.29 0.14 
   Control  21 50.33 16.00 3.49  
SBS  MDD  18 33.78 9.06 2.14 5.01 16.45 35.14 <.001** 
   Control  21 23.05 8.43 1.84  
SCS  MDD  18 40.61 15.23 3.59 -32.18 -13.46 33.99 <.001** 
   Control  21 63.43 13.22 2.89  
SUIS  MDD  18 36.39 8.48 2.00 -10.09 1.15 36.47 0.12 
   Control  21 40.86 8.81 1.92  
Note: BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; DERS, Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scale; FFMQ, Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire; IPSM, Interpersonal 
Sensitivity Measure; ISQ, Involuntary Subordination Questionnaire; PANAS, Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale; SAIS-I/II, Strive to Avoid Inferiority Scale Part I and II; SBS, 
Submissive Behaviour Scale; SCS, Social Comparison Scale; SUIS, Spontaneous Use of 
Imagery Scale. All tests, variances of groups not assumed equal. * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.001. 
See Chapter 2 for details on measures. 
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 Affective ratings of session I versus session II  
We also sought to explore any potential differences as a function of group and 
memory type between the affective experience in response to recalling the personal 
memories within the initial memory-generation session (‘session I’) and the 
following week, in the fMRI scanning session (‘session II’) to ensure comparable 
saliency of memories across session. Results suggest that memories recalled across 
both sessions elicited comparable positive, negative and neutral affect as a function 
of memory type (Appendix 4.3); maintained its affective state across sessions, crucial 
to this paradigm (Appendix 4.4) and exhibited elevated mood in controls compared 
to MDD (Appendix 4.5). For interactions, see Appendix 4.6 and Appendix 4.7. 
Affective ratings at time of recall from the session I and during the fMRI session II 
were entered into an ANOVA with group (MDD/controls) as a between-group factor 
and memory type (rejection/inclusion/neutral) and time (session I/session II) as the 
within-group factor. Both memory type (x2=10.60, p=0.005) and the interaction 
between memory type and session (x2=16.53, p<0.001) violated Mauchly’s 
assumption of sphericity and are reported using Greenhouse-Geisser.  
Results revealed a significant main effect for memory type (F[1.57,53.35]= 265.33, 
p<0.001, ηp2=0.89). Planned comparisons of the main effect of memory type 
corrected using a Bonferroni adjustment, indicated that affective ratings (p<0.001) 
derived during rejection, neutral and inclusion memories differed significantly from 
each other, with greater positive mood in response to inclusion memories, compared 
to neutral (3.68±0.34) and rejection memories (10.75 ±0.57), which in turn resulted 
in most impaired positive mood relative to neutral (-7.07±0.49). There was also a 
main effect of group (F[1,34]= 7.14, p=0.01, ηp2=0.17), which in planned 
comparisons revealed significantly elevated mood in control participants compared 
to MDD (p=0.011) when collapsed across all memories and sessions. Further, there 
was a significant interaction between session and memory type (F[1.44,48.78]=5.84, 
p=0.01, ηp2=0.15), suggesting that while overall there was comparable saliency across 
sessions and memory types, rejection in particular revealed a slight decrease in 
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negative mood from session I to session II, while the reverse was observed for 
inclusion memories, which were rated as slightly less positive in the second session 
(see Appendix 5.9). However, importantly, there was no main effect for session type 
(F[1,34]=0.01, p=0.94, ηp2=0.00), interaction between session and group 
(F[1,34]=0.39, p=0.54, ηp2=.01), or interaction between memory type and group 
(F[2,34]=1.10, p=0.34, ηp2=.03) or three-way interaction (F[2,68]=0.46, p=0.64, 
ηp2=.01). 
 Mean affective ratings for memory type - session I & session II 
(Chapter 4) 
Memory 
Type Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Neutral 3.46 0.29 2.87 4.04 
Rejection -3.61 0.42 -4.47 -2.75 
Inclusion 7.14 0.31 6.52 7.77 
 
 Mean affective ratings for session – session I & session II (Chapter 4)  
Session Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Session I 2.32 0.20 1.92 2.72 
Session II 2.35 0.34 1.65 3.04 
 
 Mean affective ratings for group – session I & session II (Chapter 4) 
Group Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
MDD 1.77 .305 1.15 2.39 
Controls 2.89 .288 2.31 3.48 
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 Mean mood ratings for group and memory type - session I & II 
(Chapter 4) 
Group 
Memory 
Type Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
MDD 
 
Neutral 3.07 0.42 2.22 3.92 
Rejection -3.94 0.62 -5.19 -2.68 
Inclusion 6.18 0.45 5.27 7.08 
Controls 
 
Neutral 3.85 0.40 3.04 4.65 
Rejection -3.28 0.58 -4.46 -2.09 
Inclusion 8.11 0.42 7.25 8.96 
 Mean mood ratings for group, memory type and session - session I & 
II (Chapter 4) 
Group 
Memory 
Type Session Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
MDD Neutral Session I 3.02 0.44 2.12 3.92 
Session II 3.13 0.58 1.94 4.31 
Rejection Session I -4.46 0.70 -5.88 -3.04 
Session II -3.41 0.86 -5.17 -1.66 
Inclusion Session I 7.06 0.39 6.27 7.85 
Session II 5.29 0.70 3.87 6.72 
Controls Neutral Session I 3.49 0.42 2.64 4.34 
Session II 4.20 0.55 3.08 5.32 
Rejection Session I -3.69 0.66 -5.03 -2.34 
Session II -2.87 0.82 -4.53 -1.21 
Inclusion Session I 8.48 0.37 7.73 9.22 
Session II 7.74 0.66 6.39 9.09 
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 Mean mood ratings for memory type and session - session I & II 
(Chapter 4) 
Memory Type Session Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Neutral Session I 3.26 .31 2.64 3.87 
Session II 3.66 .41 2.85 4.48 
Rejection Session I -4.07 .48 -5.05 -3.10 
Session II -3.14 .60 -4.35 -1.93 
Inclusion Session I 7.77 .27 7.23 8.31 
Session II 6.52 .48 5.53 7.50 
 
 
 Mean vividness and intensity ratings for memory type and group in 
session II (Chapter 4) 
Measure  Memory Type Group Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Vividness 
Rejection 
MDD 8.14 1.13 15 
Control 8.06 1.22 16 
Total 8.10 1.16 31 
Neutral 
MDD 6.73 1.28 15 
Control 6.39 1.63 16 
Total 6.55 1.46 31 
Inclusion 
MDD 8.56 0.83 15 
Control 8.28 0.85 16 
Total 8.41 0.84 31 
Intensity 
Rejection 
MDD 8.29 0.97 15 
Control 8.03 1.10 16 
Total 8.16 1.03 31 
Neutral 
MDD 4.28 2.43 15 
Control 3.31 1.65 16 
Total 3.78 2.09 31 
Inclusion 
MDD 8.03 1.32 15 
Control 7.68 2.13 16 
Total 7.85 1.77 31 
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 One-sample T-tests in healthy controls (N=21) of brain regions 
significantly activated during silent imagery of autobiographical memories (Chapter 
4) 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score 
p-
value* 
Inclusion > Neutral 
  L Lingual Gyrus -18 -74  -4 175 4.36 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -50 -24  30  214 4.17 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  38 -26  38  160 4.07 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  24 -14  50  25 3.68 0 
  L Angular Gyrus -42 -54  26  35 3.53 0 
Rejection > Neutral 
  L 
Secondary Somatosensory 
Cortex -52 -26  24  700 4.92 0 
  R 
Secondary Somatosensory 
Cortex  50 -24  32  431 4.69 0 
  L 
Supplementary Motor 
Cortex -12  -8  56  103 4.02 0 
  L Caudate -22   2  18  47 3.92 0 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -48 -64   4  48 3.73 0 
Rejection & Inclusion > Neutral 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -52 -24  26  405 4.84 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  48 -24  32  392 4.71 0 
  L 
Supplementary Motor 
Cortex -12  -8  56  189 4.02 0 
  R Fusiform Gyrus  32 -40 -22  50 3.89 0 
  L Lingual Gyrus -16 -72  -4 104 3.84 0 
  L Caudate -22   0  18  47 3.68 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -34 -30  50  86 3.59 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -40 -54   2  51 3.42 0 
Abbreviations: R; Right, L; Left; Extent threshold: k = 20 voxels; * = p<0.001 uncorrected.  
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 One-sample T-tests in MDD (N=18) of brain regions significantly 
activated during silent imagery of autobiographical memories (Chapter 4) 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas MNI Coordinates (X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score 
p-
value* 
Inclusion > Neutral 
  L Anterior Insula -30   6  10  644 4.52 0 
  R/L Anterior Cingulate Gyrus   4  30  -2  69 4.46 0 
  R Superior Occipital Gyrus   6  30 -10    3.48 0 
  L Medial Frontal Gyrus  -2  54 -18  120 4.24 0 
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus  50 -48 -30  53 4.11 0 
  R Cerebellum  18 -64 -38  65 4.1 0 
  L Lingual Gyrus -12 -82  -8 431 4.05 0 
  L Fusiform Gyrus -32 -44 -22 37 3.92 0 
  L 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 
Medial Segment  -2  58  16  131 3.9 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -50 -24  50  635 3.85 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -30  14  28  27 3.83 0 
  L Anterior Cingulate Gyrus -10  42  12  134 3.8 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  46 -22  42  200 3.79 0 
  R Anterior Insula  28  16   8  416 3.78 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -52   4  36  169 3.77 0 
  R Superior Occipital Gyrus  16 -86  40  65 3.76 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  56  10  24  162 3.73 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  22 -48  54  26 3.65 0 
  R Middle Cingulate Gyrus   8  20  22  36 3.63 0 
  R Fusiform Gyrus  32 -46 -22  73 3.58 0 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -48 -22  -2 42 3.38 0 
  R Anterior Insula  36  -2  -2  21 3.35 0 
  R Lingual Gyrus   8 -74  -4  22 3.32 0 
Rejection > Neutral 
  R Precentral Gyrus  62   6  28  880 4.67 0 
  R Parietal Operculum  38 -30  26  200 4.4 0 
  L Anterior Insula -32  -4  12  525 4.24 0 
    Brain Stem   0 -42 -22  94 4.23 0 
  R Anterior Cingulate Gyrus   8  32  -4  143 4.16 0 
  R 
Orbital Part of the Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus  30  36  -2  23 4.01 0 
  R Anterior Insula  28  12 -14  51 3.92 0 
  R Cerebellum  10 -52 -16  516 3.85 0 
  R Thalamus  16 -20   0  248 3.73 0 
    Brain Stem   2 -26 -12  114 3.69 0 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  44 -28  -8  125 3.66 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Gyrus  -6 -12  34  22 3.63 0 
  L Lingual Gyrus  34 -72 -20  63 3.57 0 
  R Occipital Fusiform Gyrus -16  -8   8  95 3.56 0 
  L Thalamus   8  -4  -6  67 3.56 0 
  R Thalamus  -4 -78  -6  36 3.46 0 
  L Lingual Gyrus -10 -46  26    3.34 0 
  L Cerebellum -28 -78 -36 27 3.39 0 
  L Parietal Operculum -44 -28  16  21 3.33 0 
Rejection & Inclusion > Neutral 
  R Superior Occipital Gyrus  24 -84  12  482 4.66 0 
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  R Anterior Cingulate Gyrus   6  30  -2  175 4.53 0 
  R Brain Stem   4 -20 -10  144 4.42 0 
  L Anterior Insula -32   6  -6  1292 4.42 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -28 -30  38  502 4.11 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  62   8  28  1358 4.03 0 
  L Fusiform Gyrus -32 -44 -24 72 4 0 
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -42 -62  -6 270 3.98 0 
  R Cerebellum  18 -64 -36  86 3.97 0 
  L Gyrus Rectus  -4  54 -20  60 3.95 0 
    Brain Stem   2 -42 -24  92 3.94 0 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -40 -46  16  163 3.92 0 
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus  52 -62 -18  386 3.87 0 
  R Occipital Fusiform Gyrus  26 -76 -20  352 3.87 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  46 -22  42  358 3.86 0 
  L Lingual Gyrus -14 -64 -10 865 3.83 0 
  L Superior Occipital Gyrus -20 -90  12  182 3.78 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -30  12  30  31 3.75 0 
  L 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 
Medial Segment  -2  58  14  101 3.68 0 
  R Cuneus  10 -92  18  66 3.65 0 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -48 -22  -4 51 3.65 0 
  R Anterior Cingulate Gyrus   8  22  18  26 3.62 0 
  L Anterior Cingulate Gyrus -10  30  12  99 3.62 0 
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus  50 -48 -28  26 3.59 0 
  R Fusiform Gyrus  30 -48 -20  190 3.57 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  28 -50  56  29 3.57 0 
  R Thalamus  16  -8   8  44 3.51 0 
  L Central Operculum -44  -6  22  24 3.47 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  64  -6  22  25 3.45 0 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -34 -36  30  24 3.43 0 
Abbreviations: R; Right, L; Left; Extent threshold: k = 20 voxels; * = p<0.001 uncorrected.  
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 Two-sample T-tests of brain regions significantly activated during 
silent imagery of autobiographical memories (Chapter 4) 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score 
p-
value*  
MDD>Controls, Inclusion > Neutral 
  R Cerebellum  50 -48 -30 33 4.38 0   
  R Frontal Orbital Cortex  36  30  -4 484 4.63 0   
  R Frontal Pole  36  54  18 316 3.82 0   
  L Frontal Pole -36  52  18 62 3.77 0   
  R Frontal Pole  26  64  16 31 3.59 0   
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus  52 -62 -20 74 3.91 0   
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus  -50 -62 -22 39 3.62 0   
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -48  12   4 26 3.54 0   
  L Insular Cortex -32  16   6 315 3.79 0   
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -46  34  26 37 3.71 0   
  R Paracingulate Gyrus   2  26  42 57 3.44 0   
MDD>Controls, Rejection > Neutral 
  R Cerebellum 2 -44 -24 48 4.07 0   
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus  48  -8 -30 83 3.99 0   
  R Frontal Orbital Cortex / Inferior Temporal Gyrus  32  36   0 115 3.93 0   
  R Planum Polare / Heschl's Gyrus  50  -8  -6 30 3.43 0   
MDD>Controls, Rejection & Inclusion > Neutral 
  R Frontal Orbital Cortex  36  30  -4 262 4.33 0   
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus  38  30  46 203 3.76 0   
  R Frontal Pole  30  40  42 85 3.72 0   
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus  -50 -64 -22 27 3.66 0   
  R Frontal Pole  28  56  26 49 3.57 0   
  R Putamen  32   2  -8 27 3.4 0   
  R Posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus  54 -24 -12 22 3.38 0   
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus  52 -62 -20 25 3.32 0   
Abbreviations: R; Right, L; Left; Extent threshold: k = 20 voxels; * = p<0.001 uncorrected.   
Appendices 
 
355 
 
 ANOVA (MDD, controls) x memory type (neutral, inclusion, 
rejection) during silent and script imagery of autobiographical memories (Chapter 
4) 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas MNI Coordinates (X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score 
p-
value* 
Silent Imagery, Main Effect of Group, p<0.05, FEW 
  R Postcentral Gyrus 50  -4  16 58 5.55 <0.001 
  R Lingual Gyrus 6 -64   0 61 5.29 <0.001 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -50  -8  16 23 5.28 <0.001 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -16  -8  64 20 5 <0.001 
Script Imagery, Main Effect of Group, p<0.05, FEW 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus 56  -2 -16 43 5.96 <0.001 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 -24  -8 175 5.87 <0.001 
  R Hippocampus 16 -16 -24 262 5.73 <0.001 
  R Posterior Insula 40 -10 -16 55 5.42 <0.001 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule 22 -56  40 33 5.31 <0.001 
  L Hippocampus -36 -24 -18 38 5.26 <0.001 
Rejection>Neutral & Inclusion>Neutral, Controls & MDD*       
  R Postcentral Gyrus 50 -20 30 60 2.25 0.01 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -54 -24 32 87 1.99 0.02 
Rejection>Neutral & Inclusion>Neutral, Controls*       
  R Postcentral Gyrus 50 -20 30 60 2.28 0.01 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -56 -18 30 98 2.11 0.02 
Rejection>Neutral & Inclusion>Neutral, MDD*       
  R Putamen 30   4   8 1708 3.25 0.001 
  L Anterior Insula -34   0   8 1812 3.17 0.001 
  R Thalamus 18  -6  10 259 2.48 0.01 
  L Cerebellum -12 -28 -32 218 2.44 0.01 
  R Cerebellum 4 -48 -20 40 2.33 0.01 
  L Thalamus -14 -12  -4 181 2.32 0.01 
  L Anterior Cingulate Gyrus 0  32  24 939 2.27 0.01 
  L Putamen -16   6   4 31 2.23 0.01 
  R Lingual Gyrus 18 -44 -18 21 2.01 0.02 
  R Putamen 20   6  -2 22 1.91 0.03 
Rejection>Neutral & Inclusion>Neutral, MDD>Controls*,**  
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus  36  34  -4  27 2.49 0.01 
  R 
Middle Frontal 
Gyrus/Precentral Gyrus  54  12  42  98 2.44 0.01 
  R Anterior Insula  28  16 -14  84 2.31 0.01 
  L Anterior Insula -34  12 -12  84 2.17 0.02 
  R/L Anterior Cingulate Gyrus   2  34  22  131 1.93 0.03 
    Brain Stem  -4 -42 -24  22 1.91 0.03 
  L Anterior Insula -30  20   0  29 1.87 0.03 
Abbreviations: R; Right, L; Left; Extent threshold: k = 20 voxels;  
* = p<0.05, uncorrected. ** = inclusively masked by MDD conjunction of Rejection>Neutral 
& Inclusion>Neutral at p=0.05. 
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 (Chapter 5) 
 Descriptives and group comparison of social, affective and process 
measures (Chapter 5) 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% CI   
Lower Upper F[1,48] Sig. 
BAI 
Controls 27 3.02 0.68 1.62 4.42 37.73 <.001* 
MDD 23 17.46 2.42 12.44 22.49     
Total 50 9.66 1.55 6.55 12.78     
BDI 
Controls 27 3.48 0.76 1.91 5.05 114.3 <.001* 
MDD 23 25.09 2.00 20.94 29.23     
Total 50 13.42 1.83 9.74 17.10     
DERS 
Controls 27 67.43 3.77 59.68 75.19 55.30 <.001* 
MDD 23 113.52 5.05 103.04 123.99     
Total 50 88.63 4.48 79.62 97.64     
IPSM 
Controls 27 96.77 2.41 91.82 101.72 35.35 <.001* 
MDD 23 120.32 3.23 113.62 127.03     
Total 50 107.60 2.57 102.43 112.78     
ISQ 
Controls 27 70.08 2.38 65.19 74.97 70.89 <.001* 
MDD 23 105.23 3.56 97.85 112.61     
Total 50 86.25 3.24 79.74 92.76     
SAIS-I 
Controls 27 40.75 2.70 35.20 46.30 19.86 <.001* 
MDD 23 67.22 5.61 55.59 78.85     
Total 50 52.92 3.48 45.92 59.92     
SAIS-II 
Controls 27 42.10 2.63 36.68 47.52 17.29 <.001* 
MDD 23 63.19 4.55 53.76 72.62     
Total 50 51.80 2.92 45.94 57.66     
SBS 
Controls 27 21.27 1.82 17.52 25.01 18.68 <.001* 
MDD 23 34.44 2.52 29.21 39.66     
Total 50 27.32 1.77 23.76 30.88     
SCS 
Controls 27 62.25 2.31 57.50 66.99 41.00 <.001* 
MDD 23 39.49 2.73 33.82 45.17     
Total 50 51.78 2.39 46.98 56.58     
SUIS 
Controls 27 37.46 1.33 34.73 40.19 1.69 .200 
MDD 23 40.39 1.87 36.50 44.27     
Total 50 38.81 1.13 36.54 41.08     
Positive 
Affect 
Controls 27 33.15 1.51 30.05 36.25 25.93 <.001* 
MDD 23 22.02 1.58 18.75 25.28     
Total 50 28.03 1.34 25.34 30.72     
Negative 
Affect 
Controls 27 13.39 0.72 11.91 14.88 75.19 <.001* 
MDD 23 27.25 1.51 24.12 30.38     
Total 50 19.77 1.26 17.23 22.30     
Note: See Chapter 2 for details on measures. All tests, variances of groups assumed equal. 
*=p<0.001. 
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 One sample T-test in healthy control participants (N=21) of brain 
regions significantly activated during imagery of other’s memories (Chapter 5) 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score 
p-
value* 
Rejection > Neutral 
  R Angular Gyrus  44 -50  24  1043 4.85 0 
  L Precuneus   0 -54  44  520 4.62 0 
  L Angular Gyrus -60 -52  26  529 4.43 0 
  L Postcentral -64 -18  28  191 4.42 0 
  R 
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus, medial part   4  52  34  373 4.3 0 
  L Cerebelum -24 -78 -34 142 4.19 0 
  L Precentral -62   8  26  23 3.88 0 
  R 
Middle Temporal 
Gyrus  64 -16 -18  74 3.86 0 
  R Caudate  12  10  12  52 3.64 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  28  26  50  62 3.48 0 
  R SupraMarginal  58 -20  38  35 3.43 0 
Rejection > Inclusion 
  L Angular Gyrus -60 -60  30  515 5.72 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  60 -52  26  876 5.6 0 
  R 
Middle Temporal 
Gyrus  62 -22 -10  568 4.4 0 
  R Medial Frontal Gyrus  40  12  32  285 4.35 0 
  L 
Middle Temporal 
Gyrus -50 -30 -12 61 3.86 0 
  L Cerebelum -20 -90 -32 33 3.77 0 
Inclusion > Neutral 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -52 -28  40  3880 5.29 0 
  R Supramarginal Gyrus  56 -18  34  1616 4.41 0 
  R 
Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus   4  42   4  837 4.09 0 
  R 
Middle Cingulate 
Gyrus  12 -24  36  37 4.01 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  42 -56  22  193 3.86 0 
  R 
Middle Cingulate 
Gyrus  12  -4  40  311 3.81 0 
  R Precuneus  12 -44  66  145 3.8 0 
  R Precuneus  10 -60  30  630 3.77 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -60  10  28  81 3.75 0 
  L Parietal Operculum -38 -24  20  48 3.71 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  22  38  36  38 3.69 0 
  L Midde Frontal Gyrus -40  38  24  56 3.52 0 
  R Anterior Insula  44   0   6  37 3.5 0 
Inclusion > Rejection 
  R 
Superior Occipital 
Gyrus  20  -82  14  12855 4.92 0 
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  R Precentral Gyrus  36  -14  50  2126 4.48 0 
  L 
Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus  -4   42 -10  1240 4.31 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -36  -12  54  372 4.18 0 
  L Posterior Insula -34  -16  12  172 4.14 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -42   36  18  104 3.72 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -14   38  48  127 3.68 0 
  R Medial Orbital Gyrus  22   30 -16  49 3.66 0 
  R Posterior Insula  38   -6   2  28 3.51 0 
  R 
Superior Parietal 
Lobule  20  -62  52  73 3.47 0 
  L 
Posterior cingulate 
gyrus  -4  -32  34  26 3.33 0 
Neutral > Rejection 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars orbitalis -32 34 -14  50 3.45 0 
Neutral > Inclusion 
  R 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars triangularis 38 30  2  61 3.73 0 
Rejection & Inclusion > Neutral 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -64 -22  36  956 5.08 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  44 -50  24  666 4.4 0 
  R 
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus, medial part   6  48  32  615 4.33 0 
  R Precuneus   2 -58  42  559 4.19 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -60  10  26  113 4.17 0 
  R Supramarginal Gyrus  58 -20  38  713 4.17 0 
  L Cerebellum -24 -80 -32 133 4.16 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -28 -40  52  508 4.03 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  28  26  50  196 3.64 0 
  L Angular Gyrus -46 -60  30  53 3.63 0 
Neutral 
  L 
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus -58  -2 -12 6196 6.65 0 
  R 
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus  62 -10  -8  4637 6.06 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  58  -2  46  523 5.61 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -12  56  36  208 5 0 
  L 
Middle Temporal 
Gyrus -42 -56  20  566 4.84 0 
  R Cerebelum  26 -78 -36  186 4.37 0 
  R Hippocampus  26  -8 -18  752 4.36 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -54  -4  50  140 4.12 0 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars triangularis -54  26  10  123 4 0 
  R Calcarine  16 -54   8  73 3.8 0 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars orbitalis -42  32 -18  91 3.76 0 
  L Lingual -12 -54   4  51 3.57 0 
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Rejection 
  L 
Middle Temporal 
Gyrus -58 -20   0  9762 6.91 0 
  R 
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus  66 -12  -8  7625 5.58 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -10  54  38  719 5.42 0 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars triangularis -58  26   6  294 5.02 0 
  R Cerebellum  52   2  50  304 4.61 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -48   0  56  265 4.37 0 
  L Cerebellum -22 -82 -34 207 4.24 0 
  R Thalamus   6 -10   0  34 4.07 0 
  R 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars opercularis  62  22  20  59 3.93 0 
  R Fusiform  30 -34 -14  71 3.87 0 
  R 
Supplementary Motor 
Area  12   2  54  84 3.77 0 
  L Rectus  -2  30 -24  89 3.56 0 
  L Thalamus -12 -16   4  48 3.4 0 
Inclusion 
  L 
Middle Temporal 
Gyrus -58  -20   2  32267 7.25 0 
  L Rectus  -4   34 -20  710 5.53 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -12   54  38  821 5.49 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -34  -20  50  3756 5.06 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -60    8  28  448 4 0 
  R Cerebellum   8  -52 -40  20 3.88 0 
  R Calcarine  24 -104   2  134 3.86 0 
  R 
Superior Parietal 
Lobule  14  -44  64  25 3.4 0 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars orbitalis -42   34 -10  53 3.39 0 
  L Calcarine -16 -102  -4 24 3.22 0.001 
*p<0.001 uncorrected unless otherwise stated. 
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 One sample T-test in MDD participants (N=21) of brain regions 
significantly activated during imagery of other’s memories (Chapter 5) 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score 
p-
value* 
Rejection > Neutral 
  L Left Calcarine Cortex -14 -74  10  105 4.52 0 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  54 -32  -6  131 4.24 0 
  R Precuneus   6 -56  42  62 4.04 0 
  L Cerebellum -26 -80 -32 62 4.01 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  46 -56  32  176 3.91 0 
  R Inferior Temporal Lobe  54  10 -36  35 3.86 0 
  L Thalamus  -6   0  -4  74 3.68 0 
  L Angular Gyrus -42 -56  16  249 3.63 0 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  34  24  48  26 3.51 0 
Rejection > Inclusion 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  54 -34  -6  352 4.18 0 
  L Cerebellum -22 -78 -34 111 4.09 0 
  L Angular Gyrus -50 -54  28  184 3.94 0 
  R Precuneus   6 -58  42  42 3.79 0 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -56 -38  -2 82 3.53 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  56 -58  32  22 3.41 0 
Inclusion > Neutral 
  L SMC  -2  -4 56  237 4.41 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -40 -40 58  61 3.85 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -58  10 22  40 3.81 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -60 -18 32  45 3.43 0 
Inclusion > Rejection 
  L Anterior Insula -42   8 -12  486 4.74 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Cortex  -2 -26  30  569 4.57 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Cortex  -6  12  22  487 4.24 0 
  L Posterior Orbital Gyrus -26  34 -14  58 3.81 0 
  R Anterior Insula  38  14   4  137 3.76 0 
  R Precuneus  16 -70  44  42 3.67 0 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44  40   4  141 3.54 0 
  L Posterior Orbital Gyrus  28  34 -14  22 3.52 0 
Neutral > Rejection 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars 
orbitalis (p. o.) -24  32  -8  457 4.77 0 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus, p. o.  26  32 -14  148 4.46 0 
  R Anterior Insula  42  14  -4  465 4.26 0 
  R Occipital Lobe  28 -46  26  146 4.13 0 
  L Precuneus -18 -56  32  55 3.9 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Cortex  -4 -30  36  221 3.85 0 
  R Hippocampus  36 -36  -4  128 3.8 0 
  R Corpus Callosum  22  -2  34  39 3.74 0 
  L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -40  24  12  70 3.71 0 
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  L Middle Cingulate Cortex -14 -12  34  24 3.62 0 
  L Fusiform Gyrus -30 -50  -6 95 3.55 0 
  R Putamen  20  38  16  33 3.52 0 
  R Anterior Cingulate Cortex   6  30  24  22 3.35 0 
Neutral > Inclusion 
  R Anterior Hippocampus  38 -38 -10  95 4.39 0 
  L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -52  42 -12  29 4.34 0 
  L Calcarine -18 -56  14  88 3.86 0 
  R Precuneus  18 -50  16  23 3.4 0 
Rejection & Inclusion > Neutral 
  L Precentral Gyrus -60  10 26  31 4.37 0 
  L Superior Parietal Lobule -34 -46 70  175 4.03 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  54 -58 26  41 3.51 0 
Neutral 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus  60  -4   0  5383 6.05 0 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -48 -28  10  8387 5.94 0 
  R Hippocampus  26 -16 -18  436 4.7 0 
  L Calcarine -18 -50  10  90 4.26 0 
  L Rectus   0  38 -22  137 4.15 0 
  R Cerebellum  28 -80 -34  143 3.89 0 
  L 
Inferior Orbital Frontal 
Gyrus -46  28  -2  133 3.72 0 
  L 
Superior Medial Frontal 
Gyrus  -8  56  44  50 3.6 0 
  L Precentral -54   0  48  22 3.41 0 
  L Inferior Superior Cortex -32 -86  40  22 3.36 0 
Rejection 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -58 -14 -12 7121 6.37 0 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus  62  -6   0  4501 6.03 0 
  R Cerebellum  28 -82 -32  185 4.76 0 
  L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -46  34 -12  265 4.66 0 
  L Rectus  -2  48 -18  81 3.85 0 
  R Medial Frontal Gyrus  54 -74  20  255 3.83 0 
  L 
Superior Medial Frontal 
Gyrus  -8  56  44  39 3.81 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  58  -4  48  46 3.79 0 
  L Cerebellum -24 -78 -34 34 3.75 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -54  -2  48  117 3.7 0 
  L Parahippocampal Gyrus -28  -8 -26 34 3.65 0 
Inclusion 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus  56 -14   2  4441 6.49 0 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -58 -14 -10 7151 6.05 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  58  -4  48  133 4.53 0 
  R Hippocampus  26  -8 -22  129 4.13 0 
  L Rectus   0  36 -24  159 4.08 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -52  -2  46  88 3.92 0 
  L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -58  28   8  111 3.74 0 
  R Corpus Callosum   6   8  22  21 3.63 0 
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  L 
Superior Medial Frontal 
Gyrus -10  44  46  50 3.4 0 
*p<0.001 uncorrected unless otherwise stated. 
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 Two sample T-tests of brain regions significantly activated during 
imagery of others’ memories in healthy control (N=21) and MDD participants 
(N=21) (Chapter 5) 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score p-value* 
Controls > MDD, Rejection > Neutral 
  R Angular Gyrus 44 -50 22  27 3.78 0 
Controls > MDD, Rejection > Inclusion 
  L Anterior Insula -38 22  8  55 4.03 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  48  8 28  55 3.88 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Gyrus  -6 12 22  23 3.82 0 
MDD > Controls, Rejection > Inclusion 
  L Parietal Occipital Gyrus -18 -96 30  24 3.62 0 
Controls > MDD, Inclusion > Neutral         
  R Middle Occipital Gyrus 44 -72 22  62 3.52 0 
Controls > MDD, Rejection & Inclusion > Neutral       
  R Angular Gyrus 44 -50 22  67 4.18 0 
  R Anterior Cingulate Gyrus 16  48 14  130 3.78 0 
Controls > MDD, Neutral         
  R Supplementary Motor Cortex  12  -2  48  174 4.27 0 
  R Middle Cingulate Gyrus   4  12  34  78 4.01 0 
  L Anterior Insula -42  10 -16  91 3.81 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  46 -28  62  46 3.78 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -14 -32  64  28 3.71 0 
  R Middle Cingulate Gyrus  14 -18  40  37 3.44 0 
  L Hippocampus -28 -22 -10 20 3.35 0 
Controls > MDD, Rejection         
  L Hippocampus -26 -18  -6 999 4.82 0 
  R Middle Superior Frontal Gyrus   8  48  30  205 4.26 0 
  R Anterior Cingulate Gyrus   6  22  18  466 4.18 0 
  R Supplementary Motor Cortex  16  -2  48  752 4.17 0 
  R Anterior Insula  36  14   4  314 4.06 0 
  R Posterior Insula  34  -6  -8  181 4.03 0 
  R Cerebellum  10 -26 -32  131 3.94 0 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -50 -42  34  87 3.85 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Gyrus -12  -8  44  73 3.63 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -26 -30  48  91 3.6 0 
  R Precuneus  12 -50  58  35 3.58 0 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -32 -38  34  38 3.57 0 
  L Brain Stem -10 -24 -38 35 3.54 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  34 -72  48  26 3.48 0 
  R Anterior Insula  36  16 -16  26 3.48 0 
  R Supramarginal Gyrus  60 -42  38  36 3.45 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -34 -18  44  69 3.39 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  54  12  30  53 3.36 0 
Controls > MDD, Inclusion         
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  R Posterior Insula  34  -6  -8  413 4.49 0 
  L Hippocampus  -26 -22  -6 423 4.35 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -12   8  58  86 4.14 0 
  R Accumbens Area  10  18  -4  102 4.14 0 
  R Middle Cingulate Gyrus   8 -26  44  610 3.99 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus  -42  42  18  161 3.97 0 
  L Lateral Orbital Gyrus -32  38 -18  112 3.89 0 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -42 -44  38  198 3.86 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -28 -24  56  327 3.75 0 
  L Precuneus -10 -56  56  67 3.72 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  10  52  24  67 3.7 0 
  L Occipital Fusiform Gyrus -22 -70 -22 109 3.69 0 
  L Caudate -14  22  -6  35 3.66 0 
  L Precuneus -18 -68  24  54 3.63 0 
  R Supplementary Motor Cortex  10   0  50  64 3.61 0 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus  32   0  42  34 3.59 0 
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -52 -64  -8 31 3.51 0 
  L Anterior Insula -38   6 -18  79 3.49 0 
  R Cerebellum  32 -42 -34  33 3.44 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  18 -56  68  33 3.44 0 
*p<0.001 uncorrected unless otherwise stated 
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 ANOVA (Group: MDD, controls) x memory type (neutral, inclusion, 
rejection) during imagery of others’ memories (Chapter 5) 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score p-value* 
Main Effect of Group, p <0.05, FEW 
  L Hippocampus -26 -20  -6 662 6.86 0 
  R Middle Cingulate Cortex   4  12  34  1439 6.7 0 
  R Anterior Insula  34  -6  -8  196 6.19 0 
  L Inferior Parietal Lobule -50 -42  40  224 5.81 0 
  L Superior Occipital Gyrus -18 -68  24  57 5.75 0 
  L Posterior Orbital Gyrus -28 -28  60  356 5.65 0 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars 
orbitalis -32  42 -16  39 5.33 0.001 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -14  12  56  21 5.24 0.004 
  R 
Frontal Superior Medial 
Gyrus   8  52  26  34 5.17 0.002 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  56 -52  12  24 5 0.003 
Main Effect of Valence 
  L Posterior Orbital Gyrus -32  34 -16  146 4.68 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  54 -52  28  175 4.19 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -62 -20  32  210 4.1 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  54 -22  42  112 3.83 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -32 -40  60  107 3.69 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  32 -40  62  105 3.57 0 
All valences all groups 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -60   -6 -10 40562   Inf 0 
  L Precentral -54   -2  48  2868   Inf 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -10   54  38  1075   Inf 0 
  L Rectus  -2   36 -22  657   Inf 0 
  R Cerebellum   6  -52 -40  129 6.25 0 
  R Superior Occipital Gyrus  20 -106   6  312 5.63 0 
  L Precuneus  -2  -54  36  120 4.1 0 
  L Middle Occipital Gyrus -16 -104   0  35 3.47 0 
Controls > MDD all valences, p <0.05, FEW 
  L Hippocampus -26 -20  -6 823 6.96 0 
  R Middle Cingulate Cortex   4  12  34  1768 6.8 0 
  R Putamen  34  -6  -8  299 6.3 0 
  R Insula  34  10   2  188 5.98 0 
  L Inferior Parietal Lobule -50 -42  40  280 5.92 0 
  L Superior Occipital Gyrus -18 -68  24  75 5.87 0 
  L Precentral -28 -28  60  515 5.77 0 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars 
orbitalis -32  42 -16  54 5.46 0.001 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -14  12  56  32 5.36 0.002 
  R 
Superior Frontal Gyrus, 
medial part   8  52  26  55 5.3 0.001 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  56 -52  12  51 5.13 0.001 
  R Precentral  40 -10  46  28 5.11 0.003 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  18 -72  50  32 4.93 0.002 
  R Calcarine  18 -70  10  20 4.92 0.006 
  L Calcarine  -4 -74  12  96 4.92 0 
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MDD > Controls all valences 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -62 -24  -4 331 4.88 0 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus  58 -12  -4  192 4.69 0 
  L Precuneus -20 -48  12  68 4.25 0 
  R Caudate   6   8  20  129 4.14 0 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  46 -24 -10  62 3.97 0 
  L Caudate -28  10  24  36 3.81 0 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -42 -30  10  45 3.72 0 
Neutral > Rejection all groups 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
orbital part -34  34 -16  165 4.71 0 
  R 
Superior Frontal Gyrus, 
orbital part  22  32 -16  35 3.72 0 
  L Precuneus -22 -58  18  31 3.62 0 
*p<0.001 uncorrected unless otherwise stated 
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 (Chapter 6) 
 Transcript of the speaker’s social rejection and social inclusion story  
Social Rejection Memory 
It was very very difficult for me because after my dad passed away I ended up joining 
a school. And I joined a school a year into when everyone else had already been 
there. Everyone already had their preformulated friendship groups and I found it very 
very hard. My best friend was in the other half of the year and I begged and begged 
to be put in the same half of the year with her and all of her friends. And the school 
wouldn’t let me because they told me that the other half was already too full, but I 
knew that wasn’t true because other people who joined the school after me went into 
that year. And I couldn’t understand why they wouldn’t let me join the same year. 
And so, I stayed in my friendship group or lack thereof and ended up getting teased 
because everyone already had their friendship groups. And every lunchtime and 
every break time I hung around with my best friend and those friendship groups. And 
it was really hard cause I was really popular on that side of the year but really not 
on my own. I didn’t really know what else I could do to try and fit in better with my 
class but they just weren’t very inclusive. So I began to talk in class. Things were 
hard for me anyway, because things weren’t easy at home. So I wasn’t sleeping very 
well and I began to talk more and then the teachers thought I was a bit of a 
troublemaker and used to put me in detention. And that was really hard because it 
meant that the time that I was socializing with my friends in the other half of the year, 
I was in these detentions, which used to take up most of my break time. And it meant 
that a large part of my school experience was very difficult for me. Because I didn’t 
really feel included, I didn’t really have friends that I wanted around me. And then I 
began to make some friends towards the latter end of my middle school experience. 
But it was really hard, because there’s nothing worse than being surrounded by 
people who you don’t really like very much and you know that there are other people 
who you really like and you don’t have contact with. I felt that the school wasn’t 
listening to me and that it was really unfair that ‘why were they allowing other people 
to be amongst their friends’ and not allowing me to be amongst mine. And I could see 
how happy my friends were and my best friend and they all would hang around 
together. And have group stories and exchange notes during lessons and I couldn’t 
be a part of that. And sure I tried to kinda get involved in that and I’d send notes in 
between that they’d open up in their lessons, but it still meant that you’d miss all the 
inside stories and even when it came to middle school romances, which are obviously 
not much now that you look back but they all didn’t really happen in my half of the 
year. It was really fragmented. It was like I was living two lives. In one side I was this 
popular girl and in the other side I wasn’t very well liked. So I just continued to try 
and fit in amongst my year and continued to try and hang around with the friends I 
had to make in the half I was forced to be in. And they were friends of circumstance 
really, because they all thought I was a bit of a trouble maker because I was talking. 
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And I wasn’t sleeping very much at home, so they put me with a lot of the 
troublemakers and I didn’t really see eye to eye with them. I didn’t really want to be 
naughty. I just wanted to fit in. And being amongst those people the way to fit in was 
to be even worse. So it was just the worst thing they could have done. And when they 
tried to rectify it by putting me with the children who were responding very well and 
always sitting through class it was even worse, because they were already friends 
and they weren’t liked by the other half of the year either, so I was ostracized even 
further by that half of the year. So I ended up feeling a bit lonely and it was horrible 
because not only was I struggling to catch up with the school work because I’d 
obviously had a year after the loss of my father, and things were really hard at home. 
But I also wasn’t being understood at school either. The teachers didn’t really 
understand that what I was going through and didn’t really ask me ever about my 
home life. They didn’t really ask me why I was tired in class. And they never really 
paid attention to me when I said that I wanted to swap classes and instead spent some 
time excluding me from seeing the people I wanted to see and the happiest moments 
I had during my time in middle school which was spending time with the people I did 
really like. 
Social Inclusion Memory 
One of my best experiences was my 25th birthday and I’d moved to London. I had set 
up a life for myself there and I had just come out of a really stressful job and then I 
took up this other job which was really stress free and I had loads of free time and I 
was spending it with all of my friends and I had so many friends. I had friends luckily 
from my work places, I had friends from school, and from my work place, and from 
all these different pools, from University and I remember I had all this free time to 
spend with them because I was single and because I was dating. I was having fun. I 
just met this new guy who I really liked. And I had this 25th birthday party and I had 
it at this really cool place in London. There were loads of people there and I couldn’t 
believe it when, so I invited like a 125 people and the area could only fit 100 and I 
had that amount of people come and it was crazy because it was spilling over into 
other areas of the nightclub. I had people come I hadn’t even seen for years from 
school and they all brought me presents and a guy I had been seeing had come along 
and I was introducing him to some of my friends. It was just really cool to be amongst 
all these people that I loved and really cared about and to introduce them to this guy 
I liked and I was really excited about. And they were telling him these things about 
me and I could tell they really cared about me. It was lovely. My sister was there and 
she was giving this speech and so were my friends. And they were all telling me about 
how happy they were to know me and how humbled they were and how many life 
experiences I’ve gone through and how I have come out the other side. And just these 
amazing things that were really fulfilling friendships and they are people I still know 
and love and that I still see to this day and I am constantly baffled by the amazing 
friendships I have and the amazing people I have around me and I’ve chosen to 
surround me and the family that I have. I have so much fun with them. We have many 
memories. And how things haven’t changed that much. That 25th birthday sure I had 
all this time to spend with everyone and I invested all this time to see people and it 
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meant that the turnout was bigger than anything I’d before and I knew that everyone 
was shocked at how many people had turned up and I was shocked by how many 
people had come just for me. It’s really flattering and lovely. And to know that some 
of those friendships, in fact most of them still stood the test of time even though know 
I’m in a really settled relationship - you know that guy I was seeing, he turned out to 
be my partner for five years. He was really you know... That night was what really 
made us. I knew he was really shy but he came and made an amazing effort with 
everyone I knew. And I was really proud to show him off and I was really proud to 
show off my friends and still really feel that way. I guess it’s one of those things where 
you look back on everything that’s changed and who you are and you can be nothing 
but proud of the decisions you’ve made and the love that you conjure up for yourself. 
And that night has very happily been one of many that I’ve experienced that have 
allowed me to feel that same experience of belonging. And I can’t begin to explain 
how amazing that is that over and over again that you can have this sense of having 
made the right decisions and at the time I remember while I was in this really stressful 
job and having just come out of it. I had this freedom and crazy amazing ability to do 
what I wanted. But I was still obviously worried about where I was going to go, but I 
don’t think you ever lose those things. But having constant support networks, the 
people around you and are still with you and even on the 25th birthday some of my 
oldest friends who couldn’t make it, they were sending me all these messages about 
how they wanted to be there and they are people I still know to this day from way 
when I was 7 years old when I met my best friends. From those days to now. 
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 Brain activations of ISCs during social inclusion in MDD and 
controls, p<0.001, k=20, FEW  
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinate
s (X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels p-value* 
MDD  
  R Lingual Gyrus 20 -92 0 17400 0.18 
  L Inferior Occipital Gyrus  -24 -90 -4 17400 0.18 
  R Calcarine Gyrus 12 -70 14 17400 0.17 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -58 -12 2 1552 0.18 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -56 0 -16 1552 0.09 
  L Heschl’s Gyrus -38 -32 14 1552 0.05 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus 64 -4 0 2744 0.15 
  R Medial Temporal Pole 32 8 -34 2744 0.12 
  R Medial Temporal Pole 56 10 -18 2744 0.07 
  L Frontal Pole -8 70 -14 52 0.11 
  L Frontal Pole -6 58 -20 90 0.09 
  R Nucleus Accumbens -12 12 -12 139 0.09 
  L Medial Temporal Pole -28 12 -34 191 0.09 
  R Superior Orbital Gyrus 12 56 -12 69 0.08 
  R Cerebellum (Crus 1) 56 -66 -32 23 0.08 
  L Cerebellum (IX)  -20 -56 -40 79 0.08 
  L ACC -6 30 -8 38 0.07 
  R Cerebellum (VII) 42 -52 -38 28 0.07 
  R Middle Occipital Gyrus 52 -74 30 21 0.06 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus 50 12 56 62 0.06 
  C Vermis (8) 4 -68 -30 42 0.06 
  L Middle Orbital Gyrus -34 52 2 51 0.06 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis 46 16 32 51 0.06 
  R Lingual Gyrus 20 -62 -2 17400 0.05 
  R Lateral Superior Occipital Cortex 30 -74 22 17400 0.06 
  L Cerebellum (VI)  -20 -68 -10 17400 0.06 
Controls  
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -54 -14 2 5662 0.22 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -54 0 -16 5662 0.13 
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -40 4 -32 5662 0.09 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus 68 -22 4 22586 0.21 
  R Lingual Gyrus 22 -92 -2 22586 0.17 
  L Lingual Gyrus  -16 -92 -6 22586 0.17 
  R Frontal Pole 6 62 -14 164 0.11 
  L Cerebellum (Crus 2)  -20 -78 -34 623 0.10 
  L Cerebellum (VI)  -26 -60 -24 623 0.06 
  R Cerebellum (Crus 1) 36 -52 -28 1004 0.10 
  R Cerebellum (Crus 2) 28 -74 -34 1004 0.09 
  R Subgenual PFC 12 30 -10 217 0.08 
  L Cerebellum (Crus 1)  -44 -64 -28 67 0.07 
Appendices 
 
372 
 
  L Fusiform Gyrus  -36 -50 -4 172 0.07 
  R Fusiform Gyrus 40 -44 -6 48 0.07 
  R Cerebellum  -34 -54 -36 81 0.07 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -62 -32 46 43 0.07 
  L Cerebellum (X)  -22 -42 -38 81 0.06 
  R Cerebellum (X) 8 -6 6 73 0.06 
  C Vermis (9) 2 -62 -34 40 0.06 
  L Anterior Insula -28 24 -2 77 0.06 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus 54 -48 22 22586 0.05 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis 42 32 32 22586 0.05 
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 Brain activations of ISCs during social rejection in MDD and 
controls, p<0.001, k=20, FEW  
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels p-value* 
MDD  
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -56 -14 2 64738 0.391 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus 64 -8 2 64738 0.322 
  R Medial Temporal Pole 38 12 -34 64738 0.257 
  R Frontal Pole 52 42 28 189 0.100 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus 36 46 40 189 0.056 
  R Superior Orbital Gyrus 20 20 -16 97 0.099 
  L Superior Orbital Gyrus -20 32 -8 95 0.091 
  L Precentral Gyrus -54 -8 52 81 0.076 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus 50 50 12 78 0.070 
  L Frontal Medial Cortex 2 50 -14 47 0.059 
  R Frontal Pole 38 60 -2 35 0.057 
  R Anterior Insula 34 26 0 21 0.055 
  R Fusiform Gyrus 30 -72 4 64738 0.051 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus 40 -38 0 64738 0.051 
  R Superior Occipital Gyrus 28 -76 24 64738 0.051 
Controls           
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -58 -16 4 49316 0.299 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus 62 -8 4 49316 0.284 
  R Medial Temporal Pole 48 8 -34 49316 0.184 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -64 -10 34 32 0.108 
  L Frontal Pole -10 66 -18 234 0.106 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis 40 14 34 4327 0.104 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus 40 34 40 4327 0.094 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars orbitalis 36 28 2 4327 0.092 
  R Rectal Gyrus 8 14 -14 430 0.098 
  L Superior Orbital Gyrus -12 22 -16 430 0.081 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -30 52 12 1816 0.093 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -34 34 38 1816 0.089 
  L ACC -12 44 4 1816 0.061 
  L Frontal Pole -20 68 4 134 0.087 
  R PCC 2 -26 28 308 0.084 
  R Precentral Gyrus 44 -22 68 92 0.080 
  R Frontal Pole -6 64 38 139 0.076 
  R Rectal Gyrus 10 30 -16 47 0.075 
  L Precentral Gyrus -48 2 52 289 0.073 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -28 16 58 289 0.052 
  R Superior Medial Gyrus 6 22 50 689 0.073 
  R ACC 8 38 22 689 0.060 
  L Insula  -32 22 6 162 0.072 
  R Frontal Pole 22 72 10 32 0.072 
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  L Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis -50 22 20 67 0.061 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -46 -46 14 49316 0.050 
  L Superior Parietal Lobule -22 -46 52 49316 0.050 
  L Supplementary Motor Cortex -12 -16 58 49316 0.051 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus 44 42 20 4327 0.055 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus, pars triangularis 46 26 34 4327 0.062 
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 Brain activations of ISCs during social rejection and inclusion 
between groups, p<0.001, k=20, FEW in Chapter 6 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-voxels p-value* 
MDD > Controls Rejection 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus 52 -78 8 185322 2.08 
  L Medial Temporal Pole 36 14 -34 185322 2.06 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -38 -48 68 185322 1.37 
Controls > MDD Rejection 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -66 -28 14 185322 -1.12 
  L Cerebellum (Crus 2) 48 -52 -42 185322 -1.03 
  L Temporal Pole -50 20 -24 185322 -1.01 
MDD>Controls Inclusion 
  L Middle Occipital Gyrus -36 -86 2 177386 1.28 
  L Middle Occipital Gyrus 42 -80 8 177386 1.24 
  L Calcarine Gyrus 24 -98 8 177386 1.14 
Controls>MDD Inclusion 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -62 -32 6 177386 -1.20 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus 72 -24 2 177386 -1.19 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus -58 -2 -6 177386 -1.07 
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 Brain activations of statistically significant greater self-reported 
positivity and negativity during inclusion and rejection in healthy controls 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score 
p-
value* 
Greater Positivity During Inclusion 
  L 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 
Medial Segment   0   60  38  203 7.04 0 
  L Temporal Pole -28   14 -34  59 6.71 0 
  R Hippocampus  22  -14 -10  158 6.51 0 
  R Precuneus  14  -50  10  126 6.39 0 
  R Lingual Gyrus /   8  -86 -12  526 6.28 0 
  R 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 
Medial Segment  18   52   6  705 6.17 0 
  L 
Middle Frontal Gyrus / 
Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus -18   34  26  70 5.97 0 
  L Middle Occipital Gyrus -26  -74  22  428 5.91 0 
  L 
Triangular Part of the 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus -38   34   6  35 5.84 0 
  R Cerebellum  42  -48 -44  47 5.82 0 
  L Fusiform Gyrus -42  -44 -20 190 5.77 0 
  L 
Thalamus Proper / 
Hippocampus -22  -20  -6 117 5.7 0 
  R Inferior Occipital Gyrus  28  -76   2  110 5.65 0 
  L Brain Stem  -2  -36 -22  90 5.63 0 
  R 
Superior Occipital 
Gyrus  26  -90  24  92 5.56 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -30   42   0  40 5.53 0 
  L 
Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus -24  -96 -20 101 5.49 0 
  R 
Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus   8  -36  38  60 5.13 0 
  L 
Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus -14  -32  30  81 4.86 0 
  R 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 
Medial Segment  18   38  26  34 4.82 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  28  -56  56  36 4.72 0 
  L 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 
Medial Segment / 
Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex -16   46  -4  29 4.61 0 
Greater Negativity During Inclusion       
  R Precuneus  18  -44  16  50293   Inf 0 
  L Frontal Pole -16   68  -2  757   Inf 0 
  L 
Basal Forebrain / 
Amygdala -12    2 -18  140   Inf 0 
  R Occipital Pole  12  -98  22  446 7.25 0 
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  R Inferior Occipital Gyrus  30  -82  -4  121 6.8 0 
  R Brain Stem  10  -18 -24  51 6.44 0 
  R Cerebellum  50  -70 -38  179 6.34 0 
  R Brain Stem  10  -28 -42  210 6.25 0 
  L 
Amygdala / 
Hippocampus -24   -4 -30 106 6.11 0 
  L 
Fusiform Gyrus / 
Parahippocampal Gyrus -24  -10 -40 115 5.94 0 
  R Thalamus Proper   6   -8  -6  61 5.74 0 
  R Inferior Occipital Gyrus  34  -96  -6  43 5.09 0 
  R Temporal Pole  36   22 -24  32 4.85 0 
  L Parahippocampal Gyrus -14  -22 -18 34 4.51 0 
  L Precuneus  -6  -60  16  38 4.47 0 
  R/L Brain Stem   2  -34  -4  34 4.41 0 
  L Thalamus Proper  -6   -6  -2  20 4.29 0 
  R Thalamus Proper  20  -12  10  30 4.13 0 
Greater Positivity During Rejection       
  R Precentral Gyrus  46   -6  62  14553   Inf 0 
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus  46  -44 -28  433   Inf 0 
  L 
Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus -16   48  -4  3398   Inf 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Gyrus  -6   -6  42  1649 7.62 0 
  R Occipital Pole  22  -96   6  497 7.36 0 
  R Medial Orbital Gyrus  24   36 -14  437 7.02 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -34   36  18  73 6.43 0 
  L Temporal Pole -36    2 -42  169 6 0 
  R Hippocampus  38  -18 -10  44 5.82 0 
  R Brain Stem  18  -22 -36  45 5.8 0 
  L 
Angular Gyrus / 
Supramarginal Gyrus -60  -62  30  32 5.34 0 
  L Inferior Occipital Gyrus -34  -88   6  96 5.11 0 
  R 
Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus / Precentral Gyrus   2  -30  46  63 5.09 0 
  R Inferior Occipital Gyrus  28  -82   4  22 5.08 0 
  L Subcallosal Area  -4   10 -18  53 4.94 0 
  R 
Triangular Part of the 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  50   38  12  61 4.94 0 
  L Temporal Pole -38   18 -38  21 4.81 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -28   30  42  108 4.81 0 
  R 
Postcentral Gyrus 
Medial Segment   8  -40  58  50 4.53 0 
  L Frontal Pole -24   68   6  61 4.41 0 
Greater Negativity During Rejection       
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -40   20  22  610   Inf 0 
  L Frontal Pole  -4   64  -8  486 7.54 0 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus  32   10  26  692 7.48 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  30  -48  48  609 7.25 0 
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -56  -60 -20 158 6.75 0 
  R Thalamus Proper  24  -28  -4  152 6.61 0 
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  L 
Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus -10   30   2  234 6.58 0 
  L Anterior Insula -32   20  -6  50 6.27 0 
  L Occipital Pole  -4 -100 -10  80 6.15 0 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -38  -36  40  478 6.14 0 
  L 
Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus  -6   20 -16  121 6.03 0 
  R Cerebellum  50  -70 -32  71 5.9 0 
  L Middle Occipital Gyrus -44  -84  26  45 5.8 0 
  L 
Superior Parietal Lobule 
/ Angular Gyrus -30  -64  26  507 5.77 0 
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -44  -24 -30 142 5.75 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  10   66  28  25 5.72 0 
  L 
Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus  -4  -48  10  78 5.55 0 
  L Cerebellum -28  -68 -34 57 5.36 0 
  R Anterior Insula  38   22  -8  50 5.35 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -26    2  64  32 5.35 0 
  R 
Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus  28  -66  -8  34 5.28 0 
  L Brain Stem  -6  -20 -10  58 5.26 0 
  L 
Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus -48  -72 -22 26 5.24 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -20   40  20  30 5.17 0 
  R Cerebellum   8  -78 -30  260 5.16 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus  -6   40  54  21 5.12 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  50  -60  48  21 4.99 0 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus  30   10  62  21 4.89 0 
  R Fusiform Gyrus  36  -18 -34  40 4.83 0 
  R Precuneus  16  -68  20  30 4.83 0 
  R Middle Occipital Gyrus  42  -66  20  44 4.78 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  62  -46  22  36 4.72 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  22   60  28  22 4.59 0 
  L Hippocampus -26  -42  -2 26 4.56 0 
  L Middle Occipital Gyrus -48  -82  12  20 4.37 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -42    6  54  24 4.3 0 
  R Cerebellum  22  -64 -40  21 4.23 0 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -20   36  50  28 4.22 0 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  66  -28 -16  25 4.16 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  56  -60  34  33 4.13 0 
  R Lingual Gyrus   8  -44  -6  36 3.83 0 
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 Brain activations of statistically significant greater self-reported 
positivity and negativity during inclusion and rejection in MDD, p<0.001, k=20 
Contrast L/R MNI Structural Atlas 
MNI 
Coordinates 
(X,Y,Z) 
k-
voxels 
z-
score 
p-
value* 
Greater Positivity During Inclusion 
  R Supramarginal Gyrus   48 -44  40  382 5.97 0 
  L Cerebellum -20 -36 -46 81 5.95 0 
  L 
Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus  -4 -32  44  358 5.85 0 
  R Middle Temporal Gyrus  68 -30 -14  47 5.79 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  18  20  62  451 5.72 0 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -46 -46  -2 260 5.71 0 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -62 -38  20  66 5.66 0 
  R Anterior Insula  26  34   2  284 5.54 0 
  R Amygdala   30   0 -28  42 5.54 0 
  R 
Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus   8  42   4  141 5.37 0 
  L Temporal Pole -56   6 -30  32 5.25 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -66 -16  18  55 5.22 0 
  R Cerebellum  46 -50 -40  48 5.12 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  64   0  18  81 5.07 0 
  L Cerebellum -46 -52 -36 78 4.87 0 
  L Supramarginal Gyrus -50 -48  46  58 4.87 0 
  L Hippocampus -34 -16 -22 26 4.77 0 
  R Medial Orbital Gyrus  22  32 -20  36 4.69 0 
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus  56 -26 -24  23 4.55 0 
  L Precuneus  -8 -78  46  40 4.43 0 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus  28  40  28  28 4.34 0 
  L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -48  14  16  22 4.03 0 
MDD Greater Negativity During Inclusion          
  L Postcentral Gyrus -40  -34  64  606 6.21 0 
  L 
Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus -28  -76  -2 2249 6.12 0 
  L 
Precentral Gyrus Medial 
Segment  -6  -26  68  28 5.95 0 
  L Medial Orbital Gyrus -16   40 -12  54 5.94 0 
  L Posterior Orbital Gyrus -36   30 -22  241 5.65 0 
  L Gyrus Rectus  -8   50 -18  40 5.54 0 
  R 
Superior Occipital 
Gyrus  22  -74  34  20 5.44 0 
  R 
Superior Occipital 
Gyrus  20  -88  30  57 5.23 0 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -64  -54  -8 26 5.09 0 
  R Caudate  22    2  18  57 5.08 0 
  R Occipital Pole   8  -96  16  60 4.88 0 
  L Ventral DC  -2    2  -4  119 4.82 0 
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  R 
Superior Occipital 
Gyrus  30  -90  18  25 4.7 0 
  L Medial Orbital Gyrus -14   10 -24  20 4.69 0 
  R Middle Occipital Gyrus  50  -78  14  21 4.53 0 
  L Precentral Gyrus -28  -16  54  29 4.52 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -30   54  32  36 4.47 0 
  L 
Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus  -6  -48  26  28 4.46 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Gyrus   0  -24  20  30 4.39 0 
  L Caudate -14   20   8  23 4.38 0 
  R Middle Occipital Gyrus  48  -78  28  23 4.35 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  28  -52  70  20 4.34 0 
  L Angular Gyrus -40  -68  36  50 4.25 0 
Greater Positivity During Rejection         
  L Parietal Operculum -38 -36  22  1333   Inf 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -34  44   8  6709 7.23 0 
  L Cerebellum  -2 -72 -32  69 7.01 0 
  R Cerebellum  16 -56 -42  84 6.83 0 
  R Angular Gyrus   64 -50  32  120 6.82 0 
  L Middle Cingulate Gyrus  -2  -8  26  222 6.71 0 
  R Angular Gyrus   52 -54  54  77 6.38 0 
  R Middle Occipital Gyrus  42 -74  18  37 5.97 0 
  R Calcarine Cortex  28 -58   6  45 5.93 0 
  R Calcarine Cortex   8 -70  12  37 5.8 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  42 -70  44  256 5.79 0 
  L Brain Stem -12 -18 -30 52 5.63 0 
  L 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars opercularis -46  20  10  28 5.48 0 
  R 
Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus  34 -66 -18  66 5.47 0 
  L Middle Occipital Gyrus -32 -86  24  41 5.39 0 
  R Cerebellum  14 -44 -44  28 5.37 0 
  L Middle Frontal Gyrus -32   2  56  41 5.36 0 
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -48 -40 -22 37 5.34 0 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus  40  16  52  42 5.33 0 
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -50 -22 -22 21 5.1 0 
  L Cerebellum -24 -46 -42 43 5.08 0 
  R Entorhinal Area  26   6 -20  92 5.08 0 
  L Cerebellum -32 -34 -32 27 5.07 0 
  L Caudate -10  10  22  52 4.95 0 
  R Inferior Occipital Gyrus  42 -76   2  28 4.95 0 
  R Caudate  12  12  18  31 4.92 0 
  R Parietal Operculum  36 -22  18  35 4.91 0 
  L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -48   0 -38  74 4.87 0 
  L 
Planum Polare/Posterior 
Insula -44  -2 -10 97 4.76 0 
  R Precentral Gyrus  52   0  42  33 4.67 0 
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  R 
Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus  32 -88 -14  22 4.66 0 
  R Fusiform Gyrus  38 -48  -6  23 4.44 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  12 -56  70  34 4.42 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  24  24  60  20 4.32 0 
  L SMC  -2  26  50  20 4.27 0 
  R STG  60   2 -10  22 3.85 0 
Greater Negativity During Rejection         
  R Middle Cingulate Gyrus  18   12  32  723 7.55 0 
  R Brain Stem   6  -22 -46  199 6.82 0 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -58  -20  52  480 6.48 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  24   64  18  117 6.28 0 
  L Precuneus -12  -64  22  395 6.27 0 
  L Precuneus -18  -44  54  264 6.26 0 
  R Fusiform Gyrus  44  -14 -26  120 6.25 0 
  R 
Triangular Part of the 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  52   38  -4  211 6.22 0 
  R 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 
Medial Segment   2   34  50  104 5.93 0 
  L Precuneus -20  -50  36  29 5.92 0 
  L Brain Stem -10  -42 -48 50 5.82 0 
  R 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
pars opercularis  44   12  14  287 5.78 0 
  R Anterior Orbital Gyrus  30   40  -6  40 5.75 0 
  R Hippocampus  36  -36  -6  79 5.68 0 
  L Lingual Gyrus -24  -44 -10 25 5.63 0 
  L Cerebellum -10  -90 -36 20 5.62 0 
  L Cerebellum -32  -88 -22 37 5.49 0 
  R Caudate  18   28  14  49 5.47 0 
  L Middle Temporal Gyrus -46  -62  -2 174 5.44 0 
  R Lingual Gyrus   4  -90 -16  59 5.38 0 
  R Medial Frontal Cortex   8   24 -16  39 5.33 0 
  L Thalamus Proper   0  -16   8  33 5.26 0 
  R 
Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus  20  -46  32  137 5.24 0 
  L Cerebellum -46  -72 -38 109 5.18 0 
  R Postcentral Gyrus  46  -22  52  128 5.14 0 
  L Angular Gyrus -26  -66  52  39 5.11 0 
  R Angular Gyrus  40  -42  24  39 4.96 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  34  -58  58  83 4.96 0 
  L 
Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus -22  -92  -8 28 4.88 0 
  R Parahippocampal Gyrus  24   -8 -34  30 4.87 0 
  L Medial Orbital Gyrus -16   22 -14  23 4.83 0 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus  24    2  64  46 4.8 0 
  R Lingual Gyrus   4  -66   4  39 4.76 0 
  R Superior Parietal Lobule  36  -44  48  41 4.54 0 
  R 
Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus   4  -40  24  23 4.41 0 
